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PREFACE 
The NASA Langley Research Center has been developing reliability modeling 
technology for over a decade (ref. 1). The culmination of that research is 
embodied in the Computer-Aided Reliability Estimation computer program, third 
generation (CARE III). The CARE III model design was codeveloped by 
Dr. Jack J. Stiffler, formerly of the Raytheon Company, and 
Salvatore J. Bavuso of the NASA Langley Research Center. Dr. Stiffler 
designed and implemented the original CARE III mathematical model and 
Lynn A. Bryant of the Raytheon Company designed and implemented the computer 
code (ref. 2). I (S. J. Bavuso) implemented the original CARE III 
specification and participated in its long term design and implementation. 
This version of CARE III was designated as version 3 and was delivered to 
NASA as a proof-of-concept implementation. 
The Boeing Computer Services Company of Seattle, Washington, validated the 
CARE III model and computer code. In the process, BCS made major 
modifications to the CARE III model and code bringing CARE III to production 
status code for the CDC CYBER 170 series computers under Fortran IV. The 
validated upgraded version is called version 4 and was available through 
NASA's software dissemination center, COSMIC, as release 1 beginning August 
1984. Subsequently, version 4 was further upgraded to version 5 and is.now 
implemented in ANSI standard Fortran 77. Version 5 compiles and executes on 
the VAX-l1/700 series computer~ (VAX-11 Fortran compiler), the CYBER 170 
series computers (CDC Fortran V compiler), and should be compatible with 
other computers that will compile ANSI standard Fortran 77. 
Version 5 (release 2) has been enhanced significantly and includes the 
following modifications: The input program module CAREIN was completely 
rewritten to include extensive input data checking and more friendly error 
messages. The fault tree algorithm was improved to increase long mission 
time computation accuracy and was made more autonomous with the deletion of 
the KWT control parameter. The CARE3 program module was modified to include 
a variable time step integrator as a user option for improving the 
computational accuracy of p(tl~) and Q(tl~) functions. 
i 
This document is structured for the reliability engineering community and is 
specifically targeted toward the fault-tolerant ultrareliable system 
application. Although the initial CARE III application was directed at the 
digital aircraft flight control systems application, the generality of the 
CARE III model makes it easily applicable to a variety of highly reliable 
systems. The document is organized into two main parts: the main body and 
the appendix. The beginner will undoubtedly need to look at both parts. 
More experienced users will usually work with only the first part and 
particularly section 3 which takes the form of a quick-look reference manual. 
-Sections 1 and 2 provide a brief overview of the model for those users who 
are attempting to quickly determine if CARE III is applicable to their 
application. Section 4 addresses CARE III output and its interpretation. 
The appendixes provide backup information particularly for first time users. 
Appendix A covers machine dependency information and CARE III generated error 
and warning message. Appendixes 8 thru F provide additional information on 
some important CARE III subtleties, and appendix G contains example problems 
and some CARE III runs. Additional examples appear in reference 3 which 
contains eight example problems, two of which appear in Appendix G.2 in this 
document. 
A substantial effort was made to minimize the use of jargon, peculiar to 
experts involved in fault-tolerant research, in order to make this document 
more descriptive and, hence, intelligible to newcomers. An example 
illustrating the need for clarity of terminology involves the many uses of 
the word "coverage" in the literature. In order to minimize confusion over 
the use of this term, CARE· III uses this term to generically mean the 
"covering" of a fault. In the CARE III sense, coverage is an output of 
CARE III rather than an input to the math model. Therefore, CARE III differs 
significantly from many reliability modeling approaches which require 
coverage probabilities as inputs. The difficulty with using coverage as an 
input is that the coverage probability derivation is left to the ingenuity 
(more often, engineering guesswork) of the analyst. CARE III provides a 
fault-handling model that computes coverage based on system measurable (or 
estimative) parameters - still a nontrivial task. 
ii 
The use of the term coverage is minimally applied in this document to 
identify mathematical expressions. Instead, more descriptive terminology 
replaces it. Unfortunately, the developers of CARE III chose to use a freer 
style of coverage terminology which may present some difficulty to readers of 
references 2, 4, and 6. These reports describe the CARE III mathematical 
model. The authors feel that the inconsistency should be only a minor 
irritation to those who find it necessary to read the mathematical 
description documents. 
A final word about this document ••• The authors feel that it represents a 
good introduction to CARE III; however, we have every expectation of 
improving the guide and offering the user community the opportunity to aid in 
its improvement. 
Many individuals listed on the next page have made important contributions to 
the development of CARE III. I wish to acknowledge the main contributors and 
personally thank all the contributors for their part in bringing CARE III to 
its present status. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND CARE III APPLICABILITY 
The CARE III program makes a major departure from many existing programs in 
that it was designed from the beginning to be a computer-aided engineering 
tool, and as such, incorporates the papular fault tree notatian and structural 
fault-handling models with input parameters that can model many system 
redundancy management strategies. The CARE III mathematical model has been 
extensively scrutinized and documented. The program code was extensively 
tested and refined to be largely error free, and when errors do crop up (user 
ar program generated), user-friendly aides or messages are presented. 
The program is written in ANSI standard Fortran 77 code in single precision and 
will port to· many different computers. The CARE III program can be executed 
either interactively or as a batch jab. An interactive menu driven prampting 
program which aides the user in formatting the CARE III input data is available 
for execution on the Digital Equipment Corporation VAX-11/700 series computers 
under the VMS operating system. 
CARE III predicts the unreliability of highly reliable reconfigurable fault-
tolerant systems that include multiple digital computers ar computer systems. 
A key feature of the CARE III capability is its ability to madel very large 
systems that incorporate some form of system redundancy management strategy 
which controls hardware/saftware resources in the presence of multiple 
faults/errars of variaus types, i.e., permanent, transient, intermittent 
1 hardware faults/software errars. The model in CARE III that accounts for the 
1. The definitions of fault, error, and failure as applied to. fault-tolerant 
systems do not have an industry standard interpretation. Even when a 
concerted attempt is made to use these terms consistently within a given 
document, exceptions crop up in their meaning because of their lang term 
usage. Unfortunately, that situation applies to. this document as well. The 
following definitions have been carefully applied throughout this dacument 
and should be interpreted as their first meaning; where historical usage 
mandates, the authors will acquiesce to their terminology, e.g., failure 
rate in lieu of fault rate. 
Fault 
Error 
- A condition which temporarily or permanently affects the 
ability of a module to perf~rm its function. 
- A condition in which a module is incorrectly performing its 
function. 
Failure - Loss of system function. 
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system strategy of handling faults is the fault-handling model discussed in 
section 2.2 and appendix C. 
System architectural characteristics that are modeled by CARE III include 
temporal and spatial redundancy to gain fault tolerance. Temporal redundancy 
is often used to recover from errors (e.g., transient errors) by "roll-ahead" 
or "roll-back" techniques. The effects of these strategies can be accounted 
for in the fault-handling model. Spatial redundancy is accomplished by using 
hardware redundancy. 
Spatial redundancy is modeled as replicated modules where each module is 
assigned a failure distribution (hazard rate). What the analyst defines as a 
module is dependent on the level of the reliability assessment. Two factors 
should be considered when defining a module: a hazard rate must be assignable, 
and to utilize the fault-handling model, the system must have the capability of 
manipulating modules. 2 Manipulation involves module fault detection, module 
fault identification, and module reconfiguration. Reconfiguration can mean 
electrical isolation (a powered-down module) or it could mean Signal isolation 
(module communication is ignored by other modules). When a set of exchangeable 
modules is aSSigned an identical hazard rate, the set is called a stage. 
Stages in turn, comprise a system. CARE III presently allows a fault-tolerant 
system to be constructed of one to seventy stages. The manner in which a 
system reconfigures module failures in a stage in order to tolerate faults is 
governed by an M(x) of N(x) specification and the fault-handling model. M(x) 
is the minimum number of modules required for stage x to function and N(x) the 
number of beginning modules in stage x prior to any failures. 
To illustrate the M(x) of N(x) speCification, consider a computer system stage 
composed of three identical computers that execute identical code using 
identical input data. The three computers all send outputs to a force-sum 
voter that actuates an aircraft control surface. To maintain aircraft control, 
two of the three computers must output correct data to the force-sum voter; 
2. The first factor applies to every module. The second factor applies only to 
modules which are manipulated by the system redundancy management strategy. 
When modules are not manipulated by the system redundancy management 
strategy, as is the case of a hardware masking voter, the fault-handling 
model is not utilized by the user (default parameters are selected). 
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therefore, M=2 and N=3 for the computer stage. Each computer is a module and 
is assigned a hazard rate to model stochastic bomputer failures (fault 
occurrences). The hazard rate which is used to describe module failure 
probability is given by the Weibull hazard rate" function which reduces to the 
common constant failure rate with the proper parameter" setting, if desired. 
The user may assign a different hazard rate for each type of fault (permanent, 
transient, intermittent) that may afflict the computers. 
When a fault occurs in a stage, the fate of the stage first depends on the 
action of the system redundancy management strategy which is emulated by the 
fault-handling model. If the fault is properly handled, the faulty module 
(e.g., a computer in the above example) is reconfigured and since two modules 
still survive, the system survives. If the fault is improperly handled, the 
stage may fail as well as the system. The stage will eventually fail given 
enough time because not enough modules will be left to guarantee fault free 
operation even though all previous faults may have been handled properly. Thus 
CARE III computes system unreliability in two parts: system unreliability due 
to imperfect fault-handling and system unreliability due to module depletion. 
Many fault-tolerant systems are composed of several dlfferent sets of redundant 
modules with different hazard rates. These modules are partitioned into 
stages. System failure is then a function of combinations of stage failures. 
The failure combinations are described by a fault tree where the lower level 
events are stage failures, and stage failures are defined by M of N 
specifications (by defining input parameters M(x) and N(x)). The fault tree 
top event is system failure due to module depletion. Appendix G.1 depicts 
system trees for a number of aircraft flight control system designs. Stages 
may also be redundant. An example of stage redundancy is seen in example 8 of 
appendix G.2. The system tree shows the digital computer stage feeding into an 
AND gate with an analog computer stage feeding into the same AND gate through 
an OR gate with its switch. The analog computer stage is redundant with 
respect to the digital computer stage. 
Most fault-tolerant systems are designed to tolerate all single faults. They 
are not designed, however, to tolerate all double faults. This tack is often 
taken to minimize hardware resources without incurring unacceptable system 
reliability. The system often tolerates many double faults without serious 
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consequences, e.g., two faults occurring in two different stages that are not 
dependent (not critically coupled). The redundancy management strategr simply 
configures out the failed modules one at a time. There is a class of double 
faults, however, which can be fatal to the system. These faults are called 
critically coupled faults, and they may occur in a stage or across two stages. 
An example of stage coupled faults occurs when two faults, one each in two of 
three different voting computers performs the same flight-crucial control 
computations. The two faults are not nece~sarily simultaneous occurring but 
most often one is latent (undetected) when the second occurs. The latent 
fault, although undetected by the system, may be generating numerous errors. 
When critically coupled faults occur, as specified by the analyst, CARE III 
considers this event catastrophic to the entire system and not solely to a 
stage or between two stages. The critical-pair specification is described by a 
special fault tree called a critical-pair tree. More detail can be found in 
section 3.6. 
A popular system architecture utilizes a triad for fault masking and a number 
of spare modules for additional fault tolerance. CARE III treats these types 
of spare modules differently from redundant modules within stages (in-use 
modules). Spare modules can never incur a critically coupled failure with 
another spare or in-use module. Only in-use modules within or across stages 
can experience critical-pair failures. When spares are used with a masking 
voter, CARE III assumes that spare modules are handled by the system redundancy 
management strategy in the same manner as in-use modules, i.e., the same stage 
fault-handling model is used by both in-use and spare modules. One system 
redundancy management strategy that correlates with this assumption is one in 
which spares are "flexed" by continually retiring an in-use module (to spare 
status) while replacing that module with a spare (now an in-use module). The 
concept of spare flexing is employed to minimize latent faults by bringing 
spare units into active voting triads. The spare modules are always powered-up 
(hot spares). From a modeling point of View, spares flexing is equivalent to 
off-line spares self-testing. In this regard, CARE III models architectures 
that employ off-line self-testing. The specification that prescribes modules 
spare status is the NOP (number operational) array and is discussed in detail 
in section 3.2. Further discussion on module status is covered in appendix B. 
These details are of particular interest to users who wish to model module 
dependency. 
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The CARE III model and program have received extensive scrutiny by several 
independent researchers and engineering users. The mathematical model was 
derived independently by the Boeing Computer Services Company in two ways: 
through available documentation and from examining the computer code. The 
program was applied to numerous test cases and practical engineering system 
designs. Although the absence of program and modeling errors are not 
guaranteed by this extensive scrutiny, those that may appear should be rare. 
Confirmed program errors should be brought to the attention of the CARE III 
project engineer. 
The increased sophistication and complexity of fault-tolerant systems has 
brought about the requirement for a reliability assessment tool for these 
systems. Unfortunately, the reliability tool required to fill the need must 
also be more sophisticated and complex than traditional tools. CARE III, which 
is such a tool, was designed to minimize user interface complexity; however, 
the user must have a good understanding of the CARE III model in order to 
properly use this tool. Section 2.0 is provided as a brief introduction to the 
CARE III model. More information can be obtained from references 1, 2, 4, 5, 
and 6. 
2.0 CARE III MODEL - HIGH LEVEL VIEW 
As outlined in the introduction, the user interacts with CARE III via a system 
tree specification, one or more critical-pair tree specifications if required, 
and one or more fault-handling models. The details of the mathematical model 
that integrate the fault tree models and the fault-handling model can be found 
in numerous documents, but are not required to use CARE III as an engineering 
tool. Some exposure to the high level math model is required, however, so that 
the analyst can properly interpret the CARE III output data. 
2.1 GENERAL MODEL STRUCTURE 
Figure 2-1 shows the general structure of the high level (aggregate) CARE III 
model. Each ellipse represents a state of a system and is partitioned into the 
G(~), H(~), and F(~) states where ~ is a vector. 
~ = (~(1), 1(2), .•• , l(x» 
with ~(x) elements so that ~(x) is the number of faulty mOdules3 within 
stage x and 
G(~) represent system operational states which may contain faults 
H(~) represent module depletion states which cause system failure 
F(~) represent system failure states due to imperfect fault handling 
The system enters one of the H failure states when a combination of stage 
failures occurs which leads to the system fault tree's top event (see system 
fault tree section 3.5). Stage failures occur when the number of faulty 
modules, l(x), for each failed stage exceeds that stage's user defined limit of 
N(x) - M(x) modules. F failure states are entered when the system is unable to 
cope with faults/errors. 
3. In CARE III permanent and intermittent faults are handled in a different 
manner than. transient faults. Transient faults increment the fault variable 
~(x) only when the module is detected as faulty and permanently isolated 
from the system. Non-transient faults, permanent and intermittent, 
increment the fault variable ~(x) when they occur. Thus ~(x) is the number 
of faulty non-transient modules plus number of isolated modules with 
transient faults. 
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II 
OPERATIONAL STATES 
~ ---!~ 
........ 
FAILURE DUE TO IMPERFECT FAULT-HANDLING 
figure 2-1 General Structure of CARL III Aggregate Model 
1\ 
FAILURE BY HODULE 
DEPLETION 
The following probability definitions 4 are important to the user as they are 
CARE III outputs: 
p(tl!) probability of the system being in state G(~) at time t 
p*(tl!) probability of the system being in state H(~) at time t 
Q(tl!) probability of the system being in state F(!) at time t 
Further interpretation of figure 2-1 follows. A transition from a G(~) to an 
F(~) state may represent a single fault system failure (when it is defined by 
the user). A transition from state G(~) to G(! + ley)) represents a successful 
system recovery from the occurrence of a fault in stage y. G(! + ley)) 
represents an operating system configuration with one more fault in stage y 
than G(~) has. A transition from G(!) to F(! + ley)) represents a coexisting 
undetected pair of faults that are critically coupled in the system which cause 
system failure. 5 Transitions of this type exist when the user defines a 
critical-pair tree (see section 3.6). 
Of particular importance are the values P*SUM and QSUM, i.e., L p*(tl!) where 
the sum is over all H states and L Q(tl!) where the sum is over all F states. 
P*SUM is the probability of the system being in any H state at time t, and QSUM 
is the probability of the system being in any F state at time t. P*SUM + QSUM 
is the system unreliability, the final desired result. 
Veteran users of reliability assessment models have developed a healthy respect 
for caution in applying and interpreting model results. Every model is an 
abstraction, hence, an approximation to some physical system. Therefore, the 
user must pay close attention to the modeling assumptions and approximations 
built into the modeling methodology. The most important ones for CARE III are 
summarized in appendix D; greater detail can be obtained from references 2, 4, 
5, and 6. 
4. p*(tl!) values are not listed by CARE III, only P*SUM is. 
5. The definitions of state transitions as described here are an over 
simplification. Other factors are involved in causing the transitions that 
also depend on whether or not a transient model is defined. Reference 6 
provides this detail. 
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Although CARE III was designed to model a very large class of system designs, 
undoubtedly not every system design will be directly applicable for use by 
CARE III. In'some cases, it may be necessary for the user to do some pre/post 
processing to accommodate such system designs. An example of this necessity 
involves the modeling of critical-triple failures, i.e., a system possessing 
three coexisting faults located in modules performing critical functions. Post 
processing involving a convolution integral may be required in this case. 
2.2 FAULT-HANDLING MODEL 
The fault-handling model describes how a module fault/error of a specified type 
behaves and is handled by the system. The fault-handling model allows three 
types of fault-handling behavior to be modeled: permanent, intermittent, and 
transient. A permanent fault has the property that once a defect occurs in a 
module, it remains indefinitely and maintains only one manifestation. The 
module experiencing an intermittent fault has incurred a permanent defect but 
exhibits two manifestations: faulty or nonfaulty behavior. When exhibiting 
its faulty behavior, the module behaves like a permanent fault. During its 
nonfaulty (benign) mode, the module is operating properly. A transient fault 
is not caused by a permanent defect within a module, but rather manifests a 
faulty behavior for some finite time and then the module is fault free. The 
module may experience a subsequent transient or other fault type. 
Figure 2-2 shows the general single fault-handling model which is a composite 
model representing the three types of faults. The different fault types are 
modeled by assigning appropriate values or functions which connect the circular 
model states. One set of connecting values or functions (transition 
parameters) defines a single fault-handling model, i.e., the handling of a 
fault type. CARE III allows the user to identify a maximum of five specific 
fault-handling models in this way. 
The states in the fault-handling model are given below. The parameters 
governing transition among these states are shown in figure 2-2 and are defined 
in section 3.1. It is important to note that the interpretation given to the 
model states and state transition parameters are subjective. One such 
interpretation is given in this report. The reader is encouraged to be 
inventive in using these models and not accept the interpretation given here as 
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the only one; however, the values of the parameters used must be reasonable or 
else the CARE III program may not execute correctly (see appendix D for 
caveats). 
A ACTIVE FAULT - Latent (undetected) fault state with no errors. A module 
has experienced a fault but is performing its functions correctly. The 
system is unaware of the presence of the fault. Entry to this module 
state, given by A(t), could result from a number of possible causes. For 
each stage, the user may define up to five distinct fault occurrences, 
A(t), in the form of Weibull or constant failure rates (see section 3.3, 
for OMG(i,x) and RLM(i,x)). The fault occurrences could be attributed to 
but not limited to the following sources: permanent, transient, 
intermittent, hardware, and/or software anomalies. Since the fault is 
active, the system can excite the fault to produce errors, i.e., 
intentionally by executing a self-test program or unintentionally by 
executing application code, resulting in a transition to state AD or AE• 
AD ACTIVE DETECTED - Detected fault/error state. A module has been detected 
as faulty, i.e., the fault or error(s) was detected. Transition·to this 
state can occur in one of two ways: A 6(t) transition can be interpreted 
as resulting from a protected machine condition in that the system was 
executing a self-test/recovery program. The other path via pet) and 
C£(t) can be interpreted as an unprotected machine condition in that the 
fault produced an error(s) while an application program was being 
executed and was detected by a majority voter or comparison-monitoring 
algorithm. The unprotected machine condition is potentially more 
dangerous than protected because it is expected that fault detection in 
the unprotected case may take longer allowing a greater possibility for a 
second critically-paired fault (if defined) to occur which is 
catastrophic to the system. 
AE ACTIVE FAULT-ERROR - Latent fault and error state. A module is 
incorrectly performing a function or operation. The fault was excited by 
application code to produce an error(s). The system is unaware of the 
presence of an error(s) or the fault that produced the error(s). 
DP DETECTED AS PERMANENT - Reconfiguration state. A module is permanently 
isolated from the system. 
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Figure 2-2. - General Single Fault-Handling Model (shown in box). 
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F FAILURE - System failure has occurred due to inability to handle a single 
fault shown in figure 2-2. 
B BENIGN FAULT - Benign fault state, no errors. A module is in a benign 
state, and as long as the module is in this state, it will not be 
detected as potentially faulty because no error exists in the module. 
For a transient fault, there is an instantaneous transition to the 
originating operational state G(~). 
BE BENIGN FAULT LATENT ERROR - Benign fault, latent error state. A module 
is in a benign state after incorrectly performing a function or 
operation. The source of the current error(s), the fault, is no longer 
producing new errors; however, at least one error is still in the system, 
and it is undetected. 
BD BENIGN FAULT, DETECTED ERROR - Benign fault, detected error state. A 
benign module has been detected as faulty as a result of the error it 
produced even though the cause of the error, the fault, has vanished. 
For a permanent fault, a and S are zero (see section 3.1 for the parameter 
definition). The affected module when called upon to perform a function will 
always perform that function erroneously. There may be a delay between when 
the fault has occurred, state A, and when the module begins to generate errors, 
state AE (figure 2-2). 
For an intermittent fault, both a and S are positive. The affected module will 
only intermittently perform its function incorrectly. CARE III views an 
intermittent as a physically defective module. If an intermittent is correctly 
diagnosed, the correct action should be to purge the faulty module. 
For a transient fault, a is positive but 8 equals zero. The module may perform 
erroneously only during the "short passage" of a transient (e.g., power surge) 
through the system. If the module passes to the benign state B, it 
instantaneously returns to a fault-free state where it may incur new faults, 
transient or other types. This unique property of a transient fault 
differentiates it from non-transients and requires special treatment in the 
reliability model (see footnote 3, section 2.1). Since a module having a 
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transient is not viewed as a physically defective module, purging a module for 
a detected transient is often considered poor utilization of hardware 
resources. Choosing the proper values for PA and PB (see section 3.1) gives 
the user the capability of modeling the fate of a transient appropriately. 
When the single-fault model is specified for a stage, it represents the fault 
handling of all modules in that stage which includes both in-use and spare 
modules (see appendix B.1). Since fault-handling parameters will likely differ 
between in-use and spare modules in most applications, the analyst should use 
conservative values. The CARE III model allows a stage to be subject to a 
maximum of five different kinds of fault occurrences at one time. For example, 
a central processing unit (cpu) in a computer might be subject to permanent 
stuck-at-one logic faults occurring at a constant rate of 2.0E-5 faults per 
hour and permanent stuck-at-zero logic faults occurring at 3.5E-5 faults per 
hour. These two kinds of faults may both be linked to the same permanent 
fault-handling model created by the user (the redundancy management strategy 
will handle the two faults in the same way) or they may be linked to separate 
fault-handling models. For this example, note that the cpu is subject to a 
total of 5.5E-5 faults per hour. 
Every kind of fault identified for a CARE III application must be assigned its 
own hazard rate. For the maximum number of stages (70), up to 350 hazard rates 
could be assigned. Each kind of fault for each stage must then be linked to 
one of the five (or less) fault-handling models created by the user. If one 
had a model using the maximum number of stages (70) and the maximum number of 
identifiable faults, some identified kinds of faults would have to use one or 
more of the fault-handling models more than once. 
In addition to Single fault system failures that are described by the single 
fault-handling model, CARE III also can model double fault system failures. 
(See figure C-1 for an illustration of double fault handling.) Two modules 
which have incurred faults that are critically paired can cause system failure 
before the system can detect, isolate, and replace the faulty modules. The 
motivation for including a critical pair fault model is based on the concept 
that there is a class of synergistic paired faults which has the capability of 
causing the loss of a system critical function. The two faults are not 
simultaneous occurring faults but rather coexisting latent (undetected) faults. 
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The fact that the faults are latent doesn't mean they are dormant or benign, 
but on the contrary they are treated as jointly active and devastating. 
Usually the exact nature of the synergism is difficult to assess and, in fact, 
specific cases may be cited where the synergism breaks down. Often to cope 
with the modeling complexity, the conservative approach is taken; allowing the 
critical-pair synergism to exist irrespective of the few exceptional cases. 
Modules which are critically paired may be from the same or two different 
stages. An example of a stage critical-pair failure is the occurrence of two 
faults, one each in two of three different voted computers performing the same 
flight-crucial control computations. A fault in a spare computer and a fault 
in the voting triad, however, would not be critically coupled. An example of a 
critical-pair failure across stages would be a critically coupled fault between 
a computer module and a computer bus module as illustrated in appendix G.2 
example problem 7. Since three voting computers communicate over three buses, 
a fault in a voting triad and a coexisting fault in a bus not connected to the 
faulted computer would preclude a correct majority vote at the receiving end of 
the triplex bus. 
The critical-pairs information is defined by a CRITICAL-PAIR TREE, section 3.6. 
The sparing information specified by NOP, section 3.2, has an important effect 
on the evaluation of double-fault failures. Figures 2-2 and C-1 illustrate the 
complete general models. By judicious selection of parametric values including 
defaults, a number of specific models may be defined. Details of the double-
fault model, illustrated by figure C-1, are covered in appendix C. 
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3.0 INPUT 
A simple fault-tolerant system and the CARE III input data are defined below to 
portray the general input structure. Figure 3-1 delineates the input data in 
the NAMELIST format while figure 3-2 delineates it in the list-directed format 
(see appendix E for details). Figure 3-1 shows the data divided into six 
paragraphs: FLTTYP, STAGES, FLTCAT, RNTIME, SYSTEM FAULT TREE, AND 
CRITICAL-PAIR FAULT TREE. After describing the example problem, each paragraph 
will be discussed in relation to the example and will further be generalized to 
cover the complete capability. 
An example input will now be provided which illustrates the most important 
input statements. Consider a system composed of three stages: #1 - processor; 
#2 - memory; #3 - power supply. There are six processors, two active triads 
with no spares; five memories, one active triad with two spare modules; and two 
power supplies, one in-use and one spare. The system fails by depletion of 
modules if any of the three stages has failed. The minimum number of 
operational modules required is two for the processor stage, two for the memory 
stage, and one for the power supply. When a power supply fails, power is 
immediately supplied by the spare (perfect fault handling). For the processor, 
a system failure can occur if there are two faulty modules that are critically 
coupled within a triad (imperfect fault handling). Similarly, two faulty 
memory modules that are critically coupled in the triad can cause system 
failure. The processor is susceptible to permanent faults with a constant rate 
of 2.2E-4 per hour; the memory is susceptible to permanent faults with constant 
rate 3.5E-5; and the power supply is susceptible to permanent faults with 
constant rate of 1.5E-6. The design information assumes that a single fault in 
the processors or memories cannot cause system failure. Processors and 
memories are governed by the same system fault-handling process. Average time 
for self-test identification, isolation and replacement of a faulty module is 
4.06 seconds; average time for a faulty module to generate errors is 
188.5 msec.; average time for detection, isolation, and replacement of a module 
generating errors is 342.9 msec. All rates are assumed to be constant. The 
input to this problem is shown in figures 3-1 and 3-2 for both NAMELIST and 
list-directed formats. 
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A detailed description of the input data and format are discussed in sections 
3.1 - 3.6. A summary of the input paragraphs providing input ranges and 
default values is given in section 3.7. These paragraphs must be input in the 
order described in sections 3.1 - 3.6. The first four paragraphs must always 
be provided. The next two paragraphs are required if flags in the RNTIME 
paragraph are set .TRUE .. These paragraphs describe fault trees. The format 
for the first four paragraphs is given in the NAMELIST format for VAX-ll 
Fortran and CDC Fortran V compilation and in list-directed format for general 
Fortran 77 compilation. The last paragraphs describing fault trees have the 
same syntax in both cases. 
For the NAMELIST input, information begins in column two; column one is 
ignored. Each paragraph begins with $XXX where XXX is the paragraph 
identifier. Variables defined in a paragraph may appear in any order. Commas 
separate input lines. Each paragraph is terminated by a $. The format for 
FAULT TREE inputs is addressed in sections 3.5 and 3.6. The user is not 
required to specify every NAMELIST input value. Input parameters are preset 
with default values by CARE III. If a value is not changed by the user, a 
default value will be used. The default values are summarized in section 3.7. 
Section 3.8 discusses the availability of some data input values. 
For list-directed input, information begins in column one. List-directed input 
does not use identifiers for input parameters. Also, unlike NAMELIST input, 
the order in which input parameters are listed for list-directed input is very 
important. 
appendix E. 
The required order is given in section 3.7 and is discussed in 
If a default value is desired, it must be indicated by including 
the comma delimiter to fill its place. 
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: 
$FLTTYP NFTYPS = 2, 
MARKOV 1, 
DEL(l) 8.87E2, 
RHO ( 1 ) 1 .91 E4, 
C(1) 1.0, 
EPS(1) L05E4$ 
$STAGES NSTGES 3, 
N(1) 6, 
M( 1) 2, 
NOP(l,l) 6, 
NOP(2,1) 3, 
N(2) 5, 
M(2) 2, 
NOP ( 1 ,2) 3, 
N(3) 2, 
M(3) 1, 
IRLPCD 3$ 
$FLTCAT NFCATS(l) 1, 
NFCATS(2) 1 , 
NFCATS(3) 1, 
JTYP (1 , 1 ) 1 , 
RLM(1,1) 2.2E-4, 
JTYP ( 1 ,2) 1 , 
RLM(1,2) 3.5E-5, 
JTYP(1,3) 2, 
RLM(1,3) 1.5E-6$ 
$RNTIME FT 10.0, 
SYSFLG .TRUE., 
CPLFLG .TRUE.$ 
SYSTEM FAULT TREE FOR THREE STAGES IN SERIES 
1 344 
40123 
CRITICAL-PAIR FAULT TREE 
1 13 20 23 
1 1 6 
2 7 11 
3 12 13 
20 2 1 2 3 
21 2 4 5 6 
22 2 7 8 9 
23 0 20 21 22 
Figure 3-1 CARE III input file using NAMELIST syntax 
(Order of inputs within a paragraph is unimportant) 
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2, 
3, 
1 , 
, 
8.87E2, 
1~91E4, 
1 • 05E4, 
1 .0, 
, , , , 
6, 5, 2, 
2, 2, 1 , 
6, 3, 
3, 
3, , / 
1 , 1 , 
1 , 
, 1 , / 
1 , 2, 
, 
2.2E-4, 3.5E-5, 1.5E-6/ 
10.0, , , .TRUE., .TRUE., , , , , , , / 
SYSTEM FAULT TREE FOR THREE STAGES IN SERIES 
1 3 4 4 
40123 
CRITICAL-PAIR FAULT TREE 
1 13 20 23 
1 1 6 
2 7 11 
3 12 13 
20 2 1 2 3 
21 2 4 5 6 
22 2 7 8 9 
23 0 20 21 22 
Figure 3-2 CARE III input file using list-directed syntax 
(Order of inputs within a paragraph correspond to section 3.7) 
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3.1 FAULT HANDLING 
NAMELIST syntax: 
$FLTTYP NFTYPS 
MARKOV 
DEL( 1) 
RHO (1 ) 
C( 1) 
EPS(l) 
2, 
1 , 
8.87E2, 
1.91E4, 
1 .0, 
1.05E4$ 
List-directed syntax: 
2, 
, 
8,87E2, 
1.91E4, 
1.05E4, 
1 .0, 
, , , J ,1, / 
The fault-handling paragraph defines how the system handles faults that have 
occurred. The user assigns values to fault-handling parameters listed in the 
paragraph which define characteristics of the fault type (permanent, 
intermittent, or transient) and how the system handles/responds to the fault. 
Fault type characteristics are in turn modeled by rate functions6 which 
"connect" the different states of the single and double fault-handling models. 
Transitions between some states occur instantaneously. Probability values are 
used for these types of transitions (see figs. 2-2 and C-1). 
Up to five fault-handling models may be defined for up to five different fault 
types. It is also possible to have five fault-handling models for one fault 
type, e.g., five different transient-handling models. A fault-handling model 
is defined by one set of fault-handling parameters for the single-fault model 
shown in figure 2-2. The fault-handling model(s) may be assigned (described 
later) to any defined stage, e.g., one to five models for a given stage or they 
can be distributed across all stages in any combination. By assigning 
appropriate values to the fault-handling parameters, transition rates are 
defined which permit the formation of many variations of this model. Although 
every transition rate must be defined by the user or by default, transitions 
can be precluded by assigning very slow rates. Alternately, tranSitions can be 
made to appear instantaneous by assigning very fast rates. Some caution must 
be exercised to maintain a reasonable separation of fault occurrence and fault-
handling rates, however (see section 3.7 and appendix D). 
6. Rate functions are derived from user selected probability density functions. 
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In the example problem, two fault-handling models are required, one for the 
processor and memory stages and a second for the power supply stage, so 
NFTYPS = 2. The parameters listed in this paragraph describe the fault-
handling model for the processor and memory stages. Since it is assumed that 
the power supply stage handles its faults perfectly, a fault-handling model 
different from the processor memory stages must be assigned to the power supply 
stage. Ordinarily the power supply stage will require non-defaulted parameters 
to properly model its fault handling; however, here it is assumed that fault 
handling is accomplished perfectly. Therefore, a default fault-handling model 
is selected by setting NFTYPS = 2 and by not including parameter values for the 
second fault-handling model in this paragraph. 
$FLTTYP 
NFTYPS 
MARKOV 
fault-handling input identifier which must appear at the start of the 
paragraph. If the user is using list-directed formatting to create 
his input file, he should note the parameters discussed below are not 
discussed in the order required by list-directed format. The user 
must read section 3.7 and appendix E.2 for the format requirements if 
using the list-directed format. 
number of fault models to be included. The same fault type may be 
identified with several stages. In doing this, the analyst is 
stating that the system responds to a fault in the same manner for 
each stage, although the stages may have different fault-occurrence 
rates. The value of NFTYPS must be at least one, even if there are 
no single fault failures or no critical-pair faults in the system. 
CARE III requires that at least one fault-handling model be assigned 
to each stage even though some stages may have perfect fault-
handling. For example, if a system has stages with all perfect 
fault-handling, then NFTYPS = 1. If the system has one stage with 
perfect fault-handling and all the others are imperfect and modeled 
by one fault model (as in the example), then NFTYPS = 2. 
variable which defines whether all fault-handling models have 
exponential distributions (constant transition rates) only, and hence 
the fault-handling model is homogeneous Markovian. The numerical 
procedure used for the homogeneous Markovian model, MARKOV = 1, is 
numerically stable and very efficient. If the general fault-handling 
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= 
model (semi-Markov) is used, the numerical procedure implemented is 
much slower and may have stability problems if parameter values in 
the fault-handling model are separated by several orders of 
magnitude. Recent studies have indicated that the substitution of 
exponential distributions for uniform distributions produces minute 
differences in many cases and suggests the use of the Markov 
fault-handling model at least for preliminary analysis. 
1 - use homogenous Markov solution. All transition times are 
exponential (constant rates) irrespective of user assigned 
input distributions. 
2 - use general solution. At least one transition has a uniform 
distribution. MARKOV must be set to 2 in order to get plots of 
fault-handling intensity functions (see CVPLOT in section 3.1; 
and appendix A.2) 
The rate functions 6(.), p(.), and c(.) shown in figures 2-2 and 
C-l are of the form: 
f(t) a 0 ~ t for exponential t 
or 
f(t) a/(l-at) 0 ~ t ~ l/a for uniform t 
where the user specifies the rate functions form (exponential or 
uniform) and values for a. a values are specified in the input by 
the array names, DEL(i), RHO(i), and EPS(i) for fault type i. The 
reader should note that only when the exponential rate function is 
selected will a rate function be equal to its corresponding array 
value, e.g., 6(t) = f(t) = a = DEL(i) for exponential t. ALP(i) and 
BET(i) are always exponential rate functions. Rate functions are 
always specified in the units, eventslhour irrespective of ITBASE 
selection (see section 3.4). For an exponential distribution, an 
event occurs with a mean time of lie hours. For a uniform 
distribution, an event occurs with a mean time of 1/(2a) hours. An 
exponential distribution (constant detection rate) may be used when a 
diagnostic program (self-test program) is randomly scheduled for 
execution. In this case, detection is most likely to occur early in 
time, but allows for non-detection for long operational times. The 
uniform distribution may be used to approximate _~he effects of 
executing the diagnostic program on a fixed scheduled. In this 
regard, uniform detection means that detection will occur within the 
user specified time (l/a), but can occur equally likely during that 
time. 
-21-
The presence of any of the following parameters in the $FLTTYP paragraph is 
used to define the fault-handling model. The absence of one or more parameters 
causes CARE III to select default values (see section 3.7). 
DEL(i) 
RHO(i) 
EPS(i) 
parameter for describing the rate function between active fault 
state A to detected state AD. DEL(i) has the units, events/hour (see 
end of table for more definition). 
parameter for describing the rate function from the active fault 
state A to the active fault-error (erroneous operation) state AE• 
The expression using this parameter is used to model the rate at 
which a fault generates errors. RHO(i) has the units, event/hour. 
parameter for describing the rate function from error state to 
detected state AD' BD or to the single-fault system failure state F. 
EPS(i) has the units, events/hour (see end of section 3.1 for more 
definition). 
IDELF(i) indicator variable7 defining if DEL parameter is used for an 
exponential or uniform rate function. IDELF values are disregarded 
if parameter MARKOV = 1. 
1 - exponential rate function 
2 - uniform rate function 
IRHOF(i) indicator variable defining if RHO parameter is used for an 
exponential or uniform rate function. IRHOF values are disregarded 
if parameter MARKOV = 1. 
1 - exponential rate function 
2 - uniform rate function 
IEPSF(i) indicator variable defining if EPS parameter is used for an 
exponential or uniform rate function. IEPSF values are disregarded 
if parameter MARKOV = 1. 
1 - exponential rate function 
7. For the example problem of this section, the CARE III defaults for 
parameters ALP, BET, IDELF, IRHOF, IEPSF, PA, PB, DBLDF, TRUNC, CVPRNT, 
CVPLOT, IAXSCV, and LGTMST will be used since these parameters are not set 
in the input file. 
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PA(i) 
PB(i) 
2 - uniform rate function 
probability that a module detected as faulty (a fault or error was 
detected) in the active detected state AO is isolated from the 
system. The default value of 1.0 implies that all modules identified 
as faulty are isolated from the system. Setting this parameter to a 
value less than unity allows the analyst to model system redundancy 
management schemes where the management scheme has to decide if an 
isolated fault was either a transient or non-transient fault. For 
non-transient faults the value of PA will normally be a value close 
to one. For transient faults the value of PA will be close to zero. 
probability that a module detected as faulty (an error was detected) 
in the benign fault detected error state BO is isolated from the 
system (for intermittent or transient faults only). The default 
value of 0.0 implies that if a module error is detected. while in the 
Bo state, the module is not deleted from the system, but presumed, 
possibly from additional tests, to be fully operational. For a 
transient fault, this would be the correct decision. 
C(i) probability that a faulty module in the AE or BE state is not lethal 
to the system. This probability will only be taken into account when 
both of the parameters RHO and EPS are greater than zero. This 
parameter provides the means for modeling system failure due to a 
single fault. 
The next two parameters determine which of three possible fault types is being 
described. If ALP(i) and BET(i) both equal zero (the default value), the ith 
fault-handling model type is a permanent one. If ALP(i) and BET(i) are both 
greater than zero, an intermittent fault-handling model is being described. 
Finally, if ALP(i) is greater than zero and BET(i) equals zero, a transient 
fault-handling model is described. 
ALP(i) 
BET(i) 
parameter for constant rate transition from active state A or AE to 
benign stage B or BE' ALP(i) has the units, events/hour. 
parameter for constant rate transition from benign state B or BE to 
active state A or AE. BET(i) has the units, events/hour. 
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Some additional discussion on the interpretation of the transition parameters 
is required in order for the user to properly use the parameters. The physical 
interpretation of oCt) is manifold and depends on the fault type. As an 
example, if the user is only modeling non-transient faults, oCt) is a composite 
function that models the time to detect the fault, identify the faulty module, 
and reconfigure the module from the system. Because only non-transient faults 
are being modeled, parameter PA will be set to unity (default value) 
guaranteeing module isolation from the system. 
If the user is modeling a transient, he has several choices in defining the 
meaning of oCt). One redundancy management strategy is to treat transients 
like non-transients as described above. Another strategy is to wait some small 
time duration to allow fast transients to vanish. In a known heavy transient 
environment, the first strategy would waste modules; however, the probability 
of incurring a second fault while the first is being handled (a critically 
coupled system failure) is significantly reduced. The latter strategy of 
waiting for a transient to vanish may better conserve hardware resources but 
brings with it a greater probability of incurring a critically coupled system 
failure. By setting PA to a value of less than unity, the user can model the 
latter strategy. 1.0 - PA is the probability of not reconfiguring a known 
faulty module from the system, i.e., return to state A. The parameter oCt) 
takes on a different meaning than that for non-transients when PA < 1.0 because 
oCt) for non-transients includes reconfiguration time while a module containing 
a transient fault may return to state A and thus not include reconfiguration 
time. The distinction between oCt) for transients and non-transients may in 
practice be a moot point since the significant time factor contributing to oCt) 
is often the fault detection time. 
The interpretation of the E(L) transition parameter is intimately linked to the 
parameter C. If C = 1.0, then transition to state F for a single fault/error 
is precluded. In this case, E(L) can take on a similar interpretation to oCt). 
The difference being that E(L) models elapsed time after an error occurs while 
oCt) models elapsed time to state AD when the detection mechanism is something 
other than comparison of outputs. The parameter pet) acts as a time delay 
which slows down the error recovery process and makes a system failure due to 
critical-pair faults more probable. When C = 1.0, the system will always 
recover from single faults/errors provided that there exist redundant modules 
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in the system stages. Setting e < 1.0 allows the possibility of system failure 
resulting from a single fault/error by transition from state AE to F or by a 
single error by transition from state BE to F. 
If the general fault-handling model is used, MARKOV 
parameters will be used: 
2, the following 
DBLDF 
TRUNe 
parameter governing the step doubling rule used in the numerical 
integration of the general fault-handling model functions. Although 
the range allowed is from 0.01 to 0.1, a value of 0.01 is recommended 
for controlling accuracy. A value of as large as 0.05 will 
significantly reduce the fault-handling model computation time but 
may provide inaccurate answers if there is moderate disparity between 
transition rates. 
fault-handling function's truncation value. See appendix F for more 
detail. 
In addition to the end product, system reliability, the user may output some of 
the fault-handling functions. For most reliability analyses, this output is of 
limited use and may be suppressed (the default option). The controls for the 
fault-handling outputs are eVPRNT and eVPLOT: 
CVPRNT 
CVPLOT 
flag for outputting moments of single and double fault-handling 
functions. The data generated by setting this flag to .TRUE., is 
used by the program developers and is not normally of interest to the 
reliability analyst. 
flag for plot of single and double fault-handling functions. Setting 
this flag to .TRUE. will cause the COVRGE module of the CARE III 
program to generate two plot files called SNGFL and DBLFL. These 
functions are: 
1. PB(t) probability single fault is benign 
2. PaCt) probability single fault is not benign 
3. PF(t) - single fault failure intensity 
4. PLCt) - probability of latent single fault 
5. PDP(t) - single fault detected as permanent intensity 
-25-
IAXSCV 
LGTMST 
6. PDF(t) - double fault failure intensity 
This plotting capability was implemented for debugging purposes and 
may be of little interest to the user. See appendix A.2 for plotting 
options. 
Y-axis scale for plotting fault-handling functions. 
linear Y axis 
2 log Y axis (default value) 
3 linear and log Y axis plots 
4 log-log plot only 
flag governing the choice of logarithmic or linear time steps 
used in the integration algorithm for computing the p(tl~) and 
Q(tl~) probabilities. The default value .TRUE. gives logarithmic 
time steps. 
3.'2 STAGE DEFINITION 
NAMELIST syntax: List-directed syntax: 
$STAGES NSTGES 3, 3, 6, 5, 2, 
N( 1) 6, 2, 2, 1 , 
M( 1) 2, 6, 3, 
NOP ( 1 , 1 ) 6, 3, 
NOP(2,l) 3, 
N(2) 5, 
M(2) 2, 3, , / 
NOP(1,2) 3, 
N(3) 2, 
M(3) 1 , 
IRLPCD 3$ 
The stage definition paragraph defines the number of stages in the system, the 
number of modules within a stage, the minimum success status for a stage and 
the operational configurations for a stage. The type of output is also 
specified. 
$STAGES stage identifier which must appear at the start of the paragraph. 
NSTGES number of stages in the system. 
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N(x) number of identical modules in stage number x. 
M(x) minimum number of modules needed for stage x to be operational. 
NOP(j.x) specifies the jth operational configuration for stage x and therefore 
specifies which (in-use) modules are subject to critical-pair system 
failures (1Sj~5). For a stage, this array specifies the allocation 
of modules to in-use and spares as modules are deleted from the 
system. Spares do not contribute to critical-pair system failures. 
Although spares do not contribute to critical-pair system failures.) 
they can contribute single/faults causing system failure and to 
system unreliability if the parameter C for the fault-handling model 
for stage x is less than one. For each stage. up to five NOP values 
may be defined. If D(x) modules have been deleted. N(x)-D(x) modules 
are available. The number of in-use modules is the largest NOP(j.x) 
less than or equal to the number available; the remaining modules are 
spares. If N(X)-D(x) is less than the smallest NOP specified. but 
greater than or equal to M(x), the minimum number of units needed. 
then all N(x)-D(x) are in-use and there are no spares. If NOP is not 
specified for a stage. all non-deleted modules are assumed to be 
in-use. No modules are spares. Thus, when no NOP inputs are given 
for stage x, the default NOP array used is the decreasing sequence 
N(x). N(x)-1, ••• , M(x). The sparing architecture described by NOP 
affects only the double-fault error computations. If no critically 
coupled faults for any stages are specified through the critical-
pairs fault tree, the NOP parameters have no effect and need not be 
specified. 
In the example above, stage 1 starts out with six in-use modules and 
zero spares. designated by NOP(1 ,1) = 6. When one module has been 
deleted, five modules are available. With NOP(2,1) = 3, the largest 
NOP less than five is three. Therefore. after one module in stage 
one has been deleted, three modules are in-use and two modules are 
spares. If four modules are deleted, two modules are available. 
Because a NOP(3,1) value was not specified, the default of NOP(3,1) 
will be one less than the specified NOP(2.1) value. Thus, when four 
modules for stage one are deleted, two modules will be in-use and 
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LC(x) 
IRLPCD 
RLPLOT 
IAXSRL 
there will be no spares. For the general case, the number of in-use 
modules reduces by steps of one, from the last specified NOP value, 
down to the value of M. See appendix B for more discussion on how 
NOP parameters are used. 
parameter8 that inhibits some critical-pair failure computation of 
Q(tl~) values with less than LC faults occurring in stage x •. See 
appendix F for more details. 
specifies the option chosen for output print-out. One may obtain 
summary results only, or for each fault vector, ~ = (t(l), t(2), ••• , 
t(x), ••• ), the probability of system failure due to imperfect fault-
handling Q(tl~), or/and the probability of successful operation, 
P(tl~).9 A discussion of these output options with examples is 
given in section 4.0 
1 summary results only (default value) 
2 p(tl~), probability of successful operation plus summary 
results 
3 Q(tl~), probability of a fault-handling failure plus 
summary results 
4 all of the above 
flag specifying if summary information QSUM, P*SUM and QSUM + P*SUM 
are to be plotted against time. See appendix A-2 for details. 
specifies axes for summary information plot. 
1 Linear Y-axis 
2 Log Y-axis (default value) 
3 Linear and Log Y-axis 
4 Log-log plot only 
8. For the example problem of section three, the CARE III default values for 
parameters LC, RLPLOT and IAXSRL will be used since these parameters are not 
set in the input file. 
9. The user is cautioned in selecting options 2-4 for large systems. The 
number of p(tl~) and Q(tl~) values can be huge. By adjusting the control 
parameters, the user can exercise some control on the size of the output. 
See appendix F. 
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3.3 FAULT OCCURRENCE 
NAMELIST syntax: List-directed syntax: 
$FLTCAT NFCATS(l) 
NFCATS(2) 
NFCATS(3) 
JTYP(l,l ) 
RLM( 1 ,1 ) 
JTYP(1,2) 
RLM( 1,2) 
JTYP (1 ,3) 
RLM( 1 ,3) 
1 , 
1 , 
1 , 
1 , 
2.2E-4, 
1 , 
3.5E-5, 
2, 
1.5E-6$ 
1,1,1, 
1 , 1 , 1 , 
, , 
2.2E-4, 3.5E-5, 1.5E-61 
Every fault type has a fault occurrence rate and fault-handling model 
associated with it. The fault-handling model associated with a fault type 
determines if the fault type is permanent, intermittent, or transient. Fault 
types are only identical if both their fault occurrence rate and fault-handling 
model are identical. The fault occurrence paragraph defines the quantity of 
fault types assigned to modules within a stage, the fault-handling model each 
fault type is linked to, and the fault type's corresponding fault occurrence 
rate. A stage may experience up to five different fault types. 
$FLTCAT fault occurrence input identifier which must appear at the start of 
the paragraph 
NFCATS(x) quantity of fault types aSSigned to stage x. The value of one for 
each stage implies that each stage has only one fault type. The 
fault type(s) may, however, differ from stage to stage, as it does 
in the example above. 
JTYP(i,x) links a fault-handling model to the ith fault type to stage x. 
OMG(i,x) 
JTYP(l,x) links the first fault type that affects stage x; JTYP(2,x) 
links the second fault type; etc. In the example above, stages 1 
and 2 are both subject to the same fault-handling model, #1, and 
stage 3 is subject to fault-handling model, #2. 
parameter w of the Weibull fault occurrence rate AW(At)w-l 
10 for fault type i for stage x. The default valu~ for w is 1.0, 
10. The default values for the OMG parameters are used in the example problem 
of this section. 
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RLM(i,x) 
which yields a constant failure rate A, an exponential distribution. 
The time scale is always in hours. 
parameter A of the Weibull fault occurrence rate for the fault 
type i for stage x. The time scale is always in hours. 
3.4 RUN TIME 
NAMELIST syntax: List-directed syntax: 
$RNTIME FT 
SYSFLG 
CPLFLG 
10.0, 
.TRUE., 
.TRUE.$ 
10.0, , , .TRUE., .TRUE.,/ 
The RNTIME paragraph is used for specifying the operating time and the time 
scale for which the system is to be assessed. The user also specifies if a 
system fault tree is to follow which defines the system failure configurations 
and if a critical-pair fault tree is provided. Parameter controls are 
available which reduce the amount of computation. 
$RNTIME 
FT 
NSTEPS 
run time input identifier which must appear at the start of the 
paragraph. 
operating time for which the system is to be assessed. 
minimum number of time stepsll for which each p(tl~) and Q(tl~) 
probability array is listed for the operating time, FT, of the 
system. The number of time steps used affects the accuracy of the 
integration algorithms used; the more steps used, the greater the 
accuracy and computation time. If parameter LGTMST = .FALSE., then 
the number of time steps used will equal NSTEPS where the default is 
set to 50. If LGTMST = .TRUE., then the number of time steps used 
will be equal to or greater than NSTEPS and is determined 
automatically by CARE III. 
11. For the example problem of this section, the CARE III default values for 
parameters NSTEPS, ITBASE, KWT, PSTRNC, CINDBG, QPTRNC, IVSN, NPSBRN, and 
CKDATA will be used since these parameters are not set in the input file. 
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ITBASE 
SYSFLG 
CPLFLG 
KWT 
PSTRNC 
CINDBG 
QPTRNC 
time scale used for system operating time (FT). This time scale is 
reflected only in the output listings and does not affect the 
scale of input parameters other than FT. 
1 - hours 
2 - minutes 
3 - seconds 
4 - milliseconds 
; ... 
flag stating if a system fault tree is to follow. The system fault 
tree states what stage failures define a system failure due to module 
depletion. The default system tree is a series fault tree; any stage 
failure causes system failure. 
flag stating if a critical-pairs fault tree(s) is provided. The 
critical-pairs tree(s) defines which pairs of modules will cause a 
system failure due to coexisting faults (fault-handling 
unreliability, QSUM). 
this parameter is not currently used; however, its presence must be 
accounted for in the list-directed format. 
parameter used to limit the number of fault vectors, ~, used in 
computing fault-handling unreliability. Fault vectors with a module 
depletion probability, p*(tl~) of less than PSTRNC will not enter 
into the fault-handling unreliability calculations. See appendix F 
for more detail. 
flag to create debug files in the CAREIN program module. This was 
used when developing the CARE III program. 
parameter used to limit the number of fault vectors, ~, used in 
computing fault-handling unreliability, QSUM. The default value is 
1.0E-2. Smaller values will cause more vectors to be assessed which 
have an impact on higher order terms in QSUM. See appendix F for 
more detail. 
IVSN parameter selecting whether developmental version 3 or version 4 
algorithms are to be used in the CARE3 program module. 
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NPSBRN 
CKDATA 
parameter that is used to determined the number of subruns and 
consequently, the number of noncritically-paired stages that are 
to be grouped together in a subrun. The default is 20, but 
fastest execution will usually result if NPSBRN is three or four 
(see appendix D for a more detailed discussion). 
flag indicating if the CARE III program is to check user's input 
before processing it. Default is CKDATA = .TRUE •• 
3.5 SYSTEM FAULT TREE 
SYSTEM FAULT TREE FOR THREE STAGES IN SERIES } TITLE 
1 3 4 4 } STAGE AND LOGIC RANGE 1D 
4 01 2 3 } LOGIC GATE ID 
The system failure description, in terms of stages, is given thru the system 
fault tree (see ref. 7 for fault tree nuances). All of the stage numbers from 
one up to the value of 'NSTGES' are used as input to this tree. Stage numbers 
take on physical significance. This means that stage number x used as an input 
to the system fault tree will use the input information directly associated 
with it, e.g., stage number 2 will use the input data M(2), N(2), NOP(1,2) thru 
NOP(5,2), NFCATS(2), JTYP(1,2) thru JTYP(5,2), RLM(1,2) thru RLM(5,2), and so 
on. The system fault tree is described using a small subset of logic operators 
depicted as logic gates. The system tree is constructed from these gates to 
define what combinations of the system stages, if failed, will produce system 
failure. The user is defining system failure states, H states as shown in 
figure 2-1, via the system fault tree. The system fault tree for the example 
discussed in section 3.0 is shown on the next page. The system fault tree has 
its own syntax and is independent of the syntax used for input paragraphs 
FLTTYP, STAGES, FLTCAT, and RNTIME. The rules for constructing a system tree 
are discussed subsequently. 
Example 
SYSTEM FAILURE 
I 2 3 
~ 
stage ID numbers 
SYSTEM TREE 
As shown at the top of this section (3.5), the system fault tree is divided 
into three parts; the TITLE section, the STAGE ANO LOGIC RANGE 10 section, and 
the LOGIC GATE 10 section. Before creating these sections for the problem of 
interest, it is recommended that the user sketch his tree on paper to avoid 
numbering mistakes. 
TITLE 
identification label. The TITLE section is used to identify the system 
tree and to make any notes about it. This section of the system fault 
tree immediately follows the RNTIME input paragraph. To continue the 
TITLE section from one line to the next, the letter C preceded by a space 
must be typed as the last non-blank character between columns 9 and 80 
inclusive. In this manner the TITLE section can be continued to as many 
lines as desired. The TITLE for the example problem of section 3.0 could 
have been written: 
SYSTEM FAULT TREE 
FOR THREE STAGES 
IN SERIES 
C 
C 
The system tree TITLE section is printed near the top of the output 
listing produced by program module CARE3 and therefore provides a useful 
mechanism for also identifying the computer listing and the system being 
modeled. See section four for example CARE III output. 
STAGE ANO LOGIC RANGE 10 
provides the range of inputs and range of logic gates defining a system 
fault tree. The information in this section is always contained in one 
line. The line consists of four integers all separated by at least one 
space and is of the form 1 K I J. 1 and K identify the range of basic 
inputs to be used for the system fault tree. Each input corresponds to a 
physical stage of the system. The integers I and J identify the range of 
numbers associated with logic gates used to construct the system fault 
tree. A logic gate is numbered by assigning a unique integer to the 
logic gate's output. Thus the system tree will have to be constructed 
and numbered before this section can be completed. In all cases, 
however, the integers K, I and J must obey the relationship: 
NSTGES = K < I ~ J $ 2000, where NSTGES is one of the input variables to 
input paragraph STAGES. 
For the example, the first two integers of the STAGE AND LOGIC RANGE ID 
section must be 1 3 because NSTGES equals three. The system fault tree 
consists of one OR gate whose output is numbered 4. Since the system 
fault tree consists of a Single gate, integers I and J are both 4. An 
example where I and J are not equal can be seen in appendix G.2. Because 
logic gates in a system fault tree must be numbered sequentially, the 
quantity J-I+l equals the number of gates the tree contains. 
LOGIC GATE ID 
lists the logic gate descriptors for the system fault tree. There will 
be one descriptor for every gate of the tree. Logic gate descriptor 
format is of the form k 1 m n ••• z, where k is the gate number, I is the 
gate type, and m n ••• z are the gate input numbers which the gate 
operates on. Input events identify stages or outputs from preceding 
gates. In the example for this section, k = 4 (gate number), I = 0 
(letter 0 for OR operator), and m n •.• z = 1 2 3. Thus the logic gate 
descriptor is 4 0 1 2 3. The logic operators available are AND, OR, 
M of N, and INVERT. The general format for the logic gate descriptors is 
shown below. Notice that the OR gate can be represented by three 
different symbols. For the M of N gate, M is not the symbol used. 
M represents an integer larger than one and less than or equal to the 
number of inputs to the gate. For all gates used, k must be less than or 
equal to 2000, and inputs m n ••• z must all be less than k. 
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AND k A m n .•. z 
m z 
OR k 0 m n z 
k 0 m n z 
k 1 m n z 
m z 
M of N k M m n .•• z 
m z 
INVERT k V m 
m 
3.5.1 System Fault Tree Rules and Procedures 
all events m thru z 
must occur (fail ) for 
event k to occur 
if any of the events 
m thru z occur (fail) , 
event k occurs 
if 'M' of the events 
m thru z occur (fail), 
event k occurs 
if input m occurs, 
output k ceases to 
occur 
In order for the CARE III program to read system fault tree information, the 
parameter SYSFLG in input paragraph RNTIME must be set equal to .TRUE •• If 
SYSFLG = .FALSE., then the CARE III program assumes that the user has not 
provided a system fault tree for input. In this case, CARE III assumes the 
default system tree. The default system tree is a single OR gate with all 
stage numbers serving as inputs. Note that for the discussion example this 
approach could have been taken. 
The basic input numbers to a system fault tree are the stage numbers one thru 
'NSTGES'. If any of these inputs are not used, the CARE III program assumes 
the omitted stages will never fail the system being modeled with respect to 
depletion of hardware. Another way to model this situation is to include such 
stages in the system fault tree and then setting the stage's M values in input 
paragraph STAGES to equal zero. In either case, the stages modeled may 
contribute to system failure due to improper fault-handling, but the stages 
will not contribute to unreliability due to depletion of hardware. This 
feature was included to enable the user to model the effects of software 
errors. In this sense, software errors may lead to single or double fault 
system failures. 
Logic gates of the system fault tree must be numbered sequentially without 
interruption. All numbers used must be integers. The inputs to any logic gate 
must be less than the gate number they feed. This requirement prevents the 
user from creating feedback paths in the tree. It is permitted, however, to 
let a basic input or gate output to act as an input to more than one higher 
level gate. This basic input event or gate output event is called a common 
mode event. As an example, the output to a gate numbered 105 could act as an 
input to any number of gates numbered greater than 105. 
The first logic gate of a system fault tree does not have to have a value equal 
to 'NSTGES' + 1. A gap left between the highest numbered input (equal to 
NSTGES) and the lowest numbered logic gate is usually desired when numbering 
the fault tree. Leaving a gap of integers between the highest numbered input. 
event and the lowest numbered logic gate will sometimes facilitate potential 
revisions without having to renumber the whole system fault tree. 
The addition of the INVERT gate for use in the system fault tree has been a 
recent addition to the CARE III program. The user is cautioned in its use. 
With the INVERT gate, it is possible to construct a system fault tree where no 
combination of failed stages will cause the system to fail (incoherent fault 
tree). The user is reminded that the system fault tree describes the events 
that cause system failure and not system success. 
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3.6 CRITICAL-PAIR FAULT TREE 
CRITICAL-PAIR 
1 13 20 23 
1 1 6 
2 7 11 
3 12 13 
20 2 1 2 3 
21 2 4 5 6 
22 2 7 8 9 
23 0 20 21 22 
FAULT TREE } TITLE 
} MODULE AND LOGIC RANGE ID 
}MODULE UNIT TO STAGE ASSOCIATION 
}LOGIC GATE ID 
The inputs to a critical-pair tree represent functional modules from particular 
physical stages. The critical pair fault tree paragraph as illustrated above 
defines the pairs of functional modules from specific stages that have the 
potential to cause system failure. By including one or more critical-pair 
trees for the problem being analyzed, the CARE III program invokes the double-
fault model illustrated in appendix C. The meaning of a critical-pair tree 
differs significantly from a system fault tree. The combinations of faulty 
pairs of modules are assumed to cause failure due to improper fault handling 
versus due to depletion of hardware. The construction of a critical-pair tree 
also differs Significantly than that of the system fault tree. The critical-
pair tree has an added (MODULE UNIT TO STAGE ASSOCIATION) section and there are 
more restrictions for the type of logic gates that can be used to build a 
critical-pair tree. The sections of the critical-pair tree and the rules for 
creating one or more critical-pair trees are discussed subsequently. The 
critical pair tree diagram for the example problem is shown below. 
Example, SYSTEM FAILURE 
21 
123 456 789 
CRITICAL-PAIR 
TREE 
TITLE 
identification label for critical-pair tree. This label can be continued 
to as many lines as desired by using the same continuation rules as given 
for the system fault tree TITLE section. 
MODULE AND LOGIC RANGE ID 
provides the range of possible inputs and range of logic gates defining a 
critical-pair tree. The information in this section is always contained 
on one line. This line consists of four integers all seperatedby at 
least one space and is of the form K L I J. Integers K and L represent 
the range of functional module numbers which may be used as inputs to the 
critical-pair tree (not all modules must be identified in the tree). 
Integers I and J identify the range of logic gate numbers to be used in 
the critical-pair tree. The four integers of this section must obey the 
following relationships; (L-K+l) S 70 and 1 S K S L < I S J S 2000. The 
first relation restricts the number bf basic input numbers to 70 and the 
second relation restricts the numbering of logic gates to be less than or 
equal to 2000. For the example of this section, there is a total of 
(13-1+1) or 13 modules whose stages will be formed into a subrun (see 
below) by the critical-pair tree, and the logic statements for the tree 
start with number 20 and end with number 23. 
MODULE UNIT TO STAGE ASSOCIATION 
shows the correspondence of functional module input numbers to a physical 
stage. The form of a particular line of this section is X B C. X is the 
number of the physical stage that consists of functional modules numbered 
B thru C. The stage numbers X from one line to the next do not have to 
be consecutive but must be in increasing order. The range of stage 
numbers used by this section cannot exceed twenty. Thus the MODULE UNIT 
TO STAGE ASSOCIATION section will not be longer than twenty lines. 
In the example problem, modules 1-6 are associated with processor 
stage 1, modules 7-11 with memory stage 2, and modules 12-13 with power 
supply stage 3. All three MODULE UNIT TO STAGE ASSOCIATION statements 
are listed in the critical-pair tree paragraph even though the critical-
pair tree diagram does not show modules 12 and 13. The state~nt, 
3 12 13, is included so that only one subrun will be formed; otherwise, 
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if it were omitted and it could have been, then two subruns would have 
been formed to produce the same results (see section 3.6.1 and 
appendix D.2). Creating two subruns, however, would int'roduce addi tional 
difficulty in describing the CARE III output, disriussed later. Modules 
10 and 11 although listed are not critically coupled. They are listed in 
statement 2 7 11 to simply associate them with stage 2. 
The integer B o~ the first MODULE UNIT TO STAGE ASSOCIATION line must 
equal the integer K of the MODULE AND LOGIC RANGE ID section. For the 
rest of the MODULE UNIT TO STAGE ASSOCIATION lines, the integer B must 
equal one more than the integer C of the preceding line. The integer C 
of the last MODULE UNIT TO STAGE ASSOCIATION line must equal the 
integer L of the MODULE AND LOGIC RANGE ID section. Thus all L-K+1 
functional module numbers are associated with some stage. 
At the beginning of a mission, each stage X of the system under study 
consists of N(X) modules. (See section 3.2 for N(x) description.) 
Another rule in constructing the MODULE UNIT TO STAGE ASSOCIATION section 
is that the quantity C-B+l for each line must equal N(X). For the 
example of this section, notice that 6-1+1 = N(1), 11-7+1 = N(2), and 
13-12+1 = N(3). 
When more than one critical-pair tree is created by the user, the stage 
numbers of the MODULE UNIT TO STAGE ASSOCIATION section must be in 
increasing order from one tree to the next. Thus the same stage cannot 
be referenced by more than one critical-pair tree. The input numbers to 
a critical-pair tree can, however, be used again from one tree to the 
next since they have functional, versus physical significance. 
LOGIC GATE ID 
This section lists the logic gate descriptors for the critical-pair tree. 
There will be one descriptor for every gate of the tree. Logic gate 
descriptor format is identical to that of the system fault tree LOGIC 
GATE ID section. Fewer gates are available for making a c~itical-pair 
tree than for a system fault tree. The gates available are 2-input AND 
gates, 2 of N gates, and OR gates with two or more inputs. Input events 
to these gates are functional module numbers or outputs from preceding 
m 
m 
gates. The general format for these logic gates are shown below. Notice 
that the OR gate can be represented by three different symbols. For each 
gate used, k must be less than or equal to 2000, and inputs m n ••• z 
must all be less than k. 
AND 
n 
OR 
z 
2 of N 
k A m n 
k 0 m n 
k 0 m n 
k 1 m n 
z 
z 
z 
k 2 m n ••• z 
if events m and n 
occur (fail), event 
k occurs 
if any of the events 
m thru z occur (fail), 
event k occurs 
if any two of the events 
m thru z occur (fail), 
event k occurs 
m z 
3.6.1 Critical-Pair Tree Rules and Procedures 
Critical-pair tree information is read and processed only if the parameter 
CPLFLG in input paragraph RNTIME is set equal to .TRUE •• If CPLFLG = .FALSE., 
and if all fault-handling models used for the system being modeled all have 
their C parameters in input paragraph FLTTYP set to one, then all Q(tl~) and 
QSUM values calculated and shown on the CARE III output listing will equal 
zero. 
Logic gates for a critical-pair tree must be numbered sequentially without 
interruption. All numbers used must be integers. The inputs to any logic gate 
must be less than the gate they feed. The first input module number does not 
have to equal one, nor does the first logic gate have to be numbered one more 
than the last input module number. Like the system fault tree, leaving a gap 
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of integers between the highest numbered input event and the lowest numbered 
logic gate will sometimes facilitate revisions without having to renumber the 
whole critical-pair tree. 
The purpose of a critical-pair tree is to indicate the pairs of module failures 
(input events) that can cause system failure due to improper fault handling. A 
critical-pair tree should not be constructed so that one, or more than two 
module failures cause an output from the top most gate. To facilitate this 
type of construction, the CARE III program only allows 2-input AND gates, 
2 of N gates, and OR gates with two or more inputs when constructing a 
critical-pair tree. Combinations of three or more events which lead to the top 
event of a critical-pair tree are ignored by CARE III. For the example of this 
section, any two faults among modules (functionally numbered) 1, 2, and 3. or 
any two among modules 4, 5. and 6 cause failure of the first or second triad as 
well as the system. From the example. the reader should note that not all 
modules need to be critically coupled, only those that apply to the system 
design. More examples of critical-pair trees can be found in appendix G. 
CARE III often computes fault-handling unreliability in segments called 
subruns. Every critical-pair tree created by the user will spawn a subrun. 
For details on how this works see appendix D.2. The example problem of this 
section is suitable for partitioning into subruns. Below are two examples of 
critical-pair tree input that would create two subruns from the discussion 
problem. Stage one would be in subrun one, and stages two and three would be 
in subrun two. Note that many other types of tree numbering are possible than 
the ones shown. 
Example one: 
CRITICAL-PAIR TREE ONE 
1 6 7 9 
1 6 
7 2 1 2 3 
8 2 4 5 6 
9 0 7 8 
CRITICAL-PAIR TREE TWO 
1 788 
215 
3 6 7 
8 2 1 2 3 
Example two: 
CRITICAL-PAIR TREE ONE 
11 16 21 23 
1 11 16 
21 2 11 12 13 
22 2 14 15 16 
23 1 21 22 
CRITICAL-PAIR TREE TWO 
21 27 31 31 
2 21 25 
3 26 27 
31 2 21 22 23 
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3.7 INPUT SUMMARY 
The table on the next page provides the user with a quick-look summary of all 
the user input values and their valid ranges. The variables listed in the 
first column are the user definable input variable names that are presented as 
arrays. The array size is given by column two and tells the user the maximum 
number of values that can be defined for its corresponding variable name 
(Col. 1). The variable and arrays are defined in sections 3.1-3.4. The 
variables and arrays are listed in the table in the order in which they must be 
provided for list-directed type formatting. 
Because of the possible large amount of input data that can be described, 
CARE III uses default parameters. The default values will be automatically 
used by CARE III unless another value is defined. The default values have been 
preselected by the CARE III designers as their best guess of the values that 
would most likely be used most often. The right most column defines the valid 
ranges of CARE III input values, which means, CARE III will not give a warning 
or abort the execution if user specified values are within range. The listed 
values are those that CARE III will accept as possible input; however, the 
reasonableness of using sets of these values must be obtained from engineering 
judgement. With this approach, correct execution is virtually assured. A 
random selection of values from this list will not guarantee correct execution. 
Typically, the fault-handling rate parameters should be three or four orders of 
magnitude larger than the fault occurrence rates. A 32 bit machine will not be 
able to process as large a range of fault-handling parameters as a 60 or 64 bit 
machine will. If fault-handling parameters are too large for a given CARE III 
problem, the COVRGE program module will write an error message to the output 
listing. 
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VARIABLE ARRAY SIZE 
FLTTYP - fault-handling parameters 
NFTYPS 
ALP(i ) 
BET(i ) 
DEL (i) 
RHO(i ) 
EPS (i) 
IDELF(i) 
IRHOF(i) 
IEPSF(i ) 
PA(i ) 
PB(i) 
, C(i) 
DBLDF 
TRUNC 
CVPRNT 
CVPLOT 
IAXSCV 
MARKOV 
LGTMST 
STAGES - stage 
NSTGES 
N(x) 
M(x) 
NOP(j,x) 
LC(x) 
IRLPCD 
RLPLOT 
IAXSRL 
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
definition parameters 
1 
70 
70 
(5,70) 
70 
1 
FLTCAT - fault occurrence parameters 
NFCATS(x) 
JTYP(j ,x) 
OMG(j ,x) 
RLM(j ,x) 
70 
(5,70) 
(5,70) 
(5,70) 
RNTIME - run time parameters 
FT 
NSTEPS 
ITBASE 
SYSFLG 
CPLFLG 
KWT 
PSTRNC 
CINDBG 
QPTRNC 
IVSN 
NPSBRN 
CKDATA 
DEFAULT 
1 
0.0 
0.0 
3.6E+3 
0.0 
0.0 
1 
1 
1 
1.0 
0.0 
1.0 
.05 
1.0E-4 
.FALSE. 
• FALSE. 
2 
1 
• TRUE. 
see NOP 
0 
1 
• FALSE. 
2 
1 
1 
1.0 
1.0E-4 
1.0 
50 
1 
.FALSE. 
.FALSE. 
on page 
(not used) 
1.0E-14 
• FALSE. 
1.0E-2 
4 
20 
• TRUE. 
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RANGE 
1 - 5 
~ 0.0 
'f! 0.0 
~ 0.0 
~ 0.0 
~ 0.0 
1 or 2 
1 or 2 
1 or 2 
0.0 - 1.0 
0.0 - 1.0 
o~o - 1.0 
0.01 - 0.1 
1.0E-3 - 1.0E-6 
• FALSE. or .TRUE • 
.FALSE. or ~TRUE • 
1 - 4 
1 or 2 
• FALSE • or 
- 70 
~ 1 
;: 0 
27 
0 - N(x) 
1 - 4 
.FALSE. 
1 - 4 
1 - 5 
1 - 5 
> 0.0 
> 0.0 
> 0.0 
17 - 64 
1 - 4 
or 
.TRUE. or 
• TRUE~ or 
(not used) 
> 0.0 
.TRUE. or 
> 0.0 
3 or 4 
1 - 20 
.TRUE. or 
.TRUE • 
.TRUE • 
.FALSE. 
.FALSE • 
.FALSE • 
.FALSE . 
3.8 AVAILABILITY OF DATA 
The acquisition of reliability failure data is a perennial problem for analysts 
even when traditional piece-part reliability models are used. The most common 
source of data is given by Mil-Handbook 217. Unfortunately not much data are 
available for Wei bull failure distributions. Over the years, several papers 
have appeared in the literature supporting the use of Weibull distributions, 
e.g., see references 8, 9, 10, and 11; however, the use of Weibull 
distributions for prediction of system reliability remains sparse. 
The justification for including it in CARE III is manifold: As a consequence 
of the state aggregation/decomposition technique that enables CARE III to 
handle very large state spaces, CARE III implements a non homogenous Markov 
model which uses nonconstant transition rates. The Weibull distribution is a 
very flexible distribution with a nonconstant hazard rate that reduces to an 
exponential distribution (constant failure rate) by setting one parameter. The 
Wei bull distribution permits the analyst the opportunity to examine the effects 
of wear-out on the reliability estimate, or it can be used to model modules 
that are redundant internally. Note that CARE III normally models replication 
of simplex modules in a stage, and redundancy across stages can also be 
modeled. Since the distributions of several CARE III model parameter 
distributions are not well known (e.g., transient, intermittent, and software 
faults), it is fitting to have a generalized distribution available (i.e., 
Weibull distribution). 
Some work was done to estimate intermittent arrival time distributions 
(ref. 12) and to characterize transient faults (ref. 13). New work on 
predicting software reliability is described in reference 14; and references 15 
and 16 present fault latency data for permanent faults. 
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4.0 OUTPUT 
Each of the CARE III program modules writes data to an output file listing. 
This listing and its interpretation .is discussed .in this section. 
4.1 CARE IN Output 
CAREIN is the first main program module of the CARE III computer program. The 
CAREIN module preprocesses the user-supplied input file for program modules 
COVRGE and CARE3. The CAREIN module begins by copying the user-supplied input 
file to the output listing. The CARE III header is printed next. The header 
is followed by a list of the stages for the system under study. For each stage 
of the system, the probability of failure due to permanent and intermittent 
faults 12 is calculated at time, t, where t is the end mission time specified by 
input parameters 'FT' and 'ITBASE'. This list of probabilities is provided to 
give the user a 'feel' for the minimum probability of failure for each stage, 
when each stage is considered separately. These probabilities can be used to 
determine if a reasonable P*SUM computation is presented, when the following 
conditions exist: For long mission times, it is possible that the CARE III 
program will not compute P*SUM conservatively for some systems containing 
twelve or more stages. This condition may occur when the probability of module 
depletion failure for one or more stages approaches one, leading to a P*SUM 
value that approaches one. Normally, this condition will not occur when 
modeling ultrareliable systems. If it should occur, a warning message is 
printed by the CAREIN program module to alert the user. 
A second list is provided by the CARE IN program module. This list shows how 
many subruns will be created by the CARE3 program module, the physical stages 
that are considered in each subrun, and the subruns if any, that will involve 
critical-pair failure calculations (see appendix D.2 for information on how 
subruns are created and what they are). 
If the CAREIN module executes successfully, a "SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF CAREIN" 
message will be printed. If this message does not appear, program modules 
COVRGE and CARE3 will not execute normally. 
12. Transient faults are not accounted for in this list. 
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4.2 COVRGE Output 
The COVRGE program module prints a CARE III header followed by a table listing 
the parameters for all fault-handling models used by the current problem. 
Information for at least one fault-handling model will be shown. If input 
parameter CVPRNT is set .TRUE., some debugging information will also be printed 
on the listing. The debug information, if printed, is usually of little or of 
no interest to a typical user. 
4.3 CARE3 Output 
It is the CARE3 program module output which provides the unreliability 
predictions for the system being modeled. Predictions for overall system 
unreliability along with general information about subruns is always given, but 
specific information about individual subruns may also be obtained. This 
subrun information will be described subsequently and will be followed with a 
discussion of the summary information. 
Like the COVRGE program module, the CARE3 program module begins by printing a 
CARE III header to the output listing. The header is followed by the system 
fault tree title, provided a system fault tree existed in the user-supplied 
input file to the CAREIN program. 
The next portiones) of CARE3 output provides subrun information. Every 
CARE III problem will contain at least one subrun. Part of the listing for the 
example of section three is shown as figures 4-1 thru 4-3 showing the structure 
of the subrun portion of the listing. The beginning of a subrun listing starts 
with a subrun number. This number is printed at the top of a fresh page. 
Following the subrun number is the range of stages included in the subrun. The 
number of stages in this range determines how many elements the subrun's 
~ vector will have. Next in the listing is a table summarizing each fault 
occurrence rate and fault-handling model used by the stages in the subrun. 
When looking at this table, note that 'ICAT' is used for bookkeeping purposes 
to identify the lth fault type that a stage is subject to, and 'JTYP' 
represents a fault-handling model number. 
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1 
+:'-
--.j 
1 
, . 
SUB RUN 
S TAG E S 3 
CON F G U RAT ION F A U L T I N FOR MAT ION : 
S TAG E N M I CAT R L M o M G J T V P 
2 
3 
6 
5 
2 
F A U LTV E C TOR S 
TIMES AT WHICH THE FOLLOWING 
H.H.0'H.0'H.0'.0'.0'.0'HE+.0'.0' 
2.288853284.0'E-.0'4 
7.62951.0'9466E-.0'4 
1.9836728461E-.0'3 
4.73.0'2967869E-.0'3 
1.2.0'54627761E-.0'2 
2.9144732282E-.0'2 
6.82.0'783.0'191E-.0'2 
1.56.0'997963HE-Hl 
3.9.0'47837257E-.0'1 
9.3736171722E-.0'1 
2.18738.0'79.0'7E+.0'H 
4.9999237.0'61E+.0'.0' 
P ( H, .0', H) 
Q( H, g, H) 
1 • .0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'HH.0'.0'E+.0'.0' 
9.9999964237E-.0'1 
9.9999892712E-Hl 
9.9999719858E-.0'1 
9.99993.0'2626E-.0'1 
9.9998217821E-Hl 
9.9995619.0'59E-Hl 
9.9989771843E-Hl 
9.9976611137E-Hl 
9.99415338.0'4E-.0'1 
9.98597.0'8548E-.0'l 
9.9672865868E-Hl 
9.925378561HE-.0'1 
2 
2 
-------
2.2.0'.0'E-.0'4 
3.5.0'.0'E-H5 
1.5.0'.0'E-H6 
FUNCTION VALUES CORRESPOND (IN HOURS): 
-------
1 • .0'.0'E+.0'H 1 
1 • .0'.0'E+.0'H 
1 • .0'.0'E+.0'H 2 
3.8147554733E-.0'5 7.62951.0'9466E-.Il'5 1.144426642.0'E-H4 1.5259H21893E-.0'4 
3 • .0'518.0'43786E-.0'4 3.8147554733E-.0'4 4.5777.0'65679E-H4 6.1.0'36H87573E-H4 
9.1554131359E-H4 I.H681315325E-.0'3 1.37331197H4E-.0'3 1.6784924H82E-.0'3 
2.288853284HE-H3 2.8992141597E-.0'3 3.5.1l'9575H354E-.0'3 4.1199359111E-.0'3 
5.951HI85383E-H3 7.17174.0'2898E-.0'3 8.3924625.0'69E-.0'3 9.6131842583E-.0'3 
1.4496.0'71264E-.0'2 1.6937514767E-.0'2 1.937895827.0'E-.0'2 2.4261845276E-H2 
3.4.0'2762115.0'E-.0'2 3.891.0'5.0'8156E-.0'2 4.8676282167E-.0'2 5.8442.0'56179E-.0'2 
7.79736.0'42.0'2E-H2 9.75.0'5152225E-.0'2 1.17.0'367H.0'25E-.0'1 1.3656824827E-.0'1 
1.9516289234E-Hl 2.3422598839E-.0'1 2. 73289.0'8443E-.0'1 3.1235218H48E-Hl 
4.686.0'456467E-.0'1 5.4673.0'75676E-Hl 6.2485694885E-Hl 7.811H9333H4E-.0'1 
1 • .0'936141.0'14E+.0'H 1.2498664856E+.0'.0' 1.562371254.0'E+.0'.0' 1.874876.0'223E+.0'.0' 
2.4998855591E+.0'.0' 3. 124895.0'958E+.0'.0' 3.7499.0'46326E+.0'.0' 4.3749141693E+.0'H 
6.2499427795E+HH 7.499961853.0'E+.0'.0' 8.74998.0'9265E+H.0' 1 • .0'.0'H.0'.0'H.0'.0'HHE+.0'1 
1 • .0'.0'H.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'E+HH 1 • .0'.0'.0'H.0'.0'.0'.0'H.0'E+.0'.0' I.H.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'H.0'.0'.0'E+HH 9.9999964237E-Hl 
9.9999964237E-.0'1 9.9999964237E-.0'1 9.9999928474E-Hl 9.9999928474E-.0'1 
9.99998629.0'9E-.0'1 9.9999827147E-Hl 9.9999791384E-.0'1 9.9999755621E-.0'1 
9. 9999684.0'95E-.0'1 9.9999547.0'.0'5E-Hl 9.9999475479E-.0'1 9.99994H3954E-Hl 
9.9999123812E-Hl 9.999895H958E-Hl 9.9998742342E-.0'1 9.9998569489E-Hl 
9.99978.0'.0'589E-.0'1 9.9997448921E-.0'1 9. 9997.0'97254E-.0'1 9.9996352196E-.0'1 
9.9994885921E-.0'1 9.9994152784E-.0'1 9.999268651.0'E-.0'1 9. 999125.0'.0'38E-.0'1 
9.99883.0'5569E-.0'1 9.99854.0'2822E-.0'1 9.9982458353E-.0'1 9.99795556H7E-Hl 
9.997.0'763922E-.0'1 9.996488.0'943E-.0'1 9.9959.0'6353.0'E-.0'1 9.9953222275E-.0'1 
9.99298.0'957HE-Hl 9.9918121H99E-.0'1 9.99.0'6438589E-.0'1 9.9883.0'25885E-.0'1 
9.9836313725E-.0'1 9.9812924862E-.0'1 9.976623H583E-.0'1 9.9719524384E-.0'1 
9.9626195431E-.0'1 9.9532979727E-Hl 9.9439829588E-Hl 9.934678.0'777E-Hl 
9.9.0'68117142E-.0'1 9.888283.0'143E-.0'1 9.8697817326E-.0'1 9.8513162136E-.0'1 
'%j 
~. 
OQ 
~ 
Ii 
CD 
+:'-
,'I 
I-' 
'"dO 
Ii '0 
o CD 
C"t-! 
Pl Pl 
C"rt 
~. ~. 
1-'0 
~. ::l 
rt Pl 
~. I-' 
CD 
rJl Pl 
::l 
p. 
t'%j 
~ '%j 
~ ~ 
'0 I-' 
I-'rt 
(0 1 
::r: 
HlPl 
t-! ::l 
o p. 
S I-' 
1-" U)::l 
CDOQ 
() 
rt'%j 
1-" Pl 
o ~ 
::l I-' 
~ 
Nt-! 
CD 
o 
H.H FOR ALL TIME STEPS. 
P( H, H, 1 ) 
H.HHHgHHH888E+88 1.1444258735E-IH 2.2888528572E-IH 3.4332825471E-IH 4.5777H62696E-IH 
6.8665534378E-IH 9.15541698HIE-18 1.1444259984E-89 1.37331H7984E-H9 1.831H8HH654E-H9 
2.2888515527E-89 2.7466211527E-89 3.2843878662E-H9 4.1199248457E-89 5.H3546893H7E-89 
5.951HH14694E-89 6.8665371167E-H9 8.6976H53H26E-H9 1.H528673845E-88 1.2359744339E-88 
1.419878818HE-H8 1.7852898721E-88 2.1514994231E-H8 2.5177892411E-88 2.8839158617E-88 
3.6163243867E-88 4.3487268897E-88 5.8811244989E-H8 5.8135185554E-88 7.2782952998E-H8 
8.743H4H7882E-88 1.8287762182E-87 1.1672473477E-H7 1.46818H6697E-H7 1.7531H74548E-H7 
2.H46825287HE-87 2.3389343885E-H7 2.9247291877E-H7 3.51H4855556E-87 4.89621H3753E-87 
'%j 4.6818982469E-87 5.8531753666E-87 7.H243146411E-H7 8.1953188597E-H7 9.3661839173E-87 
1.1787512613E-86 1.484827799HE-H6 1.6388496533E-H6 1.8728184159E-H6 2.3485887H77E-86 ..... ()Q-2.8881421988E-H6 3.2754744552E-H6 3.7425879782E-H6 4.6761633712E-86 5.6888615565E-H6 ~ 6.5486879912E-86 7.471639H372E-H6 9.3389217846E-H6 1.1186728443E-H5 1.3839H55375E-85 t1 
1.4887895384E-H5 1.8575197828E-8S 2.2248652385E-85 2.59H8388813E-8S 2.95S4181318E-HS (l) 
.p-
a( H, H, 1 ) I N H.H FOR ALL TIME STEPS. . 
P ( H, 1, H) 
'"dO 8.H8H888HH88E+H8 6.6758198969E-H9 1.3351646899E-88 2.8827451697E-H8 2.67H3293798E-8a 
4.H854983394E-H8 5.34H6S1299HE-H8 6.6758211483E-88 8.81H982H999E-88 1.H681384738E-87 t1'd o (l) 1.3351639438E-87 1.6H219642HHE-H7 1.869227H487E-H7 2.483298S799E-H7 2.9373526988E-87 c:rt1 3.4714193475E-H7 4.8H54817418E-87 5.H736848252E-H7 6.1417222241E-87 7.2898464443E-H7 III Pl 8.2779638433E-H7 1.H41419H683E-86 1.2558419797E-H6 1.4686629584E-86 1.6822833686E-H6 c:rrt 
2.1895236287E-86 2.5367567185E-H6 2.9639913919E-H6 3.391221S258E-86 4.2456713345E-H6 1-" 1-'-
5.1H81861365E-H6 5.9S4S332878E-86 6.8H89429988E-86 8.5177387483E-H6 1.8226474842E-HS t-'O 
1.193S165276E-8S 1.36438H6S97E-85 1.7H68938262E-8S 2.8477888753E-8S 2.3894624974E-8S 1-" ::s rt Pl 2.7311154SS4E-H5 3.4143646189E-85 4.H975384728E-8S 4.78H62S8222E-H5 5.4636377172E-H5 1-'- t-' 
I 6.8294219H91E-85 8.1948877778E-85 9.5688466811E-H5 1.8924882372E-84 1.3653686584E-84 (l) 1.6381898973E-84 1.91H7288972E-H4 2.1832228231E-H4 2.7278313864E-H4 3.2719364398E-84 (fl Pl 
.p- 3.8155386574E-84 4.3586362153E-H4 5.4433243349E-H4 6.526HH31261E-84 7.6866679321E-84 ::s co 8.6853356333E-84 1.8836659931E-H3 1.2988813853E-H3 1.511538852HE-83 1.7242822796E-83 ....... p.. I n 
o '%j 
::s Pl 
ac 8, 1, H) -~ 
H.H FOR ALL TIME STEPS. rtt-' 
'-J rt 
P ( 1 8, H) .. I ::I:: 
, H.HHHH8HHH8HE+HH 5.8354771828E-H8 1.887H959178E-87 1.5186425622E-87 2.8141921198E-87 t'JPl 
3.H212854885E-87 4.8283785552E-87 5.H354782388E-H7 6.8425713855E-H7 8.8567571184E-H7 ~ ::s 
1.8878945189E-86 1.2885138265E-86 1.4899317696E-H6 1.8127682324E-86 2.2156859458E-86 Pl p.. 
2.6184487834E-86 3.H21279H989E-86 3.8269463483E-86 4.6326163181E-86 5.4382885537E-86 S t-' 
6.2439539761E-86 7.8552811829E-86 9.4666828232E-86 1.1877927411E-85 1.2689238247E-85 'd 1-" t-'::S 1.5911844457E-85 1.9134422473E-85 2.2356982299E-85 2.5579529392E-85 3.2824541724E-85 (l)()Q 
3.8469498391E-85 4.4914344471E-H5 5.1359H85774E-HS 6.4248335548E-85 7.7137279732E-85 
9.8H25838298E-85 1.82914H5488E-84 1.2868944832E-H4 1.5446329788E-84 1.8823598383E-84 M}'%j 
2.868H715652E-84 2.5754538365E-84 3.8987767359E-H4 3.686H463754E-84 4.121264218HE-84 t1 Pl 
5.1515229279E-84 6.1815575464E-84 7.2113738861E-H4 8.24896H8876E-84 1.8299467249E-83 o 1-" S t-' 1.2357887187E-83 1.4413884747E-83 1.6469646944E-83 2.8578624681E-H3 2.4684836616E-83 ~ 2.8785897885E-83 3.2884182874E-83 4.1878896195E-H3 4.9241785891E-83 5.7399254292E-83 (l)t1 
6.5544289537E-83 8.178885H811E-83 9.7972758664E-H3 1.1418558214E-82 1.3HI7944992E-82 (l) (l) 
n 
rt 
a{ 1,8, H) 1-" 0 H.H FOR ALL TIME STEPS. ::s 
P ( H, 1 , 1) N 
H.HHH88HHHHHE+HH 7.6399812752E-19 3.H55995612HE-18 6.87599Z127HE-18 1.2223988238E-17 . 
2.7583922458E-17 4.88959H6631E-17 7.6399863831E-17 1.lH81576262E-16 1.9558338838E-16 0 
3.H5S99S3473E-16 4.488632622SE-16 5.9897389S88E-16 9.9813969389E-16 1.4798984616E-15 
I 
.J::-
~ 
I 
THE FOLLOWING Q(tl~) VALUES ARE NOT SHOWN IN DETAIL: 
QO,O,1) = ° QO,l,O) = ° Q(2,O,O) 2 ° Q(O,2,O 2 ° 
Q(O,3,O) :2 ° Q(l,l,l,) = ° QO,2,O) 2 ° Q<2,o,1) 2 ° 
Q(2,1,O) ~ ° Q(3,o,O) 2 ° Q(O,3,1) ~ ° QO,2,1) > ° 
QO,3,O) 2 ° Q( 2, I, 1) ~ ° Q(2,2,O) ~ ° QO,o,1) > ° 
Q(3,l,O) ~ ° Q(4,O,O) 2 ° 
Q(X,Y,z) = ° means, all values are zero for time t = ° to specified mission time. 
Q(X,Y,z) ) ° means, only the t 0 value is zero, all others are greater than zero. 
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The division of stages into subruns is a function of two factors, the presence 
of one or more critical-pair trees and the parameter NPSBRN. If a critical-
pair tree was included, it will determine the subrun structure. If a critical-
pair tree is not included, then the parameter NPSBRN determines the petitioning 
of stages in a subrun (see appendix D). If the latter case applies and the 
user is ~nly interested in seeing P*SUM values in the summary; even though no 
p(tl!) ~rrays are requested, they will nevertheless be computed. Therefore, it 
is essential to use NPSBRN wisely. This point is illustrated in the following 
discussion. 
Figure 2-1 shows the general structure of the CARE III aggregate model. The 
vector! for this figure can have a maximum of 70 components, and, therefore, 
this figure depicts a model of up to 70 dimensions (see section 2.1). To 
simplify the discussion, let! have two components, ~(1)=i (stage one has 
i faults) and ~(2)=j (stage two has j faults) so that !=(i,j). The aggregate 
model for !=(i,j) is, therefore, two dimensional. In the context of CARE III 
subruns, two possibilities exist: one subrun can be formed where !=(i,j), or 
two subruns can be formed so that for subrun one, !=(i), and for subrun two, 
!;(j). From a computational point of view, the consequences of specifying one 
or more subruns can in general be dramatic. Since i and j represent the number 
of failed modules per respective stage, where 0~i~K~70 and OSjSLS70, the number 
of possible aggregate G(~) states for !=(i,j) is (K+1)·(L+1). By dividing up 
the state space of ! vectors into two subruns so that for subrun one !=(i) (the 
number of G(~) states is K+1) and for subrun two !=(j) (the number of G(!) 
states is L+1), a total of K+L+2 possible aggregate G(~) states results. 
Aside from illustrating the importance of using NPSBRN judicially, the 
discussion also gives an interpretation of p(tl!) values in a subrun. Recall 
from section 2.1 that p(tl!) is the probability of the system being in state 
G(~) at time t. If two subruns were requested, then p(tl!) for !=(i), !=(j) is 
the probability of the system being in state G(!=(i», G(!=(j», where the 
system has experienced exactly i faults in stage one, exactly j faults in stage 
two. Similarly if one subrun was requested, then p(tl!) for !=(i,j) is the 
probability of the system being in state G(!=(i,j» where the system has 
experienced exactly i faults in stage one and j faults in stage two. The user 
ability to influence the formation of p(tl!) probabilities into different 
subruns may be useful to those analysts interested in predicting the number of 
replacement modules required to effect repairs at various mission times. 
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The time pOints at which CARE III calculates its operational probability 
functions, p(tl~), and its unreliability functions, Q(tl~), QSUM, and P*SUM, 
are determined by several factors. This necessitates that the time pOints for 
which these calculations are solved to be shown on the output listing. 
Figure 4-1 shows the location and format of these time pOints. If a problem 
contains more than one subrun, the time points used from one subrun to the next 
will be the same. In all cases the first time point will be for t=O and the 
final time point will be for the ending mission time specified by input 
parameters FT and ITBASE. In the event the user does not define a 
critical-pair tree, a warning message will appear following the time points 
listing: **WARNING- CRITICAL FAULT PAIR FILE 'BXYFL' ...... ** The message is 
provided to alert the user that no critical-pair tree was read by CARE-III. 
If input parameter IRLPCD is set equal to one, than the listing for each subrun 
in the user's problem will finish with the time array just described. If 
IRLPCD is set equal to four, then the listing for each subrun will also include 
arrays, Q(tl~), the probabilities of fault-handling failure for fault vector !, 
and p(tl~) arrays, the probabilities of successful operation for fault 
vector~. If IRLPCD equals three, then only Q(tl~) arrays are printed; if 
IRLPCD equals two, then only p(tl~) arrays are printed. For the example 
problem of section three, IRLPCD equals four. Some of the p(tl~) and Q(tl~) 
arrays for this problem are shown in figure 4-2. 
In many CARE III applications, the user will be modeling a fault-tolerant 
system where the system can experience a number of faults before system 
failure. The p(tl~) probabilities tell the analyst the probability the system 
or subsystem modeled by a subrun is still operational even though it has 
experienced ~(1),~(2) ••• faults. For the example shown, the subrun contains 
all stages of the system being modeled. The P(O,O,O) value at time step number 
fifty for the example means that at a mission time of 7.8E-1 hours 13 (46.9 
minutes) the system will be operational with probability 9.988E-1, where no 
permanent or intermittent faults occurred in the processor stage, or memory 
stage, or power supply stage. p(tl!) information may be of interest if one 
wants to predict the number of replacement modules required for maintenance at 
the end of a mission. 
13. CARE III lists more than three significant digits, but due to the user's 
host machine, the user may only see agreement to about three significant 
digits when comparing his output listing to the one in this guide. 
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Q(tl!) probabilities tell the analyst the probability of system failure due to 
i(1.),i(2), •• faults having occurred in the subsystem or system modeled by the 
subrun in which the Q(tl!) probabilities are listed. From figures 4-2 and 4-3, 
one notes that there are no single faults which cause a fault-handling failure 
for the example problem. This results because all of the Q(tl!) values 
representing the occurrence of a singe stage fault, e.g., Q(a,a,1), Q(a,1,a), 
and Q(1,a,O), are zero for all time points. Only when more than one fault 
occurs do we see nonzero Q(tl!) array values, e.g., Q(O,2,a) is greater than 
zero. Thus two faults occurring in close succession in stage two may defeat 
the system's fault h~ndling strategy and cause the system to fail. This 
failure mechanism is indicated thru the critical-pair tree. For the example, 
the Q(O,O,2) array does not appear because two faults in stage three cause 
stage failure by module depletion as specified by the system fault tree. This 
failure mechanism will be accounted for in the P*SUM function yet to be 
discussed. Similarly Q(a,4,O) doesn't appear since the vector, (a,4,a), also 
represents failure due to depletion of modules and will be accounted for in the 
P*SUM function. 
When interpreting p(tl!) and Q(tl!) array values, it must be remembered that 
transient faults are counted differently than permanent and intermittent 
faults. If the example problem above had considered transient faults, then the 
Q(a,O,a) array may not have been equal to zero for all time points. 
When a CARE III problem is partitioned into more than one subrun, the 
additional subruns follow the same format as the first. For large problems, 
selecting an IRLPCD value of four may produce large amounts of output. In many 
cases, selecting IRLPCD equal to three will provide enough detail about 
potential weak points of a design while controlling the volume of output. 
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4.4 Summary Output from CARE3 
The last portion of the CARE3 program module's output is the CARE III summary 
information. The summary gives information on functions QSUM, P*SUM, and 
QSUM + P*SUM, defined thus: 
QSUM 
P*SUM 
probability of a system failure due to imperfect fault handling 
(fault-handling unreliability). QSUM is the sum of the Q(tl&) 
functions over all subruns. 
QSUM(t) = r [r Q(tl&s)] 
s ~ 
-s 
where s 
is an index indicating sUbruns, and ~ are fault vectors for 
-s 
subrun s. 
probability of a system failure due to depletion of modules 
(module depletion unreliability). 
QSUM + P*SUM probability equal to the sum of the above two probabilities. The 
value computed is called the total system unreliability. 
For the summary output of the example shown as figure 4-4, one notes that the 
fault-handling unreliability QSUM at 10.0 hours is 8.20E-10, and the module 
depletion unreliability P*SUM, is 2.25E-10. 
A breakdown of the above two unreliability functions per exactly K stages 
having failed by the end of the mission time is given following the 
QSUM + P*SUM array. The interpretation of the data given at the very end of 
the listing can best be understood by recognizing that CARE III allows for 
redundant stages. The column of numbers under the heading, Portion of 
Unreliability Caused by Exhaustion of Modules of Exactly K Stages Failing by 
'FT', 'time units', identifies the relative contribution K stage failures make 
to the total system unreliability. The greater the stage redundancy modeled, 
the greater the number of stage failures required to substantially increase the 
unreliability. In the example problem output, one stage failure contributes 
2.25E-10 toward system unreliability, two stage failures contribute 8.5E-23, 
and three stage failures contribute 5.17E-36. One stage failure contribution 
SUM MAR Y I N FOR MAT ION : 
a SUM 
H.HHHHHffffffffffE+ffff 4. 12995ff8ff34E-16 1.5635237178E-15 3.2956482849E-15 5.457335ff233E-15 
l.ff6ff8219456E-14 1.6368149376E-14 2.241H845152E-14 2.8581886749E-14 4.1H66732263E-14 
5.36H9453844E-14 6.6164ffff6782E-14 7.8722178244E-14 l.ff384156371E-13 1.2896898174E-13 
1.5488ff29399E-13 1.7919971334E-13 2.2943851138E-13 2.7967726876E-13 3.29915999H3E-13 
3.8815475642E-13 4.8ff63218986E-13 5.811ff948779E-13 6.8158678571E-13 7.82H6397521E-13 ~ 
9.83ffI813738E-13 1.1839717574E-12 1.3849252691E-12 1.5858782386E-12 1.9877834188E-12 ~ 
2.3896869726E-12 2.7915896591E-12 3.193491H445E-12 3.9972899123E-12 4.8fflff831422E-12 ~ 
5.6848716816E-12 6.4H865529H5E-12 8.ffI62ff66221E-12 9.623735836ffE-12 1.1231246835E-l1 ~ ~ 1.2838734416E-l1 1.6853653198E-ll 1.9268489582E-l1 2.2483237494E-l1 2.5697987344E-l1 ro 3.21269955ff8E-11 3.855575928ffE-ll 4.4984193454E-l1 5.1412291891E-ll 6.42675fflH43E-ll 
7.7121392685E-ll 8.9973965778E-ll l.ff28252275ffE-lff 1.2852378883E-lff 1.5421785579E-lff ~ 
1.799ff5ff4919E-18 2.8558782454E-IH 2.56937499ff5E-lff 3.8826613484E-lff 3.595737319ffE-lff I 
4.1ff86ff31799E-lff 5.1337856828E-lff 6.15797ff2448E-lff 7.1813976987E-lff 8.2ff3988ff445E-lff ~ . 
p* SUM ~ 
ff.8ffffff88ff8ffffE+ffff 3.2742765169E-21 1.3B97118185E-2B 2.9468571847E-2B 5.2388524437E-2ff ~ 
1.1787396187E-19 2.895543ff454E-19 3.2742796835E-19 4.714963B958E-19 8.3821478833E-19 § 1.3897131142E-18 1.885987B995E-18 2.5678342627E-18 4.2434625986E-18 6.339ffI79742E-18 
8.8536548946E-18 1.17874ff81BIE-17 1.8912253861E-17 2.7713528371E-17 3.8191276297E-17 ~ ~ 5.B345315662E-17 7.9682824568E-17 1.1572616759E-16 1.5847547845E-16 2.B793B28376E-16 ~ 3.269566764ffE-16 4.728B643256E-16 6.4547859872E-16 8.44974B2192E-16 1.3244359629E-15 
1.911186B616E-15 2.6ff52264357E-15 3.4B6564ff738E-15 5.331B983151E-15 7.6848B89B5BE-15 H 
l.ff467687372E-14 1.367973B329E-14 2.1391341B58E-14 3.ff8195758BIE-14 4.19644957B8E-14 ~ 
5.482685ff655E-14 8.5699215736E-14 1.2343911429E-13 1.68ff4554981E-13 2.1951868491E-13 ~ 
3.4386541982E-13 4.94B78411ffBE-13 6.7255765844E-13 8.785ff516792E-13 1.3727998ff99E-12 0 ~ 1.9769611295E-12 2.69ff9923942E-12 3.5148945386E-12 5.4923223ff88E-12 7.9ff92548483E-12 S 
I 1.ff765725117E-11 1.4ff61763ff39E-11 2.1972694497E-ll 3.1642612142E-ll 4.3ff72143B74E-ll ~ 
~ 5.6262165B66E-l1 8.7929B73744E-ll 1.266565B473E-IB 1.7246429285E-IB 2.25378674B6E-IB rt 
~ ~ 
I 0 
Q SUM + p* SUM = ~ ~ 
B.8888888Bff8E+88 4.129983626ffE-16 1.5635368468E-15 3.2956777193E-15 5.4573875394E-15 
l.ff6ff8337193E-14 1.6368359448E-14 2.24111721B7E-14 2.8582357699E-14 4.1B67569132E-14 ~ 
5.361B765B51E-14 6.616589B583E-14 7.8724746448E-14 I.B38458ff565E-13 1.2896724433E-13 ~ 
1.54ff8914379E-13 1.792115B4B4E-13 2.2945743B7BE-13 2.797B497BI2E-13 3.2995419BB6E-13 ~ 
3.8ff2B5ff9B5BE-13 4.8ff71187872E-13 5.8122522637E-13 6.8174524186E-13 7.8227192519E-13 ~ 9.8334513275E-13 1.184444578BE-12 1.38557B6946E-12 1.5867232658E-12 1.9891B788BIE-12 ~ 
2.3915982842E-12 2.79419478BIE-12 3.1968976B77E-12 4.8B26211512E-12 4.8ff87679672E-12 ro 
5.6153393567E-12 6.4223348861E-12 8.ff375983647E-12 9.6545558BB7E-12 1.1273211531E-ll 
1.2893568351E-ll 1.6139352B88E-ll 1.9391929B35E-ll 2.2651283627E-l1 2.5917426191E-ll ~ 
3.2478ff61362E-11 3.9B49836281E-ll 4.5656752684E-ll 5.229B796693E-ll 6.564B298752E-ll ~ 0 7.9B98352868E-ll 9.2664959B39E-ll l.ff634BI2421E-IB 1.34BI611765E-IB 1.6212631238E-IB S 1.9B67ff77B84E-lff 2.1964959BI8E-IB 2.7891B2ffB49E-IB 3.399B874BB4E-IB 4.B264588885E-IB 
4.671225B734E-IB 6.BI29962121E-IB 7.42453543B9E-lff 8.9B6B4B9848E-18 1.8457774646E-B9 ~ 
ro 
n 
rt 
K PORTION OF UNRELIA8ILITY CAUSED BY PORTION OF UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY ~ 0 
STAGE FAULT HANDLING AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES EXHAUSTION OF MODULES OF EXACTLY K ~ 
FAILURES HAVE FAILED BY I.B8HHE+Hl HOURS STAGES FAILING BY I.HHHffE+Hl HOURS N 
H 8.2H3988H445E-lff B.HH8HffHHHffHE+HH . 
1 X 2.25378674H6E-IH 0 
2 X 8.595H213711E-23 
3 X 5.17673H6865E-36 
TOTAL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT IH.H HOURS 1.H457774646E-H9 
was predominate because the system fault tree was an OR gate specifying no 
stage redundancy. The sum of numbers for this column equals the P*SUM(FT) 
value, which is the last time point of the P*SUM array. 
Continuing the discussion of the table shown in figure 4-4, the probability 
values listed under the heading, Portion of Unreliability caused by Fault-
Handling after Exactly K Stages have Failed by 'FT', 'time units', identify the 
contribution imperfect fault-handling makes toward system unreliability as a 
function of the number of stage failures. For the example problem, one stage 
failure fails the system (OR gate for system tree) which is the reason only one 
nonzero value appears in the column. The 'X' in the other rows indicate a very 
small probability or a probability equal to zero. The sum of numbers for this 
middle column equals the QSUM(FT) value, which is the last time pOint of the 
QSUM array. Unlike the P*SUM array, the QSUM array can be further analyzed and 
broken into detail by looking at the individual Q(tl~) arrays of the subrun 
output previously discussed. 
The magnitude of the QSUM and P*SUM probabilities indicate the relative 
dependence of a system's unreliability resulting from imperfect fault-handling 
and due to stage failures. In the example problem discussed in this section, 
imperfect fault-handling makes a significant contribution to total system 
unreliability even though no stage failures have occurred. 
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APPENDIX A 
Machine Dependency Information 
. . 
It has been NASA Langley Resea~ch Center's(~aRC) "ioai to develop the Computer-
Aided Reliability Estimation (CARE III) computer program to run on a wide range 
of computers. To obtain this goal, NASA LaRC has developed the second release 
of the CARE III computer program to conform to all ANSI Fortran 77 standards. 
This approach has enabled NASA to develop CARE III so that it can execute on 
NASA's VAX-11 700 series computers or its CYBER 170 series computers. The 
following pages of Appendix A describe machine dependency information for these 
two types of computers and should help in the installation of other machines as 
well. 
The Digital Equipment Corporation VAX-11 700 series computers at NASA LaRC 
presently run under the VMS version 3.7 operating system. The VAX computers 
are virtual memory machines with 32 bit single precision words. Single 
precision floating point numbers can take on values from approximately 0.3E-38 
to 1.7E+38. The VAX-11 Fortran compiler is used to compile the CARE III 
program for these machines. 
The Control Data Corporation CYBER 170 series computers used at NASA LaRC 
presently run under the NOS version 1.4 operating system. These computers have 
a fixed core memory of 377,000 octal words, and single precision words are 60 
bits long. Single precision floating point numbers can take on values from 
approximately 1.0E-293 to 1.0E+322. The CDC Fortran V compiler is used to 
compile the CARE III program on these machines. 
The following discussions assume the user has successfully read the magnetic 
tape received from the NASA COSMIC distribution facility which contains the 
second release version of the CARE III program. 
A-1 
A.1 Installation 
With the exception of the plotting routines described in Appendix A.2, the 
CARE III computer program consists of three main program modules. These 
programs are called CAREIN, COVRAGE, and CARE3. For these three program 
modules, there are four source code files because two slightly different CAREIN 
files have been supplied. The two CAREIN modules are identical except that one 
CAREIN module reads the user-supplied input file using ANSI Fortran 11 list-
directed read statements, and the other CAREIN module uses nonstandard Fortran 
NAMELIST read statements for reading the user-supplied input file. The two 
versions of the CAREIN module were included because VAX-11 Fortran and CDC 
Fortran V both support the Fortran NAMELIST read statements, and because it is 
easier for a user to create an input file using 'namelist' syntax, than it is 
for him to create an input file using 'list-directed' syntax. The first few 
lines of each of the four Fortran source code files for the three different 
program modules to be used is shown below. 
Once it is decided which of the two CARE IN modules is to be concatenated with 
the COVRGE and CARE3 modules, one can compile the complete CARE III source 
code. A compiler that can compile ANSI Fortran 11 as a minimum, needs to be 
used: A VAX-11 Fortran compiler and a CDC Fortran V compiler will compile ANSI 
Fortran 11 as well as the NAMELIST read extension. A chart showing how 
executable code is created on the VAX and CDC machines is shown in table A.1. 
Note the names of the pieces of code that were used at NASA LaRC and that other 
names can be used if desired. 
Identification for CAREIN program module which uses NAMELIST statements 
(VAX-11 Fortran and CDC Fortran V): 
PROGRAM CARE IN 
C* 
C* NOTE: THIS CAREIN MODULE IS FOR NAMELIST FORMATTED INPUT 
C* 
* 
* 
* C********************************************************************* 
C* * 
C* TITLE: COMPUTER-AIDED RELIABILITY ESTIMATION, THIRD GENERATION * 
C* ACRONYM: CARE III. * 
C* 
* C********************************************************************* 
C* * 
C* CARE III, RELEASE VERSION 2.0, APRIL 1985 * 
A-2 
Identification for CAREIN program module which uses list-directed formats for 
reading input (Fortran 77): 
PROGRAM CAREIN 
C* 
C* NOTE: THIS CAREIN MODULE IS FOR LIST-DIRECTED INPUT 
C* 
* 
* 
* C********************************************************************* 
C* * 
C* TITLE: COMPUTER-AIDED RELIABILITY ESTIMATION, THIRD GENERATION * 
C* ACRONYM: CARE III. * 
C* * 
C********************************************************************* 
C* * 
C* CARE III, RELEASE VERSION 2.0, APRIL 1985. 
* 
Identification for COVRGE module (Fortran 77): 
PROGRAM COVRGE 
C* * C********************************************************************* 
C* * 
C* TITLE: COMPUTER-AIDED RELIABILITY ESTIMATION, THIRD GENERATION * 
C* ACRONYM: CARE III. * 
C* * 
C********************************************************************* 
C* * 
C* CARE III, RELEASE VERSION 2.0, APRIL 1985. 
* 
Identification-for CARE3 module (Fortran 77): 
PROGRAM CARE3 
C* * C********************************************************************* 
C* * 
C* TITLE: COMPUTER-AIDED RELIABILITY ESTIMATION, THIRD GENERATION * 
C* ACRONYM: CARE III. * 
C* * 
C********************************************************************* 
C* * 
C* CARE III, RELEASE VERSION 2.0, APRIL 1985. * 
Source code 
CAREIN.FOR 
or CINAME.FOR 
COVRGE.FOR 
CARE3.FOR 
Source code file 
CAREIN 
or CINAME 
COVRGE 
CARE3 
Compilation of VAX files 
Object code Executable code 
CAREIN.OBJ CAREIN.EXE 
COVRGE.OBJ COVRGE.EXE 
CARE3.0BJ CARE3.EXE 
Compilation of CDC files 
Relocatable, executable binary file 
CRING05 
COVRG05 
CAREG05 
Table A.l 
A-4 
The user has a great deal of latitude in compiling the CARE III program, but 
here are some recommendations. Some Fortran statements can be interpreted 
somewhat differently from installation to installation depending upon default 
compiler options. For CARE III, Fortran 77 options should be chosen. As an 
example, "DO" loops have a minimum trip count of zero in ANSI Fortran 77. Some 
compilers default to a minimum trip count of one. When a computation 
underflows on a VAX or CDC machine the·result is zero. With some types of 
input to the CARE III program, some of the CARE III algorithms will underflow. 
Therefore, if the host machine's compiler provides for checking underflow, 
checking for computations that underflow to zero is not recommended. The first 
release of the CARE III computer program required the host machine's memory to 
be preset to zero. For the current rele~~e ve~sion two, it is believed that 
all memory initialization problems have been resolved. When comparing results 
to the examples in this guide, the user may find that his results may only 
agree to about three or so significant digits. Even though the CARE III 
program prints many values with ten or more significant digits, many 
calculations are not done with that much precision. The precision of the 
computations is highly dependent on the host machine. 
The CAREIN, COVRGE, and CARE3 program modules, which makes up most of the 
CARE III package, create and use several files. All files are assigned and set 
up using Fortran OPEN statements except for the input file used by the CAREIN 
module which is supplied by the user, and also with the exception of each of 
the program module's output. Therefore, the user must assign Fortran unit 
numbers to four files through the use of system commands. The user-supplied 
input file to the CAREIN modules will be read from Fortran unit 7, and the 
CARE IN output will be written to Fortran unit 6. The output to modules COVRGE 
and CARE3 will also be written to Fortran unit 6. By assigning the four files 
above using system commands, the user can more easily assign different names to 
the input file and output listings each time the CARE III program is run. 
An example command file is shown in Appendix A.3 to execute CARE IlIon a 
VAX-ll computeroperating-urii::t"er a VMS operating system. The coinments in this 
command file along with figure A.l help to show how files are used and passed 
among the program modules. 
A-5 
:r 
0\ 
unit 7 
user--
supplied 
input file 
RELIN I-------~ ( subrun ;;> 
program 
module 1 1---7 
CAREIN 
CREOUT 
debug 
file 
FT25F 
debug 
file 
FT10F 
unit 6 
output 
listing 
information 
FT15F 
system tree 
fault vectors 
, BXYFL I 
critical pair(s) 
tree information 
~ 
'" 
program 
module 
COVRGE 
'DEBUG 
\ debug 
\file 
unit 6 
~I output 
listing 
SNGFL 
~ 
\ 
71 single fault-
handling model 
plot file 
DBLFL 
double 
fault-handling 
plot file 
! 
! 
;> 
~ 
....... 
'" <E 
program 
module ..... 
, 
CARE 3 .:::: 
~ 
.... 
;' 
r-----7> 
....... 
7' 
SCR17 
working 
file 
INXY 
working 
file 
IBXY 
working 
file 
unit 6 
output 
listing 
PLTFL 
reliabilitYI 
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Files used by CARE III can be divided into groups. There are files used to 
pass information from one program module to the next, files used to debug the 
program when under development, files to hold plotting information, files used 
for memory storage (working files), and fil~~ 'used to hold the output 
information (output 'listings):. 'Debug' fil'e~'CREOUT and FT25F are created from 
the CAREIN module wheh the user-supplied input parameter CINDBG is set .TRUE •• 
Debug file DEBUG is created from the COVRGE modul~'when either variable CHIDBG 
or SDBUG in COVRGE's subroutine BLOCK DATA is set .TRUE. Debug files DEBUG and 
PRFNCS are created from the CARE3 module if either variable CHIDBG or DBGFLG in 
CARE3's subroutine BLOCK DATA BLK1 is set .TRUE •• All debug files are readable 
text files. Plot files are created by setting appropriate variables in the 
user-supplied input file CAREIN to .TRUE •• More information relating to 
plotting can be found in Appendix A.2. Working files are used by some program 
modules to reduce the amount of memory required by a computer without virtual 
memory, such as a CDC CYBER 173. The output listing to CAREIN fits within 80 
columns and the output listings to COVRGE and CARE3 fit within 132 columns. 
The user-supplied input file used by the CAREIN module must not have records 
exceeding 80 columns. 
To facilitate file assignment on a CDC 170 series machine, the program 
statements to the CAREIN, COVRGE and CARE3 program modules should be changed as 
follows: 
From, PROGRAM CAREIN 
To, PROGRAM CAREIN (OUTPUT, TAPE6=OUTPUT, CREIN, TAPE7=CREIN) 
From, PROGRAM COVRGE 
To, PROGRAM COVRGE (OUTPUT, TAPE6=OUTPUT) 
From, PROGRAM CARE3 
To, PROGRAM CARE3 (OUTPUT, TAPE6=OUTPUT) 
By compiling the program modules with the above changes, the NOS procedure 
files shown in Appendix A.4 could be used to run CARE III either interactively 
or batch. 
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As noted at the beginning of this appendix, a CDC 170 series computer works 
with a longer word and thus higher precision calculations than a VAX-11 700 
series computer does. To take advantage of this extra precision, there are 
some constants in the COVRGE and CARE3 program modules which should be changed. 
These changes are now listed: 
In program COVRGE, subroutine CMPFUN 
From, REALMN 1.0E-38 
To, , REALMN ~ 1.0E-293 
In program COVRGE, subroutine VOLTRA 
From, 
To, 
REALMN 
REALMN 
1 .OE-38 ) 
1.0E-293 ) 
In program COVRGE, function PREEXP 
From, REALMX 1.0E+38 
REALMN 1 .OE-38 
EXPMAX 88.0 
EXPMIN -88.0 
To, REALMX 1.0E+322 
REALMN 1~OE-293 
EXPMAX 741 .6 
EXPMIN -675.8 
In program COVRGE, subroutine HSGEAR 
From, 
To, 
UROUND 
UROUND 
1.1920929E-07 
7.105427357602E-15 
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In program CARE3, function PREEXP 
From, REALMX 1.0E+38 
EXPMAX 88.0 
EXPMIN -88.0 
To, REALMX 1.0E+322 
EXPMAX 741 .6 
EXPMIN -675.8 
The above constants are now defined. REALMX is the largest1 single precision 
floating point number the host machine can compute with. REALMN is the 
smallest single precision floating point number the host machine can compute 
with. EXPMAX is the largest floating point number that the host's machine 
intrinsic, single precision, Fortran EXP function can handle without 
overflowing , and EXPMIN is the smallest number the EXP function will handle 
without underflowing. UROUND is the unit round off error of a single precision 
floating point number. 
1. Some constants listed were actually set a little below their maximum values 
or a little above their minimum values. 
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A.2 Plotting Information 
The second release version of the CARE III computer program has two optional 
program modules that can be used for making plots. One program module, called 
CVGPLT, can be used for plotting fault-handling model probability and intensity 
functions, and the other optional program module, called RELPLT, can be used 
for plotting the system unreliability summary functions. These modules are 
written in ANSI FORTRAN 77, and they use the DISSPLA plotting package which is 
a commercial product. The capability of having plotting routines using DISSPLA 
graphics subroutine calls was originally implemented for the Air Force Avionics 
Laboratory, at Wright-Patterson AFB, in 1982. NASA Langley Research Center 
(LaRC), however, does not have the DISSPLA plotting package and therefore has 
not been able to thoroughly test the two program modules. It is hoped that in 
the future NASA LaRC will be able to develop code using ANSI GKS graphic 
standards for program modules CVGPLT and RELPLT. For the present, however, the 
way in which the plotting modules are structured are discussed below so that 
users that have DISSPLA may insure the program modules work the way they 
should, and users who don't have it may be able to determine how to develop 
their own plotting capabilities. 
Figure A.2 shows what files are used and produced by program modules CVGPLT and 
RELPLT. In relationship to the main program modules, CVGPLT can be executed 
after the COVRGE module is executed, and RELPLT can be executed after the CARE3 
module is executed. As with any code with graphics subroutine calls, the 
appropriate graphics libraries or files would have to be linked or attached to 
CVGPLT and RELPLT. Plots produced by the original versions of CVGPLT and 
RELPLT can be found in reference 17. 
Of the two plotting routines, the user will probably find CVGPLT to be of the 
least use. It was developed primarily for developmental debugging of the 
CARE III program. The functions which are plotted by CVGPLT are listed in 
section 3.1 under the 'CVPLOT' input explanation, and the math description of 
these functions is given in section 4.2 of reference 5. 
The routine, RELPLT, is used to plot the QSUM, P*SUM, and QSUM + P*SUM arrays 
listed by the CARE3 module. These three unreliability summary functions are 
discussed in section 4.0 of this guide. 
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A.2.1 Data Structure of Files Used by Program Module CVGPLT 
One of the files used by CVGPLT is SNGFL. Plot file SNGFL is created in 
program COVRGE if the general fault-handling model is chosen, by setting 
$FLTTYP NAMELIST input parameter 'MARKOV' = 2, and if plotting is requested, by 
setting input parameter 'CVPLOT' .TRUE. 
File SNGFL contains 9326 word blocks. There are 'NFTYPS' ($FLTTYP NAMELIST 
input parameter) blocks contained in the file for a maximum of five blocks. 
Each block consists of the following functions in the order listed below: 
1. PB(t) - probability single fault is benign 
2. PaCt) probability single fault is not benign 
3. PF(t) - single fault failure intensity 
4. PL(t) - probability of latent single fault 
5. PDP(t) - single fault detected as permanent intensity. 
In program CVGPLT, each block is read into the following COMMON block: 
COMMON/SNGFNCI PBNG(1800), PBGSTP ,NPBGST(64) 
,PNBNG(1800),PNBSTP ,NPNBST(64) 
,PFLD(1800) ,PFSTEP ,NPFSTP(64) 
,PLAT(1800) ,PLTSTP ,NPLTST(64) 
,PDP(1800) ,PDPSTP ,NPDPST(64) ,LNDRLG 
The ith block is the ith fault type 'ITYP' defined in program CAREIN. 'ITYP' 
is used to label the fault type on the plots. 
A time array 'TMAR(1800)' is generated prior to each function being plotted 
using the initial step size variable and step size doubling and halving array 
corresponding to the function currently being plotted. Function PB(t) will be 
used to describe the single-fault functions' plotting data structure, and the 
manner in which the time array is generated. Each single-fault function is 
stored using the same type of structure. 
PB(t) is stored in array 'PBNG(IT)' using a maximum of 1800 values. Its 
initial step size is stored in real variable 'PBGSTP' and its step size 
doubling and halving information is stored in integer array 'NPBGST(ISTP), 
using a maximum of 64 step size changes. The step size may change only by 
doubling or halving. 'NPBGST(ISTP)' defines how many of each doubled (as a 
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positive integer) or halved (as a negative integer) steps exist per each step 
size change. If 'PBGSTP' equals 0.2 and 'NPBGST(1 - 7)' = 3, 2, 4, -2, -4, 3, 
2, with the remainder of the array filled with zeros, then the time array would 
be computed in program CVGSTP as follows: 
TMAR( 1) 0.0 ) TMAR( 2) 0.2 initial step size 0.2 TMAR( 3) 0.4 TMAR( 4) 0.6 TMAR( 5) 1.0 doubled step size 0.4 
TMAR( 6) 1.4 
TMAR( 7) 2.2 } TMAR( 8) 3.0 doubled step size 0.8 TMAR( 9) 3.8 
TMAR(10) 4.6 ) TMAR(11) 5.0 halved step size 0.4 TMAR(12) 5.4 
TMAR(13) 5.6 
TMAR(14) 5.8 halved step size 0.2 
TMAR(15) 6.0 
TMAR(16) 6.2 
TMAR(17) 6.6 doubled step size 0.4 
TMAR(18) 7.0 
TMAR(19) 7.4 ) TMAR(20) 8.2 doubled step size 0.8 TMAR(21) 9.0 
Therefore, function 'PBNG(IT)', in this truncated example, would consist of 21 
points to use for the plot, with 'IT' ranging from 1 to 21. 
Input parameter 'DBLDF' (contained in $FLTTYP NAMELIST) determines the amount 
of points generated when the single-fault functions are computed in program 
COVRGE - the smaller the value given to 'DBLDF' the more points generated. 
Each single-fault function has a unique initial step size and step size change 
description. That is why the time array for each function is not contained in 
the plot file SNGFL. The plot file can contain a maximum of 46,630 words of 
plotting data, if five fault types were defined by the user. If the time 
arrays were included in the file, instead of the step size change information, 
the file would increase to a maximum of 90,005 words of plotting data. This 
would practically double its size and I/O access time unnecessarily. 
Variable 'LNORLG', the last word contained in each block of plotting data, 
contains the $FLTTYP NAMELIST input parameter 'IAXSCV' defining the Y-axis 
scale desired for plotting the fault-handling functions. Program CVGPLT also 
uses file COVIN, generated by program CAREIN, to retrieve the system tree title 
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to help identify the current run, and the 'ITIME' variable that is used to 
identify a time base of 'HOURS', 'MINS' 'SECS " or 'MSECS'. 
File DBLFL contains 1865 word blocks. There are 'NFTYPS' squared blocks 
contained in the file for a maximum of 25 blocks. Each block consists of the 
following function: 
PDF(t) - double fault failure intensity. 
In program CVGPLT, each block is read into the following COMMON block: 
COMMON IDBLFNCI PDFAR(1800) ,PDFSTP ,NPDFST(64) 
The ith block is the ith double-fault type pair ('ITYP', 'JTYP'), where 'JTYP' 
varies the fastest. For example, if three fault types had been defined in 
program CAREIN, the double-fault failure intensity function, computed per fault 
type pair, would be written to DBLFL ordered (1,1), (1,2), (1,3), (2,1), (2,2), 
(2,3), (3,1), (3,2), and (3,3). 
A time array 'TMAR(1800)' is generated prior to each double-fault function 
being plotted using the initial step size variable 'PDFSTP' and the step size 
change description 'NPDFST(64)'. The time array is generated in the exact same 
manner as described above for the single-fault functions. 
The plot file DBLFL can contain a maximum of 46,625 words of plotting data, if 
five fault types were defined. In general there are fewer double-fault 
functions to plot than single-fault functions because there are five times 
'NFTYPS' single-fault functions and 'NFTYPS' squared double-fault functions, in 
files SNGFL and DBLFL respectively. At its maximum size, it would contain 
90,000 words of plotting data if the time arrays were passed in the plotting 
file. DBLFL does not contain the 'IAXSCV' input parameter. Program CVGPLT 
uses variable 'LNORLG' from file SNGFL for the choice of the Y-axis scale. 
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A.2.2 Data Structure of Files Used By Program Module RELPLT 
Plot file PLTFL is created in program CARE3, if input parameter 'RLPLOT' is set 
.TRUE. in $STAGES NAMELIST. File PLTFL contains 260 words of plotting data 
that consists of one 195 word block and one 65 word block. The first block 
contains the CARE3 summary results: QSUM, P*SUM, and QSUM+P*SUM read by 
program RELPLT into COMMON /PLTCOM/ QLTSUM(65) ,PSTSUM(65) ,QPSTSM(65). The 
second block contains the time values corresponding to the summary functions' 
results and is read into array 'TMAR(65)' contained in the following COMMON 
block: 
C 
COMMON /STEPCM/ ITSTPS 
LOGICAL 
, TMAR(65) 
, IPRINT 
, CPLFLG 
RLPLOT 
, MAXSTP 
, NSTGRN 
, RLPLOT 
, SYSMNT 
, RELSTP 
, KWT 
, IAXSRL 
, TBCF 
,SYSMNT ,CPLFLG 
, ITIME 
, PSTRNC 
, QPTRNC 
Due to the unequal step sizes used in computing the enhanced CARE3 functions, 
if input parameter 'LFTMST' was set .TRUE. in $FLTTYP NAMELIST, the functions' 
corresponding time values are written to file PLTFL, and hence no longer 
generated in program RELPLT. This increases the size of file PLTFL by only 65 
words since all three functions were computed using the same step sizes. 
Program RELPLT also uses file 'RELIN', generated by program CAREIN, to retrieve 
the system tree title to help identify the current run, the ITIME variable used 
to specify the time base of the plots, and input parameter 'IAXSRL' to 
determine the Y-axis plotting choice. 
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$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
*** COMMAND FILE TO RUN THE CARE-III COMPUTER PROGRAM *** 
TO RUN CARE-III, EXECUTE THIS COMMAND FILE WITH THE CARE-III INPUT 
FILE AS THE ONLY PARAMETER (i.e. @RUNCARE filename). AFTER EXECUTION 
THE INPUT FILE AND THE OUTPUT "LISTING TO THE PROGRAM WILL BE LOCATED 
ON FILE CAREIII.OUT. 
IF YOU DESIRE PLOT, DEBUG, OR WORKING FILES CREATED BY CARE-III YOU 
WILL HAVE TO ELIMINATE THE DELETE COMMAND FOR THAT FILE. SOME OF 
THE FILES NAMED IN DELETE COMMANDS MAY NOT EXIST DEPENDING UPON THE 
TYPE OF DATA THAT IS IN THE INPUT FILE AND HENCE A SYSTEM ERROR MAY 
RESULT WHEN THIS COMMAND FILE TRIES TO DELETE IT. Example - PLTFL.DAT 
DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS THE RELIABILITY PRINT FLAG 'RLPLOT' IS TRUE. 
**EXECUTION OF THE CAREIN MODULE** 
THE CAREIN PROGRAM PROCESSES THE INPUT FILE WHICH AS MENTIONED BEFORE 
IS THE ONLY PARAMETER TO THIS COMMAND FILE. 
THE CAREIN PROGRAM PRODUCES SEVERAL OUTPUT FILES. COVIN.DAT IS USED 
BY THE COVRGE PROGRAM. RELIN.DAT, BXYFL.DAT, AND FT15F.DAT ARE USED 
BY THE CARE3 PROGRAM. CREOUT.DAT AND FT25F.DAT ARE DEBUG FILES 
CREATED WHEN 'CINDBG' IS SET TRUE. FILE FT10F.DAT IS A WORKING FILE 
USED FOR FAULT TREE PROCESSING. FILE CAREIN.DAT IS THE OUTPUT 
LISTING PRODUCED BY PROGRAM CAREIN. 
$ASSIGN 'Pl' FOR007 
$ASSIGN CAREIN.DAT FOR006 
$ ! 
$RUN CAREIN 
$ ! 
$DELETE CREOUT.DAT;* 
$DELETE FT25F.DAT;* 
$DELETE FT10F.DAT;* 
$ 
$ 
$ **EXECUTION OF THE COVRGE MODULE** 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
THE ONLY INPUT FILE USED BY PROGRAM COVRGE IS COVIN.DAT. OUTPUT 
FILE CVGMTS.DAT IS USED BY THE CARE3 PROGRAM MODULE. OUTPUT FILES 
SNGFL.DAT AND DBLFL.DAT ARE CREATED WHEN INPUT PARMATER 'CVPLOT' IS 
SET TRUE. DEBUG FILE DBUG.DAT IS CREATED IF EITHER OF THE "HARD-WIRED" 
PARAMETERS 'CHIDBG' OR 'SDBUG' IN THE PROGRAM'S BLOCKDATA SUBROUTINE 
IS SET TRUE. COVRGE.DAT IS THE OUTPUT LISTING PRODUCED BY PROGRAM 
COVRGE. 
$ASSIGN COVRGE.DAT FOR006 
$ ! 
$RUN COVRGE 
$ ! 
$DELETE COVIN.DAT;* 
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$DELETE SNGFL.DAT;* 
$DELETE DBLFL.DAT;* 
$ DELETE DBUG.DAT;* 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
**EXECUTION OF THE CARE3 MODULE** 
THE INPUT FILES USED BY CARE3 ARE RELIN.DAT, BXYFL.DAT, FT15F.DAT 
CREATED BY CAREIN, AND FILE CVGMTS.DAT CREATED BY COVRGE. WORKING 
FILES USED BY CARE3 ARE SCR17.DAT, INXY.DAT, AND IBXY.DAT. THE 
OUTPUT FILE PLTFL.DAT IS CREATED WHEN THE INPUT PARAMETER 'RLPLOT' 
IS SET TRUE. OUTPUT FILES DBUG.DAT AND PRFNCS.DAT ARE CREATED IF 
EITHER OF THE "HARD-WIRED" PARAMETERS 'CHIDBG' OR 'DBGFLG' IS SET 
TRUE IN CARE3'S BLOCKDATA SUBROUTINE. CARE3.DAT IS THE OUTPUT 
LISTING PRODUCED BY CARE3. 
$ASSIGN CARE3.DAT FOR006 
$ ! 
$RUN CARE3 
$ ! 
$DELETE RELIN.DAT;* 
$DELETE BXYFL.DAT;* 
$PELETE FT15F.DAT;* 
$DELETE CVGMTS.DAT;* 
$DELETE SCR17.DAT;* 
$DELETE INXY.DAT;* 
$DELETE IBXY.DAT;* 
$DELETE PLTFL.DAT;* 
$ DELETE DBUG.DAT;* 
$ DELETE PRFNCS.DAT;* 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
CREATE OUTPUT FILE CAREIII.OUT 
$COPY CAREIN.DAT,COVRGE.DAT,CARE3.DAT CAREIII.OUT 
$ ! 
$DELETE 
$DELETE 
$DELETE 
CAREIN.DAT;* 
COVRGE.DAT;* 
CARE3.DAT;* 
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A.4 Below are two NOS procedure files for running the CARE III program on a 
CDC 170 series computer. 
A.4.1 Example procedure file for executing CARE III interactively 
.PROC,RUNCARE,I~CREIN. 
IFE,$I$=$$,LB10. 
REVERT. HI MUST BE SPECIFIED. 
ENDIF,LB10. 
IFE,.NOT.FILE(I,AS),LB20. 
GET,I. 
ELSE,LB20. 
REWIND,I. 
ENDIF,LB20. 
MAP,OFF. 
CRING05, , ,1. 
COVRG05. 
CAREG05. 
REVERT. 
A.4.2 Example Procedure File for Executing CARE III as a Batch Job 
.PROC,C3V5,I=CREIN. 
IFE,$I$=$$,LB1. 
REVERT.H1 MUST BE SPECIFIED. 
ENDIF,LB1. 
DELIVER. BIN15PP. PAUL PETERSEN. B1220. 
SEND,C5JOB,M=T,DC=IN~ 
REVERT. CARE3 VERSION 5 JOB SUBMITTED TO T • 
. DATA,C5JOB. 
SUBJOB,T100. 
USER,123456C,PASWORD. 
CHARGE,654321,LRC. 
DELIVER. BIN15PP. PAUL PETERSEN. B1220 
GET,I,CRING05,COVRG05,CAREG05. 
REWIND,I. 
MAP,OFF. 
CRING05,OUTPUT"I. 
COVRG05,OUTPUT. 
CAREG05,OUTPUT. 
A.5 Error and Warning Messages 
Error and warning messages are listed in this section. The messages are often 
succinct or cryptic and may cause the user some frustration. They are 
nevertheless included here because it was felt that. even more frustration would 
result otherwise. Error and warning messages for subprogram CAREIN are not 
included; however, because these messages were enhanced. Further improvements 
are forthcoming. 
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Error Messages 
The following sections contain the error and warning messages generated by 
modules COVRGE and CARE3 (messages for module CAREIN are not listed in this 
revision). The utility routine error messages are fatal to the computer run; 
therefore, the run will halt after one occurs. The warning messages are 
nonfatal and are used to alert the user to any out-of-the-ordinary processsing. 
The variable enclosed in single quote marks are used to show which variables 
will have their contents printed. The following variables, used in the error 
messages, have values which do not change during the course of the computer 
run: 
Variable Name Variable 
MAXTYP 5 
MXSTGS 70 
MAXCAT 5 
MXUNTS 70 
MXCPLS 20 
MXSBRN 35 
INMAX 513 
MXSTGF 13 
IJMAX 210 
MAXSTG 20 
Description 
Maximum Number of Fault 
Types 
Maximum Number of Stages 
Maximum Number of Fault 
Categories 
Maximum Number of Coupled 
Units Per Fault Tree 
Maximum Number of Coupled 
Stages Per Fault Tree 
Maximum Number of Subruns 
Maximum Index Into Coverage 
Functions 
Maximum Number of Stage 
Failures 
Maximum Number of Unique 
Fault Pair Functions Per 
BXYFL Subfile 
Maximum Number of Stages 
Per Subrun 
Beside each message is a code used to differentiate the user errors from the 
possible internal program errors for which tests are made •. 
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COVRGE ERROR MESSAGES (FATAL) 
~* ERROR - ~UMBER OF FAULT TYPES REQUESTED = 'NTYPS
' 
BUT MUST BE LESS '~HAN OR EQUAL TO 'MAXTYP'. 
**ERROR - INCORRECT RELIABILITY TIME BASE = 'TBASE'. 
** ERROR - THRASHING OCCURRED IN SUBROUTINE COMPFUN • 
.RERUN PROGRAM WITH A DIFFERENT 'DBLDF' VALUE. 
IE 
IE 
** ERROR - ITH G SINGLE-FAULT FUNCTION = 'ITH' WHILE ONLY G FUNCTIONS 1 THROUGH 9 IE 
MAY BE COMPUTED WITH FUNCTION FGSNGL. 
** ERROR - 'DELTA'('ITYP') EQUALS ZERO, WHILE THE CONSTANT DENSITY FUNCTION WAS 
CHOSEN FOR 'DELTA'. 
EITHER ASSIGN 'DELTA' A VALUE OR SPECIFY CONSTANT RATE FUNCTION FOR THIS FAULT TYPE. 
. ** ERROR - "I RHO' (I ITYP') EQUALS ZERO, WHILE THE· CONSTANT DENSITY FUNCTION WAS CHOSEN 
FOR IRHOI. 
EITHER ASSIGN 'RHO' A VALUE OR SPECIFY CONSTANT RATE FUNCTION FOR THIS FAULT TYPE. 
UE 
UE 
** ERROR - BOTH 'RHO' AND 'DELT~' ('ITYP') EQUAL ZERO, WHILE THE CONSTANT DENSITY UE 
FUNCTION WAS CHOSEN FOR BOTH FAULT RATES. 
EITHER ASSIGN THEM A VALUE OR SPECIFY CONSTANT RATE FUNCTIONS FOR THIS FAULT TYPE. 
** ERROR - ITH C DOUBLE-FAULT FUNCTION = 'ITH' WHILE ONLY C FUNCTIONS 1 AND 2 MAY BE IE 
COMPUTED WITH FUNCTION FCDBL. 
~* ERROR - ITH F DOUBLE-FAULT FUNCTION = 'ITH' WHILE ONLY F FUNCTIONS 1 AND 2 MAY BE IE 
COMPUTED WITH FUNCTION rFDBL.-
NOTE: UE = USER ERROR; IE = INTERNAL ERROR. 
~ 
N 
I-' 
COVRGE ERROR MESSAGES (FATAL) 
** ERROR - ITH B DOUBLE-FAULT FUNCTION = 'ITH' WHILE ONLY B FUNCTIONS 1 AND 2 MAY BE IE 
COMPUTED WITH FUNCTION FBDBL. 
* * ERROR - THRASHING OCCURRED IN SUBROUTINE SUMARS. RERUN PROGRAM WITH A DIFFERENT UE 
'DBLDF' VALUE. 
** ERROR - THRASHING OCCURRED IN SUBROUTINE VOLTERA. RERUN PROGRAM WITH A DIFFERENT UE 
'DBLDF' VALUE. 
** ERROR - THRASHING OCCURRED IN SUBROUTINE VLTNREC. RERUN PROGRAM WITH A DIFFERENT UE 
, DBLDF' VALUE. . 
** ERROR - INDEX PASSED TO FUNCTION FTCHSTP = 'INDX' IS LARGER THAN THE TOTAL NUMBER IE 
OF POINTS COMPUTED. 
** ERRO~ - ILLEGAL MCHI OF 'MCHI' WHICH SPECIFIES WHICH SINGLE OR DOUBLE-FAULT 
FUNCTION TO STORE INTO COMMON /CVRGCOM/, 
MUST BE IN THE RANGE OF 1 THROUGH 6 ONLY. 
** ERROR WITH MOMNT'= 'MOMNT' IN FUNCTION SIMPINT. 
ONLY MONENTS 0,1, AND 2 ARE VALID. 
IE 
IE 
** ERROR WITH INDICES REPRESENTING INTEGRATION LIMITS IN FUNCTION SIMPINT: 'ITFROM' = IE 
'ITFROM' 'ITTO' = 'ITTO' WHERE 'INMAX' = 'INMAX'. 
** ERROR - INDEX INTO 'TMAR' = 'IT' IS GREATER THAN MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE INDEX OF 'INMAX'. IE 
** ERROR - CUMULATIVE ERROR OUT OF ACCEPTABLE BOUNDS; ERRONEOUS RESULTS. RERUN PROGRAM WITH A SMALLER 
'DBLDF' VALUE. 
NOTE: UE = USER ERROR; IE = INTERNAL ERROR. 
IE 
:r 
N 
N 
COVRGE WARNING MESSAGES (NON-FATAL) 
** WARNING - NSTPIN GREATER TIUlli 'NSTPMX' IN SUBROUTINE COMPFUN. ZERODF DECREASED 
To' 'ZERODF'. 
** WARNING - NUMBER OF POINTS REQUIRED TO DEFINE A FUNCTION ARRAY IS LARGER TlUlli 
'INMAX'. ZERODF INCREASED TO 'ZERODF'. 
** WARNING - NSTPIN GREATER THAN 'NSTPMX' IN SUBROUTINE SUMARS. ZERODF DECREASED 
TO 'ZERODF'. 
** WARNING - NPSTPIN GREATER THAN 'NSTPMX'. ZERODF DECREASED TO 'ZERODF'. 
** WARNING - NUMBER OF POINTS REQUIRED TO DEFINE P ARRAY IS LARGER TlUlli 'INMAX'. 
ZERODF INCREASED TO 'ZERODF' • 
:r 
N 
\.oJ 
CARE3 ERROR MESSAGES (FATAL) 
** ERROR - INCORRECT TIME BASE = 'TBASE'. IE 
** ERROR - 'KWT
' 
= 'KWT ' • 'KWT ' MUST BE INPUT WHEN THE SYSTEM MINTERM FILE 'FT1SF ' UE 
IS MISSING. 
THE NUMBER OF STAGE FAILURES CANNOT EXCEED 'MXSTGF
' 
• 
.. ** ERROR - SUBRUN NUMBER EXCEEDED MAXIMUM OF I MXSBRN I. IE 
** ERROR - EOF ENCOUNTERED ON UNIT 4 DURING BUFFER IN. IE 
** ERROR - WITH SYSTEM MINTERM FILE 'FTlSF ' - IE 
'PRBMT
' 
(MNTRMV(ISTG) ,ISTG=l,NSTGRN) 
** ERROR - NUMBER OF UNIQUE FAULT PAIR FUNCTIONS = 'NBXY
' 
FOR 'NSTGS
' 
COUPLED STAGES, IE 
WHICH EXCEEDS THE MAXIMUM OF 'IJMAX
' 
FOR THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF COUPLED STAGES = 
'MAXSTG
'
• 
** ERROR - INVALID BXYAR INDEX OF I INBXY I EXISTS IN INDEX ARRAY IJSTGIN ( 'IJSTG I) • IE 
** ERROR - INVALID CONDITIONAL FAULT VALUE OF 'LC ' EXISTS IN CONDITIONAL FAULT UE 
VECTOR LCNDVEC ( I I I ) • 
** ERROR - INVALID SPECIFICATION OF WHICH BXY FUNCTION DEFINITION RECORD IS IE 
CURRENTLY IN MEMORY - IBREC = 'IBREC
'
• 
** ERROR - EOF ENCOmJTERED ON PREVIOUS BUFFER IN ON UNIT 'IUNIT' WHILE TRYING TO IE 
READ RECORD 'IT'. 
NOTE: UE = USER ERROR; IE = INTERNAL ERROR. 
:r-
N 
~ 
CARE) ERROR·MESSAGES (FATAL) 
** ERROR - PARITY ERROR ENCOUNTERED DURING BUFFER IN ON UNIT 'IUNIT' WHILE TRYING TO IE 
READ RECORD 'IT'. 
** ERROR - EOF ENCOUNTERED ON PREVIOUS BUFFER OUT ON UNIT 'IUNIT' WHILE TRYING TO IE 
WRITE RECORD 'ITB'. 
** ERROR - PARITY ERROR ENCOUNTERED DURING BUFFER OUT ON UNIT 'IUNIT' WHILE TRYING IE 
TO WRITE RECORD 'ITB'. 
** ERROR - INVALID SPECIFICATION OF WHICH BXY FUNCTION DEFINITION RECORD IS CURRENTLY IE 
IN MEMORY - IBREC = 'IBREC'. 
** ERROR - CURRENT BLOCK OF CRITICAL PAIR DATA IN MEMORY, STARTING AT STAGE 'KFSTG' IE 
DOES NOT MATCH THE CURRENT SUBRUN STARTING AT STAGE 'IFSTG'. 
** ERROR IN FPMUX -'MUX' LATENT FAULTS IN STAGE 'ISTG' IS LARGER THAN THE TOTAL 
NUMBER OF FAULTS = 'LX'. 
** ERROR - FGSTCALLED WITH AN INVALID MCHI OF 'MCHI'. 
** ERROR - INCORRECT FAILED ST~TE REQUESTED FOR USE IN FUNCTION FHSFST: 
MCHI = 'MCHI'. 
IE 
IE 
IE 
** ERROR - ILLEGAL FAULT TYPE = 'ITYP' WHILE TRYING TO READ COVERAGE FUNCTIONS IN IE 
ROUTINE FHSFST. 
** ERROR - INCORRECT FAILED STATE REQUESTED FOR USE IN FUNCTION FHDFST: IE 
HCHI = 'MCHI'. 
NOTE: UE = USER ERROR; IE = INTERNAL ERROR. 
CARE3 ERROR MESSAGES (FATAL) 
** ERROR - ILLEGAL FAULT TYPE(S) = 'ITYP' AND/OR 'JTYP' WHILE TRYING TO READ 
COVERAGE FUNCTIONS IN ROUTINE FHDFST. 
** ERROR - INCORRECT FAILED STATE REQUESTED FOR USE IN FUNCTION FFSFST: 
MCHI = 'MCHI'. 
** ERROR - INCORRECT FAILED STATE REQUESTED FOR USE IN FUNCTION FFDFST: 
MCHI = 'MCHI'. 
** ERROR - ILLEGAL NUMBER PASSED TO N FACTORIAL FUNCTION = 'N'. 
CARE3 WARNING MESSAGES '(NON-FATAL) 
** WARNING - SYSTEM MINTERM FILE 'FT15F', GENERATED BY PROGRAM CAREIN, IS EMPTY. 
~ CARE3 WILL GENERATE P*'S WITHOUT USING THE SYSTEM FAULT-TREE DEFINITION, 
~ SINCE A 'KWT' VALUE OF 'KWT' WAS SPECIFIED. 
** WARNING - CRITICAL FAULT PAIR FILE 'BXYFL' IS EMPTY. 
THIS RUN ASSUMES THAT NO CRITICAL PAIRS OF FAULTS EXIST. 
NOTE: UE = USER ERROR; IE = INTERNAL ERROR. 
IE 
IE 
IE 
IE 
:r-
ho) 
0'1 
UTILITY ROUTINE ERROR MESSAGES (FATAL) 
** ERROR - ILLEGAL COMBINATORIAL; NFAC = 'NFAC' KFAC = 'KFAC'. 
** ERROR - ILLEGAL VALUE FOR 'INqUT' IN SUBROUTINE BUFBLK. 
** ERROR - EOF ENCOUNTERED ON UNIT 'IUNIT' DURING BUFFER 'BTYPE'. 
** ERROR - PARITY ERROR ENCOUNTERED ON UNIT 'IUNIT' DURING BUFFER 'BTYPE'. 
NOTE: UE = USER ERROR; IE = INTERNAL ERROR. 
IE 
IE 
IE 
IE 
APPENDIX B 
Module Status and Dependency 
B.l Modul~ Status 
Modules within a stage are in one of three disjoint states: in-use, spare, and 
deleted from the system. An in-use module is a functioning part of the system. 
A spare module is available to the system to replace an identical module which 
has been deleted. A deleted module has been identified (possibly incorrectly) 
as faulty and isolated from the system. Spares are assumed to have identical 
fault-handling characteristics as in-use module for a given stage. Some system 
configuration schemes which make use of this assumption are ones in which self 
fault detection programs are run on the spares and/or ones in which spares are 
frequently being swapped with in-use modules. Unmonitored spares cannot be 
directly modeled using CARE III. 
In computing operational, p(tl&), and fault-handling failure, Q(tl&), 
probabilities, the CARE III computer program uses a bookkeeping method that 
keeps track of functional use of modules versus keeping track of the physical 
modules themselves. The user becomes involved in this functional bookkeeping 
scheme for modules when he specifies' the N, M, and NOP parameters of the STAGES 
input paragraph (see section 3.2), and when specifying one or more critical-
pair trees. 
When specifying an N(x) parameter, the user is indicating that all N modules 
for stage x are all in working order when the system under study is first 
checked out or turned on. The M(x) input parameter indicates the minimum 
number of any physical combination of M modules that will allow stage x to 
perform its function. The NOP(j,x) parameter allows the user to model systems 
in which not all available modules are in-use at a given time. As the pool of 
available modules for stage x is reduced from N(x) to M(x) through fault 
occurrences and successful fault handling, the number of in-use and spare 
modules may change. 
As an example of what can be modeled, consider a computer stage x which 
consists of seven computer modules configured into two working triads and a 
spare. Let's further assume that the system under study only needs the 
computational power of one triad, and that any two of the original seven 
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modules can keep this needed triad working (fig. B-1). For this problem, we 
would choose N(x) = 7, M(x) = 2, NOP(l,x) = 6, NOP(2,x) = 3, and we would leave 
NOP(3,x), NOP(4,x), and NOP(5,x) at their default value of zero. If functional 
module number two fails in stage x, it will be replaced by module seven, the 
spare, which then functionally becomes module two. If a second failure occurs, 
say module three fails, then module six, the next largest numbered module, 
assumes its role and number. At this time, modules four and five become spares 
and the surviving stages operate as a slngln lri~11 with two spares. The 
CARE III program computes this because five is 10S3 than the value of NOP(l ,x); 
thus NOP(2,x) or three modules are assumed to be in-use. 
Hhen the user selects the default V<lj,w of zero for a NOP value, the CARE III 
program will internally calculat·; LIw NOr value which assumes that all 
available modules are in-use. [f nll NOP values had been selected to equal 
their default value of 7,cro for trw (!)(;J;np L(", the CARE III program would have 
internally computed NOP(l ,x) = 7, NOP(2,x) = 6, NOP(3,x) = 5, NOP(4,x) = 4, and 
NOP(5,x) = 3. Just like before, as modules become faulty, the largest numbered 
non-deleted module assumes the function and number of the deleted module. For 
the original example shown in fig. B-1, the CARE III program calculates 
NOP(3,x) = 2. Since the internally calculated value of NOP(3,x) equals M(x) in 
the example, the program realizes NOP(4,x) and NOP(5,x) to be irrelevant. 
The whole importance of the NOP parameters is in how Q(tl~) values are computed 
with regard to critical-pair tree(s). If no critical-pair treees) for a 
CARE III program is given, then the CARE III program will not use any of the 
NOP parameter data. Hith respect to Q(tl~) computations, NOP limits the number 
of critical-pair failures that are associated with a particular! vector, or 
particular operating state of the system under study. CARE III assumes spares 
cannot contribute to critical-pair failures. For the example shown in 
figure B.l, functional module seven will never be able to contribute to a 
critical-pair failure. After two module failures, functional module number 
four will not be able to contribute to a critical-pair failure because it 
becomes a spare. Thus without the NOP information, some Q(tl~) values would 
reflect overly conservative probabilities of failure due to improper fault 
handling. 
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Triad 1 
Modules 
performing 
functions 
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Triad 1 
Modules 
performing 
functions 
1,2,3 
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performing 
functions 
1,2.3 
IN-USE 
IN-USE 
Figure B-1 
Triad 2 
Modules 
performing 
functions 
4,5,6 
Triad 2 
Modules 
performing 
functions 
4,5,6 
Triad 2 
None 
SPARES 
One Module 
performing 
no task 
DELETED 
None 
Module performing function 2 fails 
and is replaced by spares module 
SPARES 
None 
DELETED 
Module which 
was perform-
ing function 2 
when it 
failed 
Module performing function 3 fails and is 
replaced by a module performing a triad 2 
function; the other modules in triad 2 
'V/ become spares 
SPARES 
Two Modules 
performing 
no task 
DELETED 
Modules which 
were per-
forming func-
tions 2 and 
3 when failed 
Replacement Scheme Implemented in CARE III 
N=7, NOP = (6,3) 
Just as functional numbering applies to the NOP parameters, the user must also 
observe that functional numbering is applied to module numbers associated with 
a critical-pair tree. To say that modules five and six are critically coupled 
in the example shown in figure 8-1, is much different than saying modules one 
and two are. If modules five and six were critically coupled, they would be 
less likely to cause a critical-pair failure than if modules one and two were 
assigned to be critically coupled. The reason for this is if during a mission 
the system under study loses and recovers from the loss of any two modules from 
stage x, functional module six will no longer be around to add to a critical-
pair failure. Functional module one, however, will be the last module to be 
deleted from stage x and thus will have more time to experience a fault-
handling failure. 
A single fault system failure probability is computed by CARE III when the 
parameter C is assigned a value of less than one in the single fault-handling 
model. A single-fault system failure is a fault, which by itself, causes 
system failure when improperly handled. It needs to be noted at this time that 
the NOP parameters and any critical-pair trees, if specified, will not affect 
the way CARE III calculates the probability of system failure due to single 
faults. This means CARE III assumes that spares as well as in-use modules 
contribute to system failure when the stage that contains them is linked to a 
fault-handling model whose 'C' parameter is set less than one. Thus, spares 
are treated completely different with regard to single faults that cause a 
single-fault failure than compared to critically-paired faults that cause a 
critical-pair failure. 
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B.2 Time Sequential Dependence 
A CARE III user may want to model a system architecture which may include time 
sequential dependencies among modules. By time sequential dependency it is 
meant that the order in which modules fail and are isolated from a system makes 
a difference as to which operational state the system is in. For example, 
suppose a fault-tolerant multiprocessor system has an LRU (line replaceable 
unit) that contains a power supply, a clock, a processor, a memory, and two bus 
guardian units. If the clock fails and is correctly isolated, the entire LRU 
is removed from the system. Thus the number of operational memories, 
processors, etc., will be reduced. If the associated processor had already 
failed and been isolated, however, then the clock failure would not reduce the 
number of processors. To keep track of modules by physical identification, the 
functional numbering algorithm implemented in CARE III is not entirely 
satisfactory. Failure to allow for time sequential dependencies may lead to an 
underestimate of module depletion unreliability (P*SUM calculation). In order 
for the CARE III program to keep track of physical identification of modules 
which is needed to model time sequential dependencies, the user has to specify 
every module in his problem to be a stage. In doing this, however, the NOP 
parameters can no longer be used to model spares. Furthermore, the complexity 
of specifying a system with each module being a stage can be overwhelming. A 
moderate sized system composed of seven stages with ten modules per stage could 
require thousands of lines to describe the dependence. 
An approximate solution for modeling time sequential dependency is to use the 
CARE III program to calculate fault-handling unreliability, QSUM, and to 
calculate module depletion unreliability, P*SUM, separately. To calculate the 
fault-handling unreliability, one could model all sparing and fault-handling 
fully, ignoring the dependence. Although the value of the fault-handling 
unreliability, QSUM, cannot in general be guaranteed to be conservative, it 
should provide a reasonable estimate for many cases. A conservative bound 
could be obtained for the QSUM calculation, however, by representing all pairs 
of faults between modules to be critically coupled. This approach leads to a 
conservative result for QSUM since some pairs of faults will be assumed 
critically coupled when they are not. 
To calculate the depletion failure probability for the above scheme, a separate 
CARE III run would be done. This time the time sequential dependency would be 
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fully represented letting each module be a stage. If the system can be 
represented without a user input error (not a trivial task) and the number of 
stages is within CARE III restrictions (N~70), the depletion failure 
probability will be estimated by P*SUM. 
A variation of the above approach that often times can lead to a significant 
reduction in computational time is based on the observation that for 
ultrareliable systems the fault-handling unreliability, QSUM, is dominant. The 
P*SUM computation can often be conservatively estimated by assuming that module 
failures are stochastically independent, e.g., in the example problem discussed 
above, all the modules within an LRU can be lumped together to form a single 
stage. The combined stage failure rate is the sum of the module failure rates 
so that any module failure causes stage failure. This model produces a 
conservatively high module failure probability compared to the model that 
properly treats time sequential dependency. If the P*SUM values are lower in 
value than the QSUM values, then a more refined fault-occurrence model is 
unnecessary. 
8.3 Common Mode Events 
An event which causes multiple basic events is called a common cause (ref. 7). 
The events caused by a common cause are called common mode events (CME) of the 
cause. In CARE III terminology, the basic events are stage failures (module 
failures if stages are so defined). CME's are present when an event (stage ID) 
appears in more than one place at the lowest level of the system fault tree 
(see section 3.5), or when the output to an event in the system fault tree 
feeds two or more upper level events. For example, a stage with ID number 5 
could appear as an input to more than one gate. As another example, the output 
of a gate numbered 93 could feed into gates numbered 94 and 101. The effect 
that CME's produce is the loss of two more more subsystems given a single stage 
or event failure. CME's differ from Single-point failures in that Single-point 
failures cause the entire system to fail whereas a CME mayor may not fail the 
entire system. The structure of the system tree makes that determination and 
is a function of stage redundancy. 
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APPENDIX C 
General Double Fault Handling Model 
The concept of critically coupled system failures .is a relatiYely recent 
addition to the reliability modeling of fault-tolerant systems. For this 
reason, a brief tutorial follows as it is essential that the user understands 
the model. 
With the inclusion of a double fault handling model, CARE III captures the 
notion of critically coupled system failures. Highly reliable fault-tolerant 
systems are commonly designed without single-fault system failure mechanisms, 
or, perhaps more realistically, with an extremely low probability of single-
fault failure occurrence. Often, the dominant system failure cause is a 
critically coupled double fault. In these systems, most double faults are 
tolerated by the system; however, certain critical groupings of double faults 
are often not tolerated by the system and will cause system failure. It is the 
aim of these system designs to make critically coupled faults less probable 
than the mission desired unreliability. An illustrative example of a 
critically coupled system failure is the occurrence of two faults, one each in 
two of three different voting or comparison-monitoring computers performing the 
same flight-crucial control computations. A fault in a spare computer and a 
fault in the voting triad, however, would not be critically coupled. 
The user specification of the critically coupled faults is accomplished by the 
user defining a critical-pair tree. The critical-pair tree defines all 
combinations of critically coupled modules, i.e, all pairs of modules that will 
cause system failure when faults exist in the two modules. The critical-pair 
tree for a voting triad is simply a 2 out of 3 logic gate. In more practical 
systems, the critical-pair tree can become quite complex, as critical-pair 
faults may occur not only within a stage (such as the voting triad) but also 
across stages. An example of the latter application would be a critically 
coupled failure between a computer module and a computer bus module as 
illustrated in appendix G.2, example problem 7. Since three voting computers 
communicate over three buses, a failure in a voting triad and a failure in a 
bus not connected to the failed computer would preclude a correct majority vote 
at the receiving end of the triplex bus. 
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The manner in which the system handles double faults is depicted by a 
conceptual illustration of the general double fault handling model given by 
figure c-,.' The parameters of the double-fault model are obtained from the 
single-fault model automatically requiring no additional user input. In order 
to keep the model within computational feasibility, CARE III makes the implicit 
conservative assumption that all critically coupled (user-specified, if any) 
latent faults will cause system failure. Thus any paired combination of 
critically coupled faults occupying states A, AE, or BE in the single-fault 
model (see fig. 2-2) will constitute system failure irrespective of whether or 
not the system still has sufficient operational units left to meet the M out of 
N stage requirements. Those particular states appear in the large rectangle 
labeled DF (double failure) as states A1A2 , AiAEj' AiBEj , for i=',2, j=',2, and 
i~j. Entry to these states is by way of the single fault handling model 
(SFHM). 
In addition, CARE III supports an intermittent critically coupled fault model, 
which is depicted in figure C-1 also by the circled states and state DF. In 
the event the user defines the single-fault model to represent the system 
behavior resulting from the occurrence of one or more intermittent faults, the 
double intermittent fault model will be invoked. On the occurrence of the 
second fault, the first having been an intermittent fault, state B1A2 will be 
entered. If A2 also becomes benign, then state B,B2 may be entered. 
Alternately, if while in state A,B2 or B,A2 the active fault is determined with 
rate function 0, (t) or 02(t), then the fault is determined to be permanent and 
the system enters state D, the detected state (D,B2 or B,D2 ). At this pOint, 
CARE III will reconfigure out the faulty detected module (DP,B2 or B1DP2). The 
last possible transition is to state DF, the system failure state. That 
transition can occur if the benign intermittent (B, or B2 ) becomes active 
(giving two coexisting critically coupled latent faults), if the active fault 
begins to propagate errors (p, (t) or P2(t», or if a fault is detected as 
nonpermanent «1-P A1 )0, (t) or (1-PA2 )02(t». PAi is the probability that the 
ith fault, i=1,2, is detected as permanent. More detailed models could have 
been implemented (they were in fact seriously considered), but only at the 
expense of creating greater computational cost with little justification to 
1. The illustration in figure C-1 is not intended to describe the math model 
but presents instead a visual concept. The mathematical implementation is 
partitioned differently (see ref. 5). 
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back up the need. The present fault/error-handling models represent a 
compromise between a conservative model with reasonable detail and 
computational cost. 
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APPENDIX D 
Model Assumptions and Characteristics 
D.l Appendix D.l summarizes important assumptions and modeling characteristics 
of the CARE III program that the user may need to know. 
GENERAL MODELING CHARACTERISTICS 
Time constants (reciprocal of failure rates for w = 1) of fault occurrences 
(~104 hours) should be at least 4 orders of magnitude greater than the 
fault/error transition times (~10-3 hour) in the fault/error-handling model. 
This time separation will insure that mathematical approximations 
assumed by CARE III are not compromised. 
Transition times separated by more than two orders of magnitude in the general 
fault-hpndling model (invoked by use of at least one uniform distribution) may 
cause numerical instability. This restriction does not apply to the 
homogeneous Markov solution (MARKOV = 1). 
FAULT CHARACTERISTICS 
Module faults occur independently with Weibull arrival times. The Weibull rate 
function, A(t) = AW(At)w-l, allows time dependent rates (t = operational time), 
thus allowing for much modeling flexibility. The Wei bull rate function 
reduces to the exponential rate function, A(t) = A, when W equals one. 
Faults in spare or in-use modules occur according to the same rate functions, 
i.e., unit dormancy factors. 
MODULE DEPLETION FAILURES 
Module and stage failures are statistically independent, i.e., a failure in one 
module or stage cannot cause another module or stage to fail. 
A stage fails if fewer than a specified number of modules are 
operational. 
A system fault tree determines which combinations of stage failures define 
system failure by module depletion. 
SYSTEM FAILURES DUE TO IMPERFECT FAULT HANDLING 
Single-Fault Failures: An existing latent (undetected) fault creates 
errors that are not masked/recoverable by the system. 
Double-Fault Failures: The interaction of a fault in a module critically 
paired with an in-use module containing a latent fault causes system failure. 
In-use modules that are critically paired may be in the same stage or across 
two stages. Multiple paired faults are possible. 
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No interactions of more than two critically coupled modules are considered, 
i.e., no critical triples, quadruples, etc. The case of a quintuple of modules 
with a majority voter is not directly modeled by CARE III, but can be 
approximated: All possible pairs within the quintuple are considered critical, 
and fault-handling unreliabilities are computed only if three or more faults 
are present (use LC=3). 
FAULT-HANDLING MODEL 
The same fault-handling model is used for all operational modules, spare or 
in-use, within a stage. It is independent of global time, i.e., operational 
time, is independent of the number of operational modules remaining in a stage, 
and asumes zero probability of incorrectly deleting a module which has not 
experienced a fault. 
Single Fault Handling Model (SFHM): The SFHM models the latency period of a 
fault and the dynamics of detection, isolation, error generation, etc. It is 
defined as a semi-Markov process with exponential and/or uniform transition 
distributions. It defines faults as permanent, intermittent, or transient as a 
function of parameters a and e. The fault-handling model was designed for fast 
transients and intermittents, where a and e would be within 2 or 3 orders of 
magnitude of the other fault-handling parameters, i.e., 6, p, etc. Slower 
transients and intermittents are possible, but the user is cautioned to their 
use. 
Double Fault Handling Model (DFHM): The DFHM models the latency period of two 
faults where the faults occur in "critical pairs" of modules and one of the 
faults is intermittent. The DFHM as described here is implemented 
mathematically in CARE III and is depicted in figure C-l with states AiAEj' 
AiBEj deleted, and entry into state DF occurs only from states drawn to the 
left of the DF state. The complete illustration depicts the handling of 
critical-pair faults and is mathematically implemented differently from the 
DFHM. 
SPARING 
Parameter matrix NOP defines the number of spare and in-use modules as a 
function of the number of faulty modules. Only the in-use modules are subject 
to critical-pair failures. 
Fault dynamics are the same for all operational, spare, and in-use modules 
within a stage, e.g., spare modules are hot and are being dynamically flexed 
(in-use and spare modules exchange roles); or equivalently, spares are assumed 
to be executing a self test program, or the spares have some other fault-
handling capability. 
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RECONFIGURATIONS AND FLEXING OF SPARES 
Two cases can be considered: 
Dynamic flexing: Spare and in-use module3 continuously exchange roles (see NOP 
section 3.2 and appendix B.l). Module flexing is done in order to reduce the 
number of latent faults by bringing spare modules into voting triads for 
Single-fault detection and reconfiguration. 
Reconfiguration: In the event that an in-use module experiences a fault and is 
detected and reconfigured out of the stage, a hot spare will replace the 
deleted in-use module, if one is available. If a fault occurs in a spare and 
is reconfigured, no further action is taken. 
Fault analysis of spare modules in CARE III is the same as for in-use modules, 
i.e., they have the same fault rates (unit dormancy factor) and fault-handling 
models. In consequence, the probability that a module is in a given fault 
status (fault free, latent, etc.) is independent of the status, spare or 
in-use, of the module. This scheme allows for simple evaluation of the 
probability of lethal critical pairs of modules. 
CRITICAL PAIRS 
Set of Critical Pairs: The set of critical pairs consists of pairs of modules 
which when faulty can lead to system failure. This set is defined by a 
Critical-Pairs Fault Tree. The numbering of modules in this fault tree 
corresponds 
to functional use. 
Functional Numbering of Modules: The numbering of modules in the Critical-
Pairs Fault Tree corresponds to functions performed in listed order of 
decreasing importance, but not to physical units (see appendix B.l). 
APPENDIX D 
Model Assumptions and Characters 
D.2 Appendix D.2 explains how subruns are created and how they should be used. 
CARE III provides a modeling decomposition technique called a subrun (sub'-run) 
to significantly reduce the computation of Q(tl~) probabilities associated with 
user specified critical-pair trees. By using multiple subruns, the user 
partitions the state space of fault vectors, ~, into disjoint sets which 
consequently reduces the number of elements in the ~ vectors for Q(tl~) 
computations. To properly utilize this feature, the user must insure that 
stage failure events are not critically coupled across the multiple subruns. 
If coupling does exist, the failure events all must be contained in the same 
subrun fault tree. 
A subrun can contain up to twenty stages. Another way to say this is that 
CARE III can only solve operational probabilities, p(tl~), and fault-handling 
failure probabilities, Q(tl~), where the ~ vector for these functions has at 
most twenty dimensions. (See definitions in section 2.1.) Multiple subruns 
become necessary when solving CARE III problems with 21 or more stages. The 
two factors that affect the creation of subruns are the user-defined critical-
pair tree(s), if any, and the input parameter NPSBRN. 
If one or more critical-pair trees are specified for a given CARE III problem, 
each critical-pair tree will generate a subrun. The ~ vector for each 
particular subrun will keep track of faults for each of the stages referenced 
by the original critical-pair tree. For example, suppose the user were 
modeling a problem with eight stages, and the user defines two critical-pair 
trees. The first critical-pair tree references stages one thru three in its 
STAGE ID AND MODULE RANGE lines, and the second critical-pair tree references 
stages four thru eight. This problem would generate two subruns. The first 
subrun's p(tl~) and Q(tl~) arrays would be a function of an ~ vector having 
three dimensions. The first element of this vector would keep track of faults 
for stage one. Similarly, the second element of this vector would keep track 
of faults for stage two, and the third element would keep track of faults for 
stage three. The second subrun's p(tl~) and Q(tl~) arrays would be a function 
of an ~ vector having five dimensions. The first element of this vector would 
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keep track of faults for stage four, the second element would keep track of 
faults for stage five, and so on, with the last element of this subrun's 1 
vector keeping tracking of faults in stage eight. 
When solving for the total fault-handling unreliability QSUM array printed in 
the summary information listing, the CARE III program assumes that stages 
grouped by subruns are in separate branches of the system tree such that the 
branches are 'ORed' together. (A branch to the system tree is defined to be a 
portion of the tree which serves as an input to the top event of the tree.) If 
this assumption is violated, the total fault-handling unreliability as given by 
QSUM may not be conservative. When the above assumption is violated, some 
individual Q(tl~) values, possibly important to the QSUM total, will not be 
computed. To obtain details of the mathematics of the above assumption, the 
reader can find information in section 4.0 of reference 6 and in section 3.5.4 
of reference 5. 
If all of the stages for a given CARE III problem are not contained entirely in 
one or more critical-pair trees or if the CARE III program has no critical-pair 
tree, the CARE III program will automatically create subruns from the stages 
not referenced by a critical-pair tree. The algorithm that CARE III uses to do 
this can be controlled somewhat by using the input parameter NPSBRN. If no 
critical-pair tree exists, then NPSBRN will partition the stages of the problem 
being solved into subruns with 'NPSBRN' stages to a subrun, e.g., a CARE III 
problem consisting of a twenty stage system with NPSBRN = 5 will consist of 
four subruns with five stages per subrun. For this example subrun, one's 
calculations would be based on an 1 vector keeping track of stages 1-5, subrun 
two would similarly keep track of stage 6-10, subrun three would keep track of 
stages 11-15, and subrun four would keep track of stages 16-20. If a single 
critical-pair tree exists such that not every stage is referenced by the tree, 
the excluded stages will form subruns using the NPSBRN parameter. Let's now 
suppose one is working a CARE III problem containing twenty stages where the 
first 14 are referenced in the STAGE ID AND MODULE RANGE section of a single 
critical-pair tree and that stages 15 thru 20 are free of critically-paired 
faults. If NPSBRN = 5 for this example, then the CARE III program will divide 
this problem into three subruns. Subrun one will consist of stages 1-14, 
subrun two will consist of stages 15-19, and subrun three will only consist and 
use stage number twenty. Thus the algorithm used by the CARE III program to 
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create subrun works as follows. Every critical-pair tree provided by the user 
creates a subrun consisting of the stages referenced by its STAGE ID AND MODULE 
RANGE section. After this, stages not referenced by a critical-pair tree are 
put into subruns that are different from those created by the critical-pair 
trees. In doing this, however, stages referenced by a subrun must be in 
sequential order. Stages preceded and followed by the stages used in a 
critical-pair tree could not be grouped together, for instance. Finally, for 
the groups of sequentially numbered stages that are not referenced by a 
critical-pair tree, these stages are further divided into groups so that 
subruns generated from these groups will be multiples of the NPSBRN value plus 
remainder, e.g., with NPSBRN = 5 and with a gap of 12 sequentially numbered 
stages, three subruns will be created from this gap. The first two would 
consist of five stages each, and the third would consist of two stages. 
The advantage of using NPSBRN to create subruns is that the CARE III program 
will execute faster when solving Q(tl~) and p(tl~) probabilities with ~ having 
as few dimensions as possible. However, by creating many subruns there may be 
more Q(tl~) and p(tl~) probabilities to solve for. As a trade off, it is 
usually best to put two to four stages in a subrun when possible. 
The reader should be aware of the following caveats at this time. The 
depletion of hardware probability, P*SUM, printed in the summary information 
listing is computed separately from any Q(tl~), p(tl~), and QSUM calculations. 
The P*SUM answer will also remain the same regardless of how the problem of 
interest is divided into subruns. Even though the user may only want to use 
CARE III to calculate P*SUM, the CARE III program will calculate p(tl~) arrays 
for all subruns even when no critical-pair trees exist and parameter 
IRLPCD = 1. Unfortunately, the present version of the CARE III program does 
not allow the p(tl~) calculations pertaining to subruns to be disabled when 
only P*SUM calculations are desired. If subruns are not partitioned 
appropriately through the use of critical-pair trees and the parameter NPSBRN, 
the p(tl~) calculations may take a long time leading to long CARE III execution 
times. The other point to note is that for any CARE III problem involving 21 
or more stages which has a system tree with the tree's top gate being an 'AND' 
or 'M of N' gate, the total fault-handling unreliability, QSUM, cannot in 
general be assumed to be conservative. Furthermore, the second release vefsion 
of the CARE III program does not warn the user if he violated the assumption 
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about subruns containing stages which are located in system tree branches which 
are not 'ORed' together when there are critical-pair failure calculations to be 
done. Examples are now illustrated to aid in identifying if this assumption 
has been violated. 
Consider a system made of three stages. Two of the stages are computer stages 
with the third stage being a memory storage device. Let's say computer stage A 
has four modules configured so that computer stage A starts as a triad with one 
spare and that computer stage B is configured similarly. Let's also assume 
that the memory device stage consists of one module and is shared between the 
two computer stages. We will consider the system as being failed if both 
computer stages fail or if the memory storage device fails. We will also 
consider critical-pair failures in both working computer triads, e.g., system 
failure occurs if a computer triad incurs two faults in succession such that 
the second fault occurs before the first fault is dealt with. With the above 
information, we can draw the system failure tree which looks like this -
computer A 
loss of 
computers 
computer B 
loss of 
system 
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memory device 
If we associate computer stage A to be stage number one, and computer stage B 
to be stage number two, and the memory storage device to be stage number three, 
then the system tree could be numbered like so -
12 
3 
1 2 
If we reference all three stages in one critical-pair tree, the bottom portion 
of the input file for this problem would look like -
SYSTEM FAULT TREE 
1 3 11 12 
11 A 1 2 
12 0 3 11 
CRITICAL PAIR TREE 
1 9 21 23 
1 1 4 
2 5 8 
3 9 9 
21 2 1 2 3 
22 2 5 6 7 
23 0 21 22 
With this type of input, our CARE III problem will be done as one subrun. We 
notice, however, that stage number three's module is not referenced in the 
logic block of the critical-pair tree. We also note that stage three is 
connected to the top event of the system tree through an OR gate. This 
structure satisfies the assumption of being in a separate branch of the system 
fault tree which is 'ORed' together with one or more other branches of the 
tree. The above input can be simplified to -
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SYSTEM FAULT TREE 
3 11 12 
11 A 1 2 
12 0 3 11 
CRITICAL PAIR TREE 
8 21 23 
1 4 
2 5 8 
21 2 1 2 3 
22 2 5 6 7 
23 0 21 22 
This input will now produce two subruns. Subrun one will have p(tl~) and 
Q(tl~) values pertaining to stages one and two, and subrun two will have p(tl~) 
and Q(tl~) values pertaining to stage three. 
In the above example, there are no critical-pair failures involving both 
computer stage A and computer stage B. The critical-pair failures are within 
stages and not across stages. Because of this ,the user may think of breaking 
the above problem into three subruns by using the input -
SYSTEM TREE 
1 3 11 12 
11 A 1 2 
12 0 3 11 
CRITICAL PAIR TREE ONE 
4 21 21 
1 1 4 
21 2 2 3 
CRITICAL PAIR TREE TWO 
1 4 21 21 
2 1 4 
21 2 2 3 
This input, however, would violate the assumption that stages one and two are 
in separate branches of the system fault tree and much less that the branches 
are 'ORed' together by the top event of the tree. If the user were to use this 
type of input to execute the CARE III program, the program may compute QSUM 
values in the QSUM array that may not be conservative. 
Let's now analyze the Q(tl~) arrays generated by CARE III for the different 
variations of the example discussed. For this comparison, let's assume both 
computer stages use a permanent fault-handling model with the parameter C=1.0. 
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If the above example is done in one subrun, up to 17 nonzero valued Q(tl!) 
arrays would be computed. They would be Q(0,2,0), Q(2,0,0), Q(0,3,0), 
Q(1,2,0), Q(2,1,0), QC3,O,O), Q(0,4,0), Q(1,3,0), Q(2,2,0), QC3,1,0), Q(4,0,0), 
Q(1,4,0), Q(2,3,0), Q(3,2,0), Q(4,1,0), Q(2,4,0), and Q(4,2,0). Since this 
problem only deals with permanent faults, these arrays, of the form Q(x,y,z), 
give the probability of failure due to fault-handling with x modules of stage 
one having failed, y modules of stage two having failed, and z modules of stage 
three having failed. The above 17 Q(tl!) arrays would be added to form the 
QSUM array printed in the summary information listing. 
For the case in which the above problem was done in two sUbruns, the first 
subrun would generate a maximum of 17 nonzero valued Q(tl!) arrays, and the 
second subrun would not gen~rate any nonzero valued Q(tl!) arrays. For the 
first sUbrun, the Q(tl!) arrays of interest would be Q(0,2), Q(2,0), Q(0,3), 
Q(1,2), Q(2,1), QC3,O), Q(0,4), Q(1,3), Q(2,2), QC3,1), Q(4,0), Q(1,4), Q(2,3), 
Q(3,2), Q(4,1), Q(2,4), and Q(4,2). 
If the example problem had been done using three subruns, the only nonzero 
valued Q(tl~) arrays would be generated in subrun one and in subrun two. For 
subrun one, these would be Q(2), Q(3), and Q(4). For subrun two, these would 
also be Q(2), Q(3), and Q(4). Notice that only six nonzero valued Q(tl!) 
arrays are calculated. For this case, not all combinations of fault-handling 
failures have been examined so the QSUM array values may not be conservative. 
D-10 
APPENDIX E 
NAMELIST and List-Directed Syntax 
E.l Syntax Rules for NAMELIST Input 
The CARE III program permits the use of NAMELIST formatted input for input 
paragraphs FLTTYP, STAGES, FLTCAT, and RNTIME. NAMELIST statements permit the 
input of groups of variables and arrays with identifying names. NAMELIST input 
is an extension of ANSI standard Fortran 77. The following rules should be 
observed when using the VAX-ll Fortran or CDC Fortran V compilers. 
1) A NAMELIST paragraph begins with a $ in column two, immediately followed by 
the NAMELIST paragraph identifier. At least one space, and spaces only, 
must separate the NAMELIST paragraph identifier and the first identifying 
name of the first variable or array used in the NAMELIST paragraph. The 
first variable or array name may, however, start the next line following 
the NAMELIST paragraph identifier. 
2) Data items in a NAMELIST paragraph are separated by commas and may be in 
the forms: 
a) variable constant 
b) array name = constant, •.• , constant 
c) array name(subscript) = constant, ••. , constant 
Column one must always be left blank when formatting NAMELIST data. 1 
Forgetting the constant behind a variable or array name will create a fatal 
execution time error. 
3) Any data item in a NAMELIST paragraph which is not assigned by the user 
will be given a default value as shown by the table in section 3.7. 
4) The order in which variables or array names are listed in a NAMELIST 
paragraph is not important. 
1. Column one of the input file may be used when inputting the CARE III system 
fault tree or critical-pair trees. 
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6) Many lines can be used to input data in a NAMELIST paragraph. Column one 
of each new line must be kept blank. All constants in a NAMELIST paragraph 
must be followed by a comma, except for the last constant in the NAMELIST 
paragraph. The last constant is followed by a $ or $END, or by both a 
comma and $. 
7) The CARE III program reads integer, real, and logical data types. See the 
host machine's Fortran Reference Manual for acceptable data type 
representations. 
8) Constants can be preceded by an asterisk repetition factor. 
RLM = 7*1.0E-3, 
is equivalent to 
RLM ( 1 , 1 ) 
RLM( 4,1 ) 
RLM(2,2) 
Also -
0.001 , 
0.001 , 
0.001 , 
RLM(2,1) 
RLM( 5,1 ) 
ALP(2) = 2*750.0, 2*1600.0, 
is equivalent to 
0.001 , 
0.001, 
RLM( 3,1 ) 
RLM( 1 ,2) 
0.001 , 
0.001 , 
ALP(2) = 750.0, ALP(3) 750.0, ALP(4) 1600.0, ALP(5) 
9) Blanks must not appear -
a) between $ and NAMELIST paragraph name 
b) within a NAMELIST paragraph name 
c) within array names or variable names 
d) within constants 
e) on either side of the asterisk repetition symbol 
1600.0, 
10) Spaces may appear before or after commas, before or after equal signs, and 
before or after parentheses. 
E-2 
APPENDIX E 
E.2 Syntax Rules for List-directed Input 
The user may select list-directed formatting for input paragraphs FLTTYP, 
STAGES, FLTCAT, and RNTIME. List-directed format is not as easy to use as the 
NAMELIST format mostly because the order in which parameters are listed for 
list-directed formatting is important. For a more detailed listing of the 
general rules of list-directed formatting, see the host machine's Fortran 
Reference Manual. 
GENERAL RULES 
1) List-directed data is read beginning in column one starting with the first 
line of the input file. 
2) A slash divides input belonging to different input paragraphs. After the 
slash is encountered, data for a new input paragraph must start on a new 
line. 
3) Data for the variables and arrays of the input paragraphs must be entered 
in the order shown by the table given in section 3.7. 
4) A comma must come after every input parameter entered. An input may be a 
constant, a null value indicated by a space, a repetition of constants in 
the form r*c, and a repetition of null values in the form r* , where r is 
an integer specifying the number of repetitions, and c is the constant to 
be replicated. 
5) If not all parameters for an input paragraph have been listed before a 
slash is encountered in the input stream, any parameters not accounted for 
will stay at their default value as given by the table shown in 
section 3.7. 
6) Spaces may not appear -
a) within constants 
b) on either side of the asterisk repetition symbol 
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7) The CARE III program reads integer, real, and logical data types for its 
various input parameters. See the host machine's Fortran Reference Manual 
for acceptable data type representations. 
8) To leave a parameter at its default value, a null value must be entered for 
it. If the parameter would have occupied the first position of the input 
paragraph, an initial comma is inserted for the parameter, otherwise two 
consecutive commas with no intervening constants enters the null value. 
Null values at the end of the input paragraph can be entered depending upon 
the location of the input paragraph's terminating slash (see rule 5). One 
or more spaces is allowed on either side of a comma. 
SPECIFIC RULES 
The number of input values required by some input arrays when using list-
directed formatting will vary each time the user creates a new CARE III 
problem. These arrays and the number of data required by CARE III using list-
directed formatting is now discussed. 
For input paragraph FLTTYP, the CARE III program will read 'NFTYPS' elements 
for the arrays ALP, BET, DEL, RHO, EPS, IDELF, IRHOF, IEPSF, PA, PB, and C. As 
an example, if NFTYPS = 3, then the CARE III program expects three input 
constants for each of the above arrays in the order they.are listed. 
For the input paragraph STAGES, the input NSTAGES will determine how many 
inputs will be needed for arrays N, M, NOP, and LC. 'NSTGES' inputs will be 
needed for the arrays Nand M. The number of inputs for the NOP array will be 
five times 'NSTGES', e.g., five values of NOP are needed for each stage of a 
CARE III problem. Finally, 'NSTGES' inputs will be needed for array LC. 
For input paragraph FLTCAT, the CARE III program expects 'NSTGES' inputs for 
the first array NFCATS. The quantity of fault-handling models that the tth 
stage has as given by array NFCATS, will determine the number of inputs to be 
expected for the two-dimensional arrays JTYP, OMG, and RLM. The sum of array 
NFCATS, over elements NFCATS(l) to NFCATS(NSTGES), will be the number of inputs 
required for these arrays. 
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The input paragraph RNTIME has no arrays; however, the order in which input 
variables are listed is still very important. 
Below is shown the Fortran code for the CAREIN module that uses list-directed 
formatting. It is provided for the user so he can see the exact way in which 
the input paragraphs FLTTYP, STAGES, FLTCAT, and RNTIME are read using list-
directed formatting. 
READ(7,*,END~10) NFTYPS 
., ( ALPCITYP),ITYP~l,NFTYPS) 
· , ( BET CITYP) , ITYP~ 1 , NFTYPS) 
., ( DELCITYP) ,ITYP~l ,NFTYPS) 
., ( RHO(ITYP) ,ITYP~l ,NFTYPS) 
., ( EPS(ITYP) ,ITYP~l ,NFTYPS) 
., CIDELFCITYP) ,ITYP=l ,NFTYPS) 
• , CIRHOF (ITYP) , ITYP= 1 , NFTYPS) 
., CIEPSFCITYP) ,ITYP=l ,NFTYPS) 
., ( PA(ITYP),ITYP=l,NFTYPS) 
., ( PB(ITYP) ,ITYP=l ,NFTYPS) 
., ( CCITY?) ,ITYP=l ,NFTYPS) 
., DBLDF ,TRUNC ,CVPRNT,CVPLOT,IAXSCV,MARKOV,LGTMST 
READ(7,*,END=10) NSTGES 
., ( N( ISTG), ISTG=l,NSTGES) 
., ( M( ISTG), ISTG=l,NSTGES) 
., «NOPCIQ,ISTG) ,IQ=l ,5) ,ISTG=l ,NSTGES) 
· , ( LC ( ISTG) , ISTG= 1 , NSTGES) 
., IRLPCD,RLPLOT,IAXSRL 
READ(7,*,END~10) (NFCATS(ISTG) ,ISTG~l,NSTGES) 
., «JTYP(ICAT,ISTG),ICAT=l,NFCATS(ISTG»,ISTG=l,NSTGES) 
., « OMG(ICAT ,ISTG) ,ICAT=l ,NFCATSCISTG» ,ISTG=l ,NSTGES) 
., « RLM(ICAT,ISTG),ICAT=l ,NFCATS(ISTG»,ISTG=l ,NSTGES) 
READ(7,*,END=10) 
FT ,NSTEPS,ITBASE,SYSFLG,CPLFLG,KWT ,PSTRNC 
., CINDBG,QPTRNC,IVSN ,NPSBRN,CKDATA 
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APPENDIX F 
Control Parameters 
TRUNC - fault-handling function's truncation value for the general fault-
handling model solution. Recall that the general fault-handling model 
is solved when the parameter MARKOV equals two. The TRUNC parameter 
LC -
I 
limits the number of points calculated for the single and double fault-
handling functions. When these functions become less than TRUNC, no 
more of their points are calculated. 
The value of TRUNC usually has little affect on the execution time of a 
CARE III job. Using smaller values of TRUNC will in most cases provide 
a more accurate fault-handling unreliability value (i.e., more accurate 
Q(tl~) values used to get QSUM). The amount of accuracy gained, 
however, is usually small. 
parameter that can inhibit Q(tl~) contributions to fault-handling 
unreliability, QSUM, when critical-pair failures exist. LC is 
specified for each stage of the system and the default for all LC 
values is zero. LC may allow for the approximate modeling of some 
reconfigurable (e.g. pentaplex) systems. 
As shown by the definition of Q(tl~) in section 2.1, a given Q(tl~) 
probability is conditional on the value of i. The LC parameter 
inhibits a critical-pair failure computation of a particular Q(tl~) 
probability when the vector! for the Q(tl~) computation has an element 
less than LC. For non-transient faults, this element of ! represents 
the number of faults incurred by stage x. For transient faults, this 
element of i represents the number of modules reconfigured from the 
system. 
The parameter LC will not affect any single-fault failure calculations 
when the parameter C, used to describe the fault-handling model, is 
less than one. Unreliability due to single-fault failures is added to 
the QSUM array regardless of the parameter LC. 
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PSTRNC- parameter used to limit the number of Q(tl~) values used in computing 
fault-handling unreliability, QSUM. If the maximum value of p*(tl~), 
for t over all mission time, is less than 'PSTRNC', the corresponding 
Q(tl~) value will not be used in computing fault-handling 
unreliability, QSUM. 
The parameter FT which specified the operational time will affect how 
PSTRNC works because the module depletion probability, p*(tl~), for a 
given fault vector, ~, changes when the mission time, FT, changes. For 
a given value of PSTRNC, using a large value for FT will usually cause 
the CARE III program to calculate fewer p(tl~) and Q(tl~) values than a 
small value for FT will. 
Any condition which causes fewer p(tl~) and Q(tl~) probabilities to be 
calculated will decrease the execution time of the CARE III program. 
If too large of a value of PSTRNC is used for a given problem, however, 
it is possible that some of the more significant Q(tl~) values or 
possibly no Q(tl~) values at all will be calculated. This value of 
PSTRNC in turn would make the value of QSUM on the output summary 
information page smaller than it should be. 
QPTRNC- parameter used to limit the number of Q(tl~) values used in computing 
fault-handling unreliability. If a problem being worked has some of 
its total unreliability due to fault handling, the CARE III program 
will print the most dominate Q(tl~) values making up this 
unreliability. After the most dominate (largest value) Q(tl~) values 
are computed, any Q(tl~) values which are a factor of 'QPTRNC' smaller 
than these values will not be calculated. 
If QPTRNC is set large, say a value of one or greater, only the most 
dominate Q(tl~) values will be calculated and the final QSUM answer may 
not be conservative due to the many lesser individual Q(tl~) terms 
which are dropped from the sum. Using QPTRNC values less than the 
default value of 1.0E-2, may cause the execution time of large problems 
to be intolerably long while providing very little improved accuracy. 
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where the input data have been thoroughly debugged, and only a few 
minor changes are made to the input file for subsequent runs. This 
capability is also useful when CARE III is used with a user-friendly 
preprocessor that does the data checking in an interactive manner. 
NPSBRN- parameter that is used to determine the number of subruns and 
consequently, the number of noncritically-paired stages that are to be 
grouped together in a subrun. The default value is 20, but faster 
execution will usually result if a value of three or four is used (see 
appendix D for more detail). 

APPENDIX G 
Example Problems 
G.l Example System Trees 
A number of system fault trees have been sketched for some typical aircraft 
flight control system architectures. The figure numbers (5 - 11) correspond to 
those given in reference 18. Further details on the system architectures can 
be found in reference 18. 
Two types of notation are used in the examples: expanded and condensed. 
Expanded notation is usually used if devices have different failure rates 
and/or there are failur~ dependencies (see fig.'s 7, 8, and 11). Expanded 
notation can also be used to show detail, e.g., fig.'s 5, 6, 9, 10. Typically, 
in the latter case, condensed notation is used. 
G-l 
Figure 5. Triplex VOledSy$lem-~1lIO Force Voting Only 
N .. 3 M .. 2 
CARE III CONDENSED NOTATION 
LOSS OF CONTROL 
2/3 
CARE III EXPA~DED ~OTAT[O~ 
FIGURE 5 
~----- ... ---, 
~~~~~: StAYO I 
vorEA : SET I , 
rlL.;..:;.:..:;,;:..-.:.-_-I l 
I ,... ____ -. ____ 1 
::1,·' 
".pur: OIGIT.l~ ;OUTPUT"+--+-.-I~EAVO ." S'·AVO " ...... . 
1 : CO ",,'uf£A : z co"''''',O: SE r 1 .,:<:=>-. 
. z • VOUR; I' 
I 
I 
., . 
r----------~I·-
" j·1 SC~\lO I .', cc~I.U,NO' S£R'w'O ..J 
VOTtA ; SET 3 
Figurt: 6. TripleJ( Va red Sysrem-Servo Force Voting imd 
Servo Command Voting . \ .. ' 
EXPANDED NOTATION 
sen & camp sen & camp sen & camp 
FIGURE 6 
G-3 
lo .. ; 
CONDENSED NOTATION 
FIgutw 1. Tripl.1f Voted System-5ervo Foret! Voting and 
$«rso, Signal Voting 
LOSS OF CONTROL 
FIGURE 7 
NO CONDENSED EQUIVALENT 
Figure 8. Triplf!x Vored System -Servo Fore:! Va ring, Servo 
CommJnd \loring, and Sensor Signal Voting 
LOSS OF CONTROL 
LOSS OF CONTROL 
FIGURE 8 
G-5 
N = 3 
CARE III CONDENSED 
NOTATION 
M = 1 
CARE III EXPANDED 
NOTATION 
• E.cII input SKtion CIlnSl'U 01: 
.A "'. of Inalo9 ill"", lignll CIlndi'io";,,, ~ 
• All Ii, dig d,,].ul in .... 'act 
• An input '" .. h.p ..... and Inalo~~igilM~" 
Figure 9. Triplex Voted System-Servo Force Voting and 
Cross-Strapped Sensor Signal Voting 
LOSS OF CONTROL 
N = 3, M 2 N = 3, M 
FIGURE 9 
G-6 
2 
• 
• ,~"'''''' .alOft CDftt.1tI of: 
-A WI 01 .......... "'" """II oon'"I_ .... ___ 
-Aft." d,tI d..,.ul un"f.~ 
·M ...... ' _It,"",,,, ."., 1N!ot·to4' .. UI .... -
Figure 10. TripleJl Voted System-Servo For.:.! Voting. Servo 
Command Voting. and Cross·SuOJpped Sensor Signal Voting 
FIGURE 10 
G-7 
N=3, M=2 N=3, M=2 N=3, M .. 3 
• r~put. ~ • ."",pu .... and outpUt 
of. cNnMl muot be good '0' IhH 
dW ...... •• _ 10 be ff")0ged 
• '""'" .... proces_ muft be good 10 
Mnd _ cI.ca to _tNt chlMIi 
• Sensor "a '''-''cy rnanltC fOl 
.....,...,." cle,radatoOn 10 .. "'" .... tot __ funct_ 
·Ch ...... 'oi_ .... a_1O 
.... pIa ..... 01 operalioA 
Figu~ 11. Triplex ARCS Concept 
LOSS OF CONTROL 
FIGURE 11 
G-8 
APPENDIX G 
Example Problems 
G.2 Complete Examples 
Two example problems that are presented in the "Hands-On Dem6nstration and 
Tutorial" report (ref. 3) are included in abbreviated form in this appendix. 
For each problem, the input file is given together with a sample (incomplete) 
of the output data. The output listings shown, however, are not those shown in 
reference 3. The output listings shown are those generated by the new release 
version 2 code. Since release 2 uses an improved variable time step 
integrator, the data listed in this guide will usually not correspond to those 
in reference 3, since the time steps will.usually be different. By selecting 
the original linear time step integrator (setting LGTMST = .FALSE.), the time 
steps can be made to correspond. Also, the accuracy of the CARE III 
computations has increased, so the user will see small differences in the 
output when comparing answers to those of past versions of CARE III. 
G-9 
STG 1 
EXAMPLE PROBLEM 7 
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
Problem 7 includes critical-pair failures across stages as well as within a 
stage. To illustrate critical-pair failures across stages, a computer (C) bus 
stage which enables communication between computers is included. The C-bus 
stage is composed of four buses, but only two are required for reliable 
operation. Information going onto the buses are majority voted by the 
computers and information entering the receiving computers also majority vote 
the information. 
One bus is a hot spare and not subject to critical-pair failure; however, the 
three in-use buses are. The spare bus is constantly flexed with the other 
three in a random fashion to expose latent failures. Since three voting 
processors communicate over three buses, a failure in a voting triad and a 
failure in a bus not connected to the failed computer would preclude a correct 
majority vote at the receiving end of the triplex bus. This cross coupling of 
failures in two different stages, i.e., computer and bus, is a cri tically 
coupled failure across stages. 
FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM OF SYSTEM 
~I COMP STG 5 IRS ~ C-Bus N=4, M=2 
N=3, H=2 IRS ~ ~I COMP~~ SEC. ACT 1--1 
I 
I 
I 
~ I IRS ISEC I ACT ]--10 FORCE SUM ~I COtvlp~~ I VOTING I ~ I PITCH I RATE ISEC. ACT I-J 
STC 2 PITCH ~ ) N=3, M=2 RATE \ 
STC 4 
PilCH ~ ~I COMP N=3, M"'2 RATE 
STC 3 
N=4, M=2 
r,-lO 
SYSTEM FAILURE CRITERIA 
The system fails if any stage fails. 
A single point failure in the computer stage causes system failure. 
The system fails if a critically coupled failure occurs in the computer 
stage or bus stage. 
The inertial reference stage fails if 2 out of 3 modules fail. 
The computer stage fails if 3 out of 4 modules fail. 
The secondary actuator fails if 2 out of 3 modules fail. 
INPUT DATA FOR FAILURE OCCURRENCE MODEL 
Parametric Data 
inertial reference sensor module 
pitch rate sensor module 
computer module 
secondary actuator module 
computer bus 
SYSTEM TREE 
1 2 
N 3 
M 2 
3 
2 
LOSS OF SYSTEM 
CONTROL 
3 
4 
2 
(;-11 
Exponential_5 A. = 1. 5 x 10 5 
1. -A =1.9xl0 4 AP = 4.8 x 10-5 c -A = 3.7 x 10 6 
AS = 2.7 x lO-b 
4 
3 
2 
5 
4 
2 
INPUT DATA FOR SINGLE FAULT MODEL PARAMETRIC DATA 
Self test rates (t) =4360 detections/hour for computer stage 
6 (t) = 1.0 x 10 for computer bus stage 
Random test = exponential detection times 
Error detection rate e(t) = 3600 detections/hour for computer stage 
E(t) = 0.0 for computer bus stage 
Random test • exponential 
Error recovery probability C c 0.999 for computer stage 
C = 1.0 for computer bus stage 
Error generation rate pet) a 180 errors/hour for computer stage 
pet) = 0.0 for computer bus stage 
Random pattern = exponential 
SINGLE FAULT MODEL 
computer 
f4i tu,. cacol 
CRITICAL PAIR TREE 
faul: detecti.on 
r d't ~ 
Q-jr~co~erY e~ror path . AD ~error ~ 
cs(t) 
recovery pr0bability 
detection rate 
system failure 
~ state 
L error generation rate 
The 2/4 gatJwith putput 15 models the computer stage critically coupled 
failure. The 2/4 gate with output 16 models the bus stage critically coupled 
failure. The OR gate with output 17 and all lower connecting gates model 
critically coupled failures across the computer and bus stages. For example, 
if computer 2 or 3 fails and bus 5 fails, the bus will have bad data on 2 out 
of 3 in-use buses even though only one bus failed. The loss of the bus 
function causes system failure. Output 13 and 14 and lower level gates take 
into account the other combinations of a computer failure and a bus failure. 
lSince NOP(l,3)=3 and NOP(l,5)=3, one module (4) in the computer stage and one 
module (8) in the bus stage are not critically coupled, i.e., they are spares~ 
even though the critical-pair tree shows these modules in the 2/4 gates. The NOP 
specification overrides the gate specification. Equivalently, the gates could 
have heen 2/3 ~ates ToTithOllt morlnlpR 4 and 8 included. 
r.-l? 
.. 
1 
15 
Loss of System 
due,; to critical 
pair failure in 
cO lIlputers, buses, 
and computers and 
buses 
Computers 
within stage 
critical 
pair failure 
5678 
Buses 
C-Bus 
within 
stage 
critical pair 
failure 
2 3 4 3 in-use 
Computers 
3 in-use 
1 hot spare 
1 hot spare 
Q 
2 3 
Bus 
17 
1 3 
C-Bus 
across stage 
critical pair 
failure 
1 2 
computers computers computers 
3 in-use 
cOClputers 
always listen 
on 3 in-use 
buses. 
EAch computer 
talks on 1 
unique bus, 
Le. computer 1 
tdk. on bus 5 J 
computer 2 talk. 
on bu:o 6. aDd 
cODputer 3 talk. 
on b;UL 7 
..... 
r Computer 1 L L 
I Computer 2 I , 
r Computer 3 
r Computer 4 
hnt" ~nR.TP I 
5 6 7 8 
hot spare 
. 
Buse. 
o 
I 
..... 
.p-
NAHELIST FORHAT 
EXAHPLE 7 
INPUT 
SiFL TTYP 
NFTYPS-3, 
ALP· ' B.B B.B B.B 
BET.. B.B ,B.g g.B 
DEL= I.BB8g8gE+86, 368.g IHB9B.H 
RHO= B.B 10g.B B.B 
EPS= B.B 368g.B B.B 
IDELF= 1 1 1 
IRHOF= 1 I 1 
IEPSF= I 1 1 
MARKOV- 1 
PA= I.B, 1.8 , 1.II PBa 8.9, B.g , B.8 
C= 1.9 9.99BB9BE-Bl, 1.8 
DBLDF" 8.SBBg9BE-klATRUNC= 9.1998BBE-B3, CVPRNT-F,CVPLOT=F,I XSCV= 2$ !·STAGES 
NSTGES-S. 
N - 3, 3, 4, 3, 4, M.. 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
LCe Bj B, B, B, B, NOPCl 1-3 
NOPCl;SI-3: IRLPCu=.4, 
RLPLOT=F ,IAXSRL-2S $FL TCAT 
NFCATS .. 1 1 1 ,IiI ,1, JTYPCl,I," , 
J TYP C I , 2 I" 1 , 
JTVPCl,31" 2, 
JTVPCl,.4'- I, JTYPCl i SI. 3, OMGC 1, I" OMGCI,21" 
OMGCl,3'= 
l.B 
1.B 
1.B 1.g OMG ( 1 ,.4 , .. 
OMGCl,SI-
RLMCl,ll a 
RLM(I,21" 
RLM(I,3'· RLMCl,41· 
RLM(I,S'· 
$ $RNTIME 
I.B , 
I.SBBBBBE-BS, 1.9BBB9gE-BS, 
.4.8BBgBfJE-g.4, 
3.7BIIBBfJE-B5, 
2. 7BIIBBgE-B6 , 
FT .. IB.BBfJB tITBASE=I, SVSFLG-T,CPLFLG- , 
NSTEPS" 5B 
PSTRNC .. B.IBIIBBBE-13~ QPTRNC= B.IBBB9fJE-Bl~ SYSTEM TREE EXAMPLE 7 
1 S 6 6 
601 23.4 S 
CRITICAL PAIRS TREE EX 7 
1 8 9 IB 
3 1 .4 
S S 8 
902 3 
III 0 1 3 
11 0 1 2 
12 A 9 S 
13 A IB 6 
14 A 11 7 
IS 2 1 2 3 4 
16 2 5 6 7 B 
17 0 12 13 14 
18 0 15 16 17 
LIST - DIRECTED FORMAT 
B.II, B.B, H.B. 
II.B, B.B, H.B, 
I.BE+6, 36B.B, 18HBB.B, 
B.B, 18B.B, B.B, 
B.B, 36HB.B, B.B, 
1 , 1 , 1 , 
I, 1 , 1 , 
1 , 1 , I , 
1.14, 1.14, 1.B, 
B,B, B.B, B.B, 
3, 
5, 
1.B f B.999A 1.B, II.BS, .BE-",.F LSE ••• FALSE., 2. I, I 
3. 3, 4, 3, 4, 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
, 
3: 3: , , , , 
B, B~ B, B, B, 
" 1 . t AS L E., 21 
1,1, ,lfl, 
, 1, 
1.14, I.S, 
1. SE-S, 1. 9E-S, 
IB,St SlIt 1~ .TRUE.~ SVS EM RE~ EXAMPL~ 
1 566 60123 .. S 
CRITICAL PAIRS TREE 
1 8 9 18 
31 .. 
S S 8 
902 3 
IS 0 I 3 
11 0 1 2 
12 A 9 5 
13 A 18 6 
14 A 11 7 
15 2 1 2 3 4 
16 2 5 6 7 8 
17 0 12 13 U 
18 0 15 16 17 
2, 
1.B, 
4.8E-4, 
• TRUE., 
7 
EX 7 
1 , 3. 
I.B, loB, 
3.7E-5, 2.7E-61 
, 1.BE-14, , B.Bl, 
.\. 
• I 
C") 
I 
...... 
VI 
CCCCC 
C 
C 
C CCCCC 
A AA A A 
A MA A A A 
RRRR 
R R 
RRRR 
R R 
R R 
EEEEE 
E 
EEE 
E 
EEEEE 
IIIIIIIIIIlIIII 
1 I I 
1 I I 
I I I 
IllIIIIIIIIIIII 
STAGE PROBABILITV OF FAILURE AT 1B.B HOURS 
NUMBER GIVEN PERFECT FAULT HANDLING 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
SUBRUN 
NUMBER 
------
1 
2 
6.748311E-B8 
1.B82658E-B7 
4.376183E-B7 
4.1B4468E-B7 
7.87273BE-14 
STARTING ENDING STAGE STAGE NUMBER NUMBER 
-------- ------
1 2 
3 5 
INVOLVES CR IT I CALL V COUPLED UNITS 
-------------
F 
T 
S U C C E S S F U L E X E CUT ION 0 F 
. 
CAR E I N • 
n 
I 
..... 
0\ 
eeece 
c 
c 
e 
ceeee 
A 
AA A A 
A AAA A A A 
RRRR 
R R RRRR 
R R 
R R 
EEEEE 
E EEE 
E 
EEEEE 
C 0 V ERA G E F A U L T 
DEN SIT V FUN e T ION S (GIVEN RATE R) t 
1) RCT)· R-EXP(-R-T). FOR ALL T. 
2) RCT) • R, 
• 16, 
FOR B.LE. T .LE.1/R, OTHER\lISE. 
IIIIIIIIIIIIIII 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
IIIIIIIIIlIIIII 
T V PES 
S T E PSI Z E 
" S T E P S 
PAR A MET E R S I 
F T D B L 0 F T RUN e 
>.. 5. I.BBBE+B1 HOURS •• B5B 1.BBBE-B4 
T V PEl RAT E S PER H 0 U R (DENSITY FUNCTION 1 OR 2) : PRO B A B I LIT I E S I 
I T V P ALP BET DEL RHO E P S P A P 8 C 
-------
1 B.BBI1E+BB (1) B.BBBE+BB (1) 1.BBBE+B6 (1) B .BBBE+BB (1) B.BBBE+BB (1) 1.BBBBBB B.BBBfi1BB 1.BBBBBB 
2 16 .BBBE+BB (1) B.BBBE+BB (1) 3.6BBE+B2 (1) 1.8B.0'E+B2 (1) 3.6BBE+B3 (1) 1.BB.0'BB9 B.BBBBBB B.999BB8 
3 B .• BBBE+B.0' (1) B.BBBE+BB (1) 1.BBBE+B4 (1) B.BBBE+BB (1) B.BBBE+BB (1) 1.BBBBBB B.BBBBBB 1.BBBBBB 
'" 
CJ 
I 
I-' 
...... 
SUB RUN 1 
S TAG E S 2 
CON FIG U' RAT ION , F A U l T I " FOR HAT I 0 " , 
S T A Gi E N M I CAT R L M o M c: J T V P 
------- -------
3 2 1. 58BE-HS 1.88E+BB 1 
2 3 2 1 1.98BE-.0'5 1.88E+88 1 
F A U LTV E C TOR S , 
TlMES AT WHICH THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION VALUES CORRESPOND (IN HOURS)r 
8.88.0'8888899E+88 3.9521393415E-94 6.1842696831E-84 9.1563919246E-84 1.2299521366E-.3 
1.9312782849E-93 2.4417842732E-93 3.8521383415E-93 3.6625564898E-83 4.8834885464E-83 
6.1842696831E-83 7.3251128197E-83 8.5459649563E-93 1.8987669238E-82 1.3429373593E-82 
1.5871877776E-82 1.8312782949E-.0'2 2.3196198596E-92 2.8879599142E-82 3.2963897689E-92 
3.7846416235E-92 4.7613233328E-82 5.7388858421E-82 6.7146867514E-£2 7.6913684687E-H2 
9.6447318792E-82 1.1598895298E-81 1.3551458716E-81 1.5584822135E-91 1.9411548972E-81 
2.3318275889E-81 2.72258B2646E-81 3.1131729484E-81 3.8945183158E-Bl 4.6758636832E-81 
5.4572893487E-Bl 6.2385547161E-Bl 7.881245451HE-81 9.3639361958E-81 1.8926626921E+H9 
1.2489317656E+88 1.5614699125E+98 1.8748888595E+88 2.1865463257E+88 2.4998844727E+98 
3.1241687666E+88 3.7492378685E+88 4.3743133545E+88 4.9993896494E+88 6.2495422363E+88 
7.4996948242E+88 8.7498474121E+88 1.888888.0'88.0'E+81 
** WARNING - CRITICAL FAULT PAIR FILE -BXYFL" DOES 
NOT CONTAIN DATA FOR THIS SUBRUN. ** 
P( 8. g) 
1.888.0'8.0'8888E+88 1.88888.0'88.0'8E+88 1.88g8888888E+g8 1.88888888.0'BE+.0'.0' 1.8.0'8g8.0'8.0'8BE+.0'8 
9.9999982119E-81 9.9999964237E-.0'1 9.9999964237E-.0'1 9.9999964237E-81 9.9999946356E-.0'1 
9.9999928474E-81 9.9999928474E-81 9.999991.0'593E-.0'1 9.999987483BE-81 9.999997483.0'E-81 
9.9999839867E-.0'1 9.9999883385E-81 9.9999767542E-81 9.9999713898E-81 9.999966.0'254E-81 
9.9999686689E-81 9.9999517282E-81 9.9999427795E-81 9.99993285.0'7E-81 9.9999213219E-81 
9.9999816523E-81 9.9999819829E-81 9.9998623133E-81 9.9999426437E-81 9.9998815165E-81 
9.9997621775E-81 9.9997218583E-81 9.9996834993E-81 9.9996838331E-81 9.9995225668E-81 
9.9994438887E-81 9.9993634224E-81 9.9992.0'42789E-81 9.9998451336E-81 9.9988859892E-81 
9.9987268449E-.0'1 9.9984.0'67678E-81 9. 998.0'88479.0'E-.0'1 9. 99777819.0'2E-.0'1 9.9974581133E-81 
9.9968135357E-81 9.9961757668E-81 9.9955391884E-81 9.99498B8226E-81 9.9936264753E-81 
9.9923539162E-81 9.9918783768E-81 9.9899864137E-.0'1 
Q( 9. S) 
B.8 FOR ALL TIME STEPS. 
P( 8. 1) 
8.88.0'888888.0'E+88 1.7397137952E-.0'8 3.4794297221E-.0'9 5.2191392541E-89 6.9599622964E-89 
1.8438282771E-87 1.3917788414E-87 1.7397144347E-.0'7 2.9976572649E-87 2.78354.0'9355E-87 
(CONTINUATION OF SUBRUN 1 DATA NOT LISTED) 
C'1 
I 
.-
00 
SUBRUN 2 
S TAG E S 3 5 
CON FIG U ~ A T ION , F A U L T I N FOR HAT o N r 
S TAG E N H I CAT R L H o H G J T Y P 
--------- -
------- -------
3 4 2 4.B.9'.9'E-.9'4 1 • .9'.0'E+.9'.9' 2 
4 3 2 1 3.7.9'.0'E-.9'5 1 • .9'.0'E+BB 1 
5 4 2 2.7.9'BE-B6 1 • .9'.9'E+BII 3 
F A U LTV E C TOR S , 
TIMES AT WHICH THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION VALUES CORRESPOND (IN HOURS), 
P( .0' • .9'. B) 
.9'.B8888.9'.0'.0'.0'.0'E+.0'.0' 3 • .0'5213.9'3415E-.9'4 6.1.9'426.0'6831E-.9'4 9.156391.0'246E-.0'4 1.22.9'8521366E-.9'3 
1.8312782.0'49E-83 2.4417.0'42732E-.9'3 3 • .9'5213.0'341SE-.9'3 3.6625564.9'98E-.0'3 4.8834.9'8S464E-.9'3 
6.1.0'426.0'6831E-.0'3 7.3251128197E-83 8.5459649563E-.9'3 1.898766923.9'E-82 1.3429373583E-.0'2 
1.5871877776E-82 1.8312782.9'49E-82 2.319619.9'596E-82 2.8879599142E-.9'2 3.2963887689E-82 
3.7846416235E-82 4.7613233328E-82 5.7388.0'58421E-82 6.7146867514E-82 7.6913684687E-.9'2 
9.6447318792E-.0'2 1.1598.0'95298E-.9'1 1.3551458716E-81 1.55.9'4822135E-81 1.9411548972E-.9'1 
2.33182758B9E-Bl 2.7225B.0'2646E-.0'l 3.1131729484E-Bl 3.8945183158E-Bl 4.6758636832E-.0'l 
5.4572B93487E-Bl 6.2385547161E-.0'l 7.8.0'1245451.0'E-.0'l 9.3639361858E-.0'l I.B926626921E+.9'.0' 
1.2489317656E+B.0' 1.5614699125E+.0'II 1.874.0'.9'8.0'595E+.0'.0' 2.1865463257E+.0'.0' 2.499.0'844727E+.0'.0' 
3. 12416.0'7666E+B.0' 3.749237.0'6.0'5E+.0'.0' 4.3743133545E+.0'.0' 4.9993896484E+8.0' 6.2495422363E+.0'.0' 
7.4996948242E+.0'.9' 8.7498474121E+.0'.0' 1 • .9'.9'BB.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'E+.0'1 
1 • .0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'BE+.0'8 9.9999952316E-.9'1 9.999988.0'791E-.9'1 9.9999815226E-.0'l 9.999974378.0'E-81 
9.9999624491E-.0'l 9. 99994874.0'.0'E-.0'l 9.9999368191E-.9'1 9.9999272823E-Bl 9.9999.9'16523E-.0'l 
9.999876.0'223E-.0'l 9.99985.0'3923E-Bl 9.99982655.0'5E-.9'1 9.9997776747E-81 9.9997258186E-.9'1 
9.9996745586E-Bl 9.999627471.0'E-Bl 9.9995267391E-Bl 9.9994283915E-.0'l 9.99933.0'.0'438E-Bl 
9.9992269278E-.0'l 9.999.0'284443E-.0'l 9.99882698.0'6E-81 9.9986279.0'I1E~.0'1 9.9984312.0'57E-.0'l 
9.998B3.0'6625E-Bl 9.9976325.0'35E-.0'l 9.9972343445E-.0'l 9.9968338.0'13E-.0'l 9. 996.0'38.0'793E-.0'l 
9.9952375889E-.0'l 9.994443655.0'E-.0'l 9.9936449528E-.0'l 9. 992.0'5.0'5285E-.0'l 9.99.0'4584885E-.0'l 
9.9888628721E-.0'l 9.987272.0'242E-.0'l 9.984.0'849638E-.0'l 9.98.0'9.0'.0'2876E-.0'l 9.9777162.0'75E-.0'l 
9.97453.0'9353E-.0'l 9.9681681395E-.0'l 9.9618.0'9516.0'E-.0'l 9.955455.0'648E-.0'l 9.9491.0'41899E-.0'l 
9.936413765.0'E-.0'l 9.9237394333E-.0'l 9.911.0'82983.0'E-.0'l 9.898443222.0'E-.0'l 9.8732.0'72115E-.0'l 
9.848.0'373621E-.0'l 9.8229336739E-.0'l 9.79789.0'1863E-81 
Q( B, 13 .9') 
• 13.13 FOR ALL TIME STEPS. 
P( .0'. B. 1) 
B • .9'B.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'.0'E+.0'.0' 3.2962987895E-.0'9 6.5925958.0'26E-.0'9 9.8888772726E-.9'9 1.318518.0'.0'59E-.0'8 
1.97777279.0'.0'E-.0'8 2.637.0'255313E-.0'8 3.29628.0'9371E-.0'8 3.9555335.0'.0'7E-.9'8 5.274.0'2868.0'4E-.0'8 
6.5925256365E-.0'8 7.911.0'.0'94475E-.0'8 9.229484B215E-.0'8 1.1866417537E-.9'7 1.45.0'331B368E-.0'7 
(CONTINUATION OF SUBRUN 2 DATA NOT LISTED) 
,', 'I '. '~ 
GJ 
I 
..... 
\.0 
• , ~ 
SUM MAR Y I N FOR MAT ION I 
Q SUM • 
B.B999999999E+9B 4.6196648937E-12 2.7479836115E-ll 7.3925719479E-ll 1.3997712711E-19 
3.2846494968E-19 5.7364963499E-18 8.5982443387E-19 1.1754348696E-89 1.8642647426E-99 
2.5981739191E-89 3.3552958199E-99 4.1246219773E-99 5.6794315917E-99 7.2415933969E-99 
8.8957126935E-89 1.9379454717E-98 1.3599236484E-98 1.6639632871E-88 1.9761449366E-98 
2.2892326257E-98 2.9154824972E-88 3.5415789476E-98 4.1677363782E-88 4.7938993229E-98 
6.9462179381E-98 7.2985298988E-98 8.5598141912E-98 9.8939959359E-98 1.2397621944E-97 
1.48121B3188E-B7 1.7316638958£-87 1.9829926411E-97 2.4829564945£-97 2.9838993882E-97 
3.4846268633E-97 3.9854324996E-97 4.9869998925E-97 5.9884723669E-97 6.9898899348E-97 
7.9912199641E-97 9.9936469174E-97 1.1995781596E-96 1.3997614587E-96 1.5999145262E-96 
2.9B91298253E-96 2.4892242753E-96 2.8991979894E-96 3.2898482496E-96 3.9993856262E-96 
4.7982348496E-96 5.5965947467E-96 6.3944644353E-86 
P* SUM • 9.8999999899E+89 5.4636653241E-16 2.1855184339E-15 4.9175217731E-15 8.7424845466E-15 
1.9671457592E-14 3.4973965432E-14 5.4648914494E-14 7.8696767256E-14 1.3991889285E-13 
2.1864218877E-13 3.1487366967E-13 4.2861764485E-13 7.9866126552E-13 1.8588139859E-12 
1.4791B82855E-12 1.9695911568E-12 3.1612583645E-12 4.6341272833E-12 6.3885112478E-12 
8.4247979798E-12 1.3343787889E-l1 1.9393848798E-l1 2.6577346227E-l1 3.4896888727E-l1 
5.4953278839E-l1 7.9583124812E-l1 1.9888598586E-18 1.4264173176E-19 2.2423967569E-19 
3.2459825369E-18 4.4363249859E-19 5.8176941762E-19 9.1566182414E-19 1.3274764621E-99 
1.8184672657E-89 2.3898958368E-89 3.7791116992E-99 5.5952167269E-99 7.5782997655E-99 
1.9898444748E-98 1.5989152313E-88 2.3598811963E-98 3.2659731896E-98 4.3518212322E-98 
7.9678799198E-88 1.9564723141E-97 1.4995222656E-97 2.9152879188E-97 3.3624664297E-97 
5.1484778396E-97 7.4236572889E-97 1.8238198953E-96 
Q SUM + p* SUM -
8.9989898998E+98 4.6282113316E-12 2.7482821867E-ll 7.3938638154E-l1 1.3998587912E-18 
3.2848462839E-18 5.7367568782E-18 8.5987985685E-19 1.1755135754E-89 1.8644846387E-99 
2.598391724BE-99 3.3556186782E-89 4. 1259595234E-89 5.6891493581£-B9 7.2425621856E-99 
8.8871914296E-99 1.9372424697E-98 1.3593397511E-98 1.6635267386E-98 1.9767837145E-88 
2.2988751517E-98 2.9167368965E-98 3.5435193748E-98 4.1793941633E-98 4.7973891526E-98 
6.8517123757E-98 7.3964789774E-98 8.5616946421E-88 9.8173699894E-88 1.2338945251E-87 
1.4844553675E-97 1.7368992495E-87 1.9879192898E-87 2.4921121167E-87 2.9978749438E-87 
3.5B28198414E-97 4.8893314624~-97 5.8247828127E-B7 6.8435246496E-87 7.8656631124E-87 . 
8.9912951717E-87 1.8153447647E-86 1.2239789252E-86 1.4324122948E-96 1.6434247527E-86 
2.B7B8884776E-86 2.5958714973E-B6 2.9492493923E-96 3.4BI5778325E-86 4.3356321839E-B6 
5.3138825198E-86 6.3389687921E-86 7.4J82835396E-86 
K 
STAGE 
FAILURES 
B 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
PORTION OF UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY 
FAULT HANDLING AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES 
HAVE FAILED BY 1.9988E+91 HOURS 
6.3944644353E-86 X X X X 
X 
PORTION OF UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY 
EXHAUSTION OF MODULES OF EXACTLY K 
STAGES FAILING BY I.8BB8E+81 HOURS 
B.BBBB9B8899E+98 
1.9238188679E-96 
3.3597476472E-13 
3.7764349255E-29 
1.3123358863E-27 
8.8BBB988B89E+B8 
TOTAL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT IS.S HOURS. 7.41828363S6E-S6 
EXAMPLE PROBLEM 8 
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
Example 8 combines a critical-pair tree model based on example 7 with a system 
tree that incorporates stage redundancy. Since an analog computer is redundant 
to the digital computers, a critical-pair failure in the digital computers will 
not cause system failure. However, since the analog computer uses the computer 
bus, a critical-pair failure in the bus will cause system failure. 
This example will also include a full single-fault model and adds a cri tical-
pair intermittent model. The data for the latter model is given by the single-
fault model and requires no further user input. The inclusion of an 
intermittent model in the single fault model (cO 0, 8> 0) in conjunction with 
a critical-pair tree allows the reliability assessment to take into account the 
effects of latent intermittents that can form critical pairs. More on this 
later.' Single point failure for the computer stage is defined, but not for the 
bus stage, C = 1.0 for bus stage. 
FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM OF SYSTEM 
DIG COMP srG 3 
N-4. K-2 
Bus STG 7 
IIRSI • ., DIG COMPI N-4. M-2 ACT STG 6 
N-3. Ha 2 
STG 1 IIRSI • Na 3. H-2 I DIG COMPi ACT 1------
I IRS] • ---- --... -
I DIG COMPl ACT I-----~I-o IPRSI • I I I 
I Force I Sum IPRSI I DIG COMPI I_~ ___ J STG 2 • ACT Voting N-3, M-2 
switch 
IPRSI • STG 4 N-M .. l ANALOG Analog Comp STG 5 COMP N-M-l . 
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~ 
.. 
SYSTEM FAILURE CRITERIA: 
The system fails if the inertial reference, pitch rate, actuator stage, or bus 
stage fails, or the digital computer stage fails and the analog computer or 
transfer switch fails. 
The system fails if a critically coupled failure occurs in the bus stage. 
The inertial reference stage fails if 2 out of 3 modules fail. The computer 
stage fails if 3 out of 4 modules fail. The secondary actuator fails if 2 out 
of 3 modules fail. The bus stage fails if 2 out o£ 3 modules fail. 
INPUT DATA FOR FAILURE OCCURRENCE MODEL 
Parametric Data 
inertial reference sensor module 
pitch rate sensor module 
digital computer module (permanent) 
digital computer module (transient) 
digital computer module (intermittent) 
secondary actuator module 
analog computer module 
transfer switch 
bus module (permanent) 
bus module (transient) 
bus module (intermittent) 
G-21 
Exponential 
A. :: 1.5 x 10-5 
l. 
10-5 A = 1.9 x p 
10-4 A ::I 4.8 x 
c 
10-3 \t 
:: 7.2 x 
A . :: 3.3 x 10-4 
Cl. 
10-5 As :: 3.7 x 
Aa = 2.3 x 10-
9 
\c= 1.7 x 10-10 
Ab :: 2.7 x 10-
6 
Abt :: 6.2 x 10-
4 
Abi :: 3.7 x 10-
5 
~STIMT~E 
LOSS OF SYSTEM 
CONTROL 
INPUT DATA FOR SINGLE FAULT MODEL PA~~TRIC DATA 
Self-test rate o(t) = 360 detections/hour for computer, oCt) a 1.0 X 104 for 
bus 
Random test = exponential detection times for both 
Error detection rate E(t) = 3600 detection/hour for computer, £(t) = 0.0 for 
bus 
Random test = exponential 
Error recovery probability C = 1.0 for computer, C = 1.0 for bus 
Error generation rate pet) = 180 errors/hour for computer, pet) = 0.0 for bus 
Random pattern = exponential 
G-22 
.' 
.. 
Transient duration rate a ~ 3.6 x 
Intermittent duratio'n rate a· 2.1 
Intermittent benign to active rate 
Retire module (fault) probability 
Retire module (error) probability 
4 .. 
10 (exponential) 
x 103 (exponential 
a ~ 3.0 x 103 (exponential) 
P A • 1.0 
P :II 0.0 B 
See figure 2.2 for the single fault-handling model, 
G-23 
same for 
both 
CRITICAL-PAIR TREE. 
The critical-pair treJdo~~ not include a gate for critical-pair failures in 
th~ computer stage ~ecause the analog computer is redundant to the digital 
computer stage. In other words, the 10s8 of the digital computer stage, for 
whatever cause, will not cause system failure. The analog computer stage 
doesn't contribute a critical-pair gate linking the c-bus to the analog 
computer because the loss of the analog computer aft"er a loss of the digital 
computer stage will cause system failure, irrespective of the bus failure. 
Only critical-pair failures in the bus stage will cause system failure. 
LOSS OF SYSTEM 
CONTROL DUE TO 
RITICAL PAIR BUS 
FAILURE 
C-BU8 
2/4 within 
1 2 3 4 
stage 
critical pair 
3 in-use buses subject to critical-pair failures 
1 hot spare not subject to critical-pair failures 
The double intermittent fault model is invoked in the bus stage because the bus 
stage has intermittents defined and also a critical-pair failure tree (see fig. 
C-l for double fault-handling). If an intermittent failure goes benign (see 
single-fault model) and another failure occurs that is critically coupled to 
the benign failure (critical-pair tree defined the linking), the double 
intermittent fault model is entered at state A28,. Entry into state A 8 is the inverse order case. Detection of the active fault takes the syste~ €o the 
detected state where the faulty active unit is purged. If the active fault 
at states A28, or A,82 goes benign then state 8,82 is entered. 
The last case takes the system to the failure state from A,B l or AlB2 if the benign fault goes active or the active fault generates errors, or i1 the 
active fault is detected as nonpermanent (intermittent or transient). The 
failure condition occurs only if a critical-pair tree was defined and the 
single-fault model contains an intermittent fault model. 
lThe NOP(I,7)=3 specification overrides the 2/4 gate specification; effectively 
deleting module 4 as an input and treating the 2/4 gate as a 2/3 gate. In this case, 
a 2/3 gate with inputs 1, 2, and 3 would be equivalent to the above representation. 
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Cl 
I 
N 
l/1 
~ 
SFL TTVP 
NFTVPS-S, 
ALP· B.B , 
BET= B.B , 
• DEL'"' 1 .BBBBBBE+B6, 
RHO= B.B 
EPS- B.B 
IDELF- 1 
IRHOF= 1 
IEPSF- 1 
MARKOV- 1 
B.B 
H.H 
36B.H 
ISH.B 
36.0'.0' • .0' 
1 
1 
1 
H.B 
.0'.H 
IBHBH.f1 
H.f1 
.0'.ff 
I 
1 
1 
PA- 1.H, loB 1.H 
PB- H.H, B.H , H.B 
C- I.H I.H 1.B 
DBLDF- B.SBBHBHE-BIJTRUNC- B.IBBBBHE-H3, CVPRNT-F,CVPLOT-F,IAXSCV·· 2$ 
SSTAGES 
NSTGES-7, 
N - 3, 3, 4, I, I, 3, 4, 
M - 2, 2, 2, I, I, 2, 2, 
LCD H~ H, B, B, B, H, H, 
NOP(1.l"-3, IRLPCu=4, 
RLPlOT"F SFLTCAT 
NFCATS-l,I,3 i l,l.1,3, JTVP ( I , I J - , 
,IAXSRl-2$ 
JTVP(I,2)- I, JTVP(I,3)- 4, 5, 2, 
JTVP(l,4)· I, 
JTVP(I,S)- I, 
JTVP(I,6)· I, JTVP(1 17). 4, OMG (1, ) .. OMG(l,Z)" OMG(l,3)" OMG(I,4)-OMG(l,S)-
OMG(I,6)-
S1. 3, 
1 • III 
I.B 
l.ff 
1..0' 
I.B 1.B , 
I.H , 
l.B 
l.B 
EXAMPLE ~ INPUT 
NA}ffiLIST FOR}fAT 
loS 
l.B 
36BBB.B 
B.B 
36B.B 
lSB.B 
36BB.S 
1 
1 
1 
l.H 
B.B 
l.B 
OMG ( 1,7)· 
RLM<1,I)" 
RLM(l,2)" 
RLM(I,3)" 
RLM(I,4)-
RLM(I,S)-
RLM(l~6)­
RLM(l,7)· 
1.S.9'BBHBE-BS, 
1.9BBBH.0'E-BS, 
7.2HHHHf1E-H3, 
1.7HBBBBE-IB, 
2.3Bf1f1Hf1E-f19, 3.7HHf1f1f1E-HS, 
6.2.9'BBHBE-B4, 
3.3BBHBHE-B4, 4.BBBBBHE-B4, 
S 
SRNTIME 
3.7BBBBBE-B5, 2.7BSBBBE-B6. 
FT- IH.BBBB tITBASE-l, SVSFlG-T,CPlFlG- , 
NSTEPS- 5H 
PSTRNC= B.IBBBBBE-13 QPTRNC- B.IBSBBBE-BlS 
SVSTEH TREE EX B 
1 7 B IB 
B 0 4 5 
9 A 3 S 
IB 0 1 2 9 6 7 
CRITICAL PAIRS TREE EX B 
1 .. S 5 
7 1 4 
S 2 1 23 .. 
2US .B 3BBB.B 
36f1.f1 
lBB.f1 36HH.B 
1 
1 
1 
loB 
B.B 
l.B 
, " 
t;") 
I 
N 
0\ 
B.B, B.B, 
S.B, B.S. 
I.BE+6, 36S.B, 
B.B, ISS.B, 
B.B, 36BS.B, 
1 , 1 • 
1 , 1 , 
1 , . 1 , 
l.S, 1.B, 
B.S, B.S. 
5, B.B, 
.0'.B. 
1BBB.0' . .0'. 
.0'.B. 
B . .0'. 
1 • 
1 , 
1 , 
1..0'. 
.0' • .0'. 
EXAMPLE 3 INPUT 
LIST-DIRECTED FOR}~T 
36.0'.0'.0' • .0', 
B . .0' • 
36.0' • .0'. 
18.0' • .0', 
36BB.B, 
1 • 
1 , 
1 • 
2lBS.B, 
3.0'BB.S, 36B.S, 
18.0'.B. 
36BB.B, 
1 , 
1 , 
1 , 
I.Bl 1.BA B.SS. .BE-"I.F LSE., 
7, 3, 3, 4, 1, • 3, ", 
2J. 2, 2, 1, 1. 2. 2. 
3..,* 
1 • .0' • 
.FALSE. , 
1.B, 
.0' • .0', 
1 .S, 
2, 1. I 
1.B. 
.0' • .0', 
1.S, 
3, 4*, 
B, B~ B~ S, B. B. 1iJ. 
" •• tAL;:,E., 21 
1, 1, 3. 1, 1, 1, 3. 
1 • 1 • 
4, 5. 
4, 
3. 
5. 2, 1. 1 , 1 , 
11*1..0'. 1.5E-S, 1.9E-S. 7.2E-3, 3.3E-4. ".BE-t, 1.7E-1S, 2.3E-9, 3.7E-5, 
6.2E-4 i 3.7E-S. 2.7E-61 1B.lIt SBt .L .TRUE., .TRUE., , loBE-14, • B.Bl, , ,I SYS EM REc EX 8 
1 7 B 1B 
80" 5 
9 A 3 8 
1B 0 1 2 9 6 7 CRITICAL PAIRS TREE EX B 
1 455 
714 
521 23" 
" 
c;") 
I 
N 
...... 
.. 
ccccc 
c 
C 
c CCCCC 
A 
A A A A 
A AAA A A A 
RRRR R R RRRR 
R R 
R R 
EEEEE 
E 
EEE 
E 
EEEEE 
. IIIIIIIIIIIIlII 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
IIIIIIIIIIIIIII 
STAGE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE AT IB.H HOURS 
NUMBER GIVEN PERFECT FAULT HANDLING 
1 
2 
3 
" 5 6 
7 
SUBRUN 
NUMBER 
------
1 
2 
6.748311E-B8 
1.B82658E-B7 
2.B874B3E-B6 
1.699999E-B9 
2.299998E-B8 
4.1H4468E-.0'7 
2.5BB596E-IH 
STARTING ENDING STAGE STAGE NUMBER NUMBER 
-------- ------
1 6 
7 7 
INVOLVES CR ITICALLY COUPLED UNITS 
-------------
F 
T 
sue C E S S F U L E X E CUT ION 0 F CAR E I N. 
f. 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
VI ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I til :: = 
~ ~ 
z: I I ~ lSI lSI ~ 
I ILl VI ~ 
= 
lSI lSI lSI 
::>1 ~ ILl ~ IJt ~ til 
I ~ . 
IDi:I ~ 
-
.... ... 
I 
~I ~ 
~ 
-
~ 
= 
~ ~ ~ 
til t til ~ IDi: &...1 
-' 
= 
~ lSI 
I Cdl t t ~ t W 01 lSI I lSI ~ I U1 a.. I til lSI ~ ~ 
~ -II lSI a:I 
· 
. . . 
I lSI lSI lSI til lSI 
w a:I 1 
I 
til < ). 
X 01 a:I :: 
= § ~ lSI < ~ 0 ~ lSI IDi: lSI ~ ~ ~ 
IDi: ::l IDi: 00(1 
= 
~ t t -:' 0 I 
= 
lSI 
00( X a.. Q.I ~ lSI ~ ~ 
a.. .... .... 
-
... ... 
~I til 
I + 
u..1 1.&1 
..... :: 
N ~ 
.... 
.... 
~ ~I ~I ~ M ~ M M I I ~ lSI ~ ~ 
a.. I Q.I + + + + + 
I lSI I ILl UJ UJ UJ ILl 
Q. UJ 1 U1 ILl I 
= 
lSI lSI ~ ~ 
I ~ lSI lSI lSI 
UJ 1-1 • ~ Ul lSI Ul Ul 
... I A . 
..................... ~ ~I ~ M lSI M M 
... 
-
I 
... ... ~ z: I 
N 
... ~ 
........... ~ .... 
'" ... ... UJ 0 
-
... 01 tQ N lSI N N 
-
Q. I til ~ lSI lSI ~ 
-
XI + + + + + 
....................... > I UJ UJ UJ ILl UJ 
... 
-
z: ",I ~ ~ lSI 
= 
t ~ 0 ~ lSI ~ CD lSI CD CD 
l-
· V ~ lSI 
:z: 
~ ::> 
u.. ,... 
UJ UJ -I 
UJ UJ 
UJ UJ UJ ::> > 
UJ UJ ILl I- -II Ul N .... N N 
UJI.&IUJUJUJ < 
-
I ~ lSI lSI ~ lSI 
~ UJ 1 + + + + + 
u.. z: I UJ UJ UJ UJ UJ 
UJ 01 ~ ~ lSI ~ lSI 
0 ~ lSI lSI ~ lSI 
'" '" 
~ .., lSI 
'" 
Ul 
a:: a:: 
'" · a:: 
'" 
UJ UJ ..... a:: .... M ... M M 
a:: a:: I-
'" 
0.:: 
'" 
< ::;) 
a:: a:: a:: a:: a:: a:: UJ 
< -I 0 z: 
'" 
UJ X 
> I- 1-1 t lsl ~ ~ M < UJ I lSI ~ ~ 
« '" 
I- ·UJ UJ 1 + + + + + 
> UJI/) a:: I UJ UJ UJ UJ UJ 
< ~ -I ..... - all lSI lSI lSI lSI ~ <00( O. I/) ..... .:;J UJ ~ lSI lSI lSI lSI < lSI a:: lSI lSI lSI ~ lSI 
< V z: UJ Q. 
< a:: a::x lSI !sl ~ ~ M < 0 0 01-
u.. u..O 
-
~ .... .... 
.... .... 
-I- UJ 
V V 
V V V I- Q.I ~ ~ ~ ~ M 
V V l- I tQ lSI ~ ~ ~ 
V V z: « 00( -I I + + + + + 
V V a:: • ILl UJ 
UJ UJ UJ 
VVV ::;) I a:: 00(, ~ ~ ~ ~ lSI 
= 
t ~ ~ '!' u.. a.. ~ Ul 
X 
UJ ~ lSI lSI M N 
« 
> a:: ",lSI 
" 
l- I • 
l- I-
~ UJ c.. 1 
a:: 
'" 
1 
z: D.. >. 
I .... N M ... U1 
ILl > 1-1 
I 
0 N I- -I 
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C':l 
I 
N 
\0 F A U L T 
SUB RUN 
S TAG E S 
CON F G U RAT ION I 
S TAG E N M 
2 
3 
~ 
5 
6 
V E C TOR S 
3 
3 
~ 
1 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
6 
F A U L T 
I CAT 
-------
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
l' 
I N FOR HA T ION I 
R L H o H G ;) T V P 
-------
I.SBBE-B5 1.BBE+BB 
1.9HHE-B5 I.BHE+HB 
7.2HlJE-H3 I.HBE+HH ~ 
3.3BBE-H4 l.lJBE+BlJ 5 
4.8HBE-B~ 1.lJBE+BH 2 
1.7BlJE-IS I.BBE+BB 1 
2.3lJBE-B9 1.BBE+BB 
3.7BlJE-lJ5 1.BBE+lJlJ 
TIMES AT WHICH THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION VALUES CORRESPOND (IN HOURS) I 
lJ.BlJBBHBBBBBE+BlJ 9.77B3956999E-B4 1.954B791~BHE-lJ3 2.93111871BBE-B3 3.9B815B2BBBE-B3 
4.BB519BBB2BE-B3 6.8392772228E-B3 8.7933568284E-B3 1.B7~7~36~34E-B2 1.27B1516B4BE-B2 
1.4655595645E-B2 1.B563754B57E-B2 2.2471914B68E-B2 2.63BBB73279E-B2 3.B2B823249BE-B2 
3.41963917B2E-B2 4.2BI271B124E-B2 4.9B29B2B547E-B2 5.7645346969E-B2 6.5461665392E-B2 
7.32779BBB09E-B2 B.B91B616934E-B2 I.B45432537BE-Bl 1.2BI75B9B62E-Bl 1.35BBB52747E-BI 
1.51441156B6E-Bl I.B27B643B55E-Bl 2.139717B424E-Bl 2.4523697793E-Bl 2.765B225163E-Bl 
3.B776751B41E-Bl 3.7B298B5779E-Bl 4.328286B51BE-Bl 4.9535915256E-Bl 5.5788969994E-Bl 
6.2B42B21751E-Bl 7.4548131227E-Bl B.7B5424B7B4E-Bl 9.956B35B18BE-Bl 1.12B6645966E+BB 
1.2457256317E+BB 1.495847B212E+BB 1.74597BBIB8E+BB 1.996B922BB3E+BB 2.2462143B9BE+BB 
2.49633646BIE+BB 2.9965BBB392E+BB 3.49682521B2E+BB 3.997B695972E+BB 4.4973139763E+BB 
4.9975581169E+BB 5.99BB46B75BE+BB 6.9985356331E+BB 7.999B243912E+BB 8.9995126724E+BB 
1.BBBBBBB954E+Bl 
WARNING - CRITICAL FAULT PAIR FILE "BXYFL" DOES 
CONTAIN DATA FOR THIS SUBRUN. ** 
P( B. B. B. B. B B) 
I.BHBBBBBBBBE+BB 9.9999648333E-Bl 
9.999819994BE-Bl 9.999744B921E-Bl 
9.9994528294E-Bl 9.9993B56B59E-Bl 
9.9987226725E-Bl 9.99843BB137E-BI 
9.9972617626E-Bl 9.9966794252E-Bl 
9.994338154BE-Bl 9.993171B958E-Bl 
9.98B49BB917E-Bl 9.98616B9936E-Bl 
9.9999272B23E-Bl 
9.9996721745E-Bl 
9.99916B17B6E-Bl 
9.9981355667E-Bl 
9.996B929155E-Bl 
9. 992.9'BB46B6E-Bl 
9.9B3B2BB678E-Bl 
9.999B9B3275E-Bl 
9.9995952B45E-Bl 
9.999B171194E-Bl 
9.9978452921E-Bl 
9.9955B8194BE-Bl 
9.99B8334B17E-Bl 
9.9814939499E-Bl 
(CONTINUATION OF SUBRUN 1 DATA NOT LISTED) 
9.999B569489E-Hl 
9.9995273352E-Bl 
9.9988657236E-Bl 
9.997555B175E-Bl 
9.9949228764E-Bl 
9.9B96627665E-Bl 
9.9791622162E-Bl 
c;) 
I 
w 
o 
SUB RUN 2 
S TAG E S 7 7 
CON FIG U RAT ION t F A U L T I N FOR MAT ION , 
S TAG E N M I CAT R L M o M G J T Y P 
------- -------
7 4 2 1 6.2.0'.0'E-.0'4 1 • .0'.0'E+.0'16 -4 
2 3.7B.0'E-.0'5 I.BBE+BB 5 
3 2.7BBE-B6 I.B16E+BB 3 
F A U LTV E C TOR S I 
TIMES AT WHICH THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION VALUES CORRESPOND (IN HOURS)I 
P( B) 
Q( B) 
, :~ , ) 
.0'.BBB.0'.0'B.0'B88E+.0'B 9.77.0'3956999E-.0'4 1.954B7914BBE-B3 2.93111B71816E-B3 3.9BB1582B.0'BE-B3 
4.BB519B16B2BE-B3 6.B39277222BE-B3 B.793356B2B4E-.0'3 1 • .0'747436434E-.0'2 1.27.0'1516.0'4BE-.0'2 
1.4655595645E-B2 I.B563754B57E-B2 2.2471914B6BE-B2 2.638B.0'73279E-B2 3.B28B23249BE-B2 
3.41963917.0'2E-.0'2 4.2BI271BI24E-82 4.9829B28547E-B2 5.7645346969E-B2 6.5461665392E-.0'2 
7.32779B16B89E-B2 8.B91B616934E-.0'2 1 • .0'454325378E-.0'l 1.2BI75891662E-.0'l 1.35BB852747E-Bl 
1.5144115686E-Bl 1.827B643855E-.0'l 2.139717B424E-.0'l 2.4523697793E-Bl 2.7658225163E-161 
3.8776751841E-.0'l 3.7.0'29B.0'5779E-81 4.328286B518E-.0'l 4.9535915256E-81 5.57B8969994E-.0'l 
6.2842.0'21751E-Bl 7.4548131227E-81 8.78542487B4E-Bl 9.95616358188E-81 1.12B6645966E+88 
1.2457256317E+8.0' 1.4958478212E+8B 1.74597BBIB8E+B.0' 1.996.0'922.0'83E+.0'.0' 2.2462143898E+B.0' 
2.49633646.0'IE+.0'.0' 2.99658.0'8392E+.0'8 3.4968252182E+B8 3.997.0'695972E+88 4.4973139763E+.0'8 
4.9975581169E+B8 5.998846875.0'E+8.0' 6.9985356331E+8.0' 7.999.0'243912E+.0'.0' 8.9995126724E+B.0' 
1 • .0'B.0'.0'B.0'B954E+Bl 
1.8BBB.0'8BB1616E+16B 9.9999976158E-161 9.9999976158E-161 9.9999952316E-Bl 9.9999952316E-161 
9.9999928474E-.0'l 9.999988B791E-Bl 9.9999856949E-.0'l 9.99998.0'9265E-.0'l 9.9999761581E-81 
9.999973774.0'E-81 9.9999642372E-81 9.9999594688E-Bl 9.9999523163E-.0'1 9.9999451637E-.0'l 
9.9999356278E-81 9.9999237861£-81 9.99998948.0'9E-81 9.9998927116E-81 9.9998784.0'65E-81 
9.9998664B56E-81 9.9998378754E-.0'1 9.9998B6881.0'E-81 9.99978.0'6549E-.0'l 9.9997528447E-81 
9. 999721.0'5.0'3E-81 9.9996662148E-.0'l 9. 9996.0'66.0'93E-.0'l 9.9995517731E-.0'l 9.9994897842E-81 
9.9994349488E-.0'l 9.9993285.0'7.0'E-81 9.9992836819E-81 9.999894.0'.0'94E-81 9.9989771843E-81 
9.9988627434E-81 9.9986314774E-81 9.9984849797E-.0'l 9.9981737137E-81 9.9979424477E-81 
9.9977159588E-.0'1 9.997253418.0'E-.0'l 9.9967956543E-.0'l 9.9963384867E-.0'l 9.99588.0'7238E-.0'l 
9.99542.0'5751E-81 9.9945.0'26636E-.0'l 9.9935853481E-Bl 9.9926686287E-.0'l 9.9917513132E-.0'l 
9.9988363819E-.0'l 9.9889987787E-.0'l 9.987167716.0'E-.0'l 9.985333.0'851E-.0'l 9.9834996462E-.0'l 
9.9816691875E-81 
B.B.0'8.0'.0'8.0'888E+.0'.0' 1.342237985.0'E-14 3.4676268267E-14 6.5828766968E-14 7.5639452655E-14 
9.625.0'163859E-14 1.3747156354E-13 1.7869295724E-13 2.1991433739E-13 2.6113567688E-13 
3 • .0'2357.0'1638E-13 3.8479966826E-13 4.6724223882E-13 5.4968475518E-13 6.3212721732E-13 
7.1456962526E-13 8.7945422429E-13 1 • .0'4433866.0'7E-12 1.289222826.0'E-12 1.3741B66661E-12 
1.53899.0'2894E-12 1.8687571.0'22E-12 2.1985228388E-12 2.5282874752E-12 2.868.0'512523E-12 
3.1878139451E-12 3.8473369456E-12 4.5.0'68562597E-12 5.16637167.0'8E-12 5.8258931787E-12 
(CONTINUATION Q} SUBRVN 2 DATA NOT LIS'l.'ED) 
,.:' 
" 
o 
I 
w 
,..... 
S U H MAR V I N FOR MAT ION I 
Q SUM • 9.888888B88BE+BB 3.54571617B2E-14 I.B982~8B834E-13 2.8484755927E-13 3.1653228216E-13 
4.48714~6796E-13 7.1686577985E-13 1.8147281885E-12 1.3267592328E-12 1.6466368618E-12 
1.9718882881E-12 2.6269281889E-12 3.2867878751E-12 3.9479934879E-12 4.6897888146E-12 
5.2716212472E-12 6.5955418218E-12 7.91947938B4E-12 9.2434957258E-12 1.8567568522E-ll 
1.1891658858E-ll 1.4539813797E-ll 1.7187988266E-ll 1.9836146614E-ll 2.2484314757E-ll 
2.5132484635E-ll 3.8428826125E-ll 3.5725172828E-ll 4.1821522984E-l1 4.6317888887E-l1 
5.161~237198E-l1 6.2266968743E-l1 7.2799717643E-l1 8.3392488421E-ll 9.3985278955E-ll 
1.8457867537E-18 1.2576373276E-IS 1.4694946648E-18 1.6813528347E-18 1.8932115597E-IS 
2.165676B399E-16 2.5287918981E-18 2.9525154543E-18 3.3762423413E-18 3.7999726837E-18 
a:~~rI:~~~~~~:l: r::I§~f~~~l~~:j~ r:r~~r~g~~~~~:j~ r:~~~g~§f~~~~:j~ I:~~~r~~~~~f~:jg 
1.6936987368E-89 
P* SUM • S.8S88S88SS6E+66 5.5987632675E-15 2.2395675693E-14 5.8388844844E-14 8.9588252938E-14 
1.3996989181E-13 2.7433963364E-13 4.5358683858E-13 6.7745189652E-13 9.4619223481E-13 
1.2597232285E-12 2.8211575469E-12 2.9617484688E-12 4.S815842318E-12 5.38S4183331E-12 
6.8584938876E-12 1.8352135815E-l1 1.4562399897E-l1 1.9489318145E-l1 2.5132885356E-l1 
3.1493116283E-ll 4.6363433925E-l1 6.4168433295E-ll 8.4783986888E-ll 1.8817396284E-18 
1.3451878813E-18 1.9578377888E-18 2.6852348123E-18 3.5272931798E-18 4.4848176817E-18 
5.5554865848E-16 8.8421638466E-18 1.6987589727E-89 1.4391688952E-69 1.8254416867E-89 
2.2575836756E-89 3.2594633659E-89 4.4448187417E-69 5.8136238846E-89 7.3659S65514E-89 
9.1816492121E-89 1.3123568616E-68 1.7879358438E-68 2.3369868458E-88 2.9592639458E-88 
3.6558172666E-88 5.2666955241E-88 7.1719483685E-88 9.3767811288E-88 1.1863281621E-87 
1.4649199898E-87 2.1162623595E-67 2.8729249379E-87 3.7531623622E-87 4.7587262479E-87 
5.8658127955E-67 
Q SUM + P* SUH -6.8668866886E+86 4.1655924123E-14 1.3221987835E-13 2.5523639734E-13 4.66112535B9E-13 
5.8668355896E-13 9.9848545738E-13 1.4682261852E-12 2.8642183827E-12 2.5928282958E-12 
3.2368634286E-12 4.6486857357E-12 6.2485355432E-12 8.8294988734E-12 9.9981267814E-12 
1.2138115488E-l1 1.6947677636E-l1 2.2481879286E-l1 2.8732814739E-ll 3.5788~53618E-ll 
4.3384761861E-ll 6.6963247723E-l1 8.1288~13586E-l1 1.8454813349E-18 1.3865827587E-16 
1.5964318756E-18 2.2621268428E-16 3.842~865485E-18 3.9375883749E-18 4.9471965413E-16 
6.8715427138E-18 8.6642326647E-18 1.1715587389E-89 1.5225614183E-89 1.9194278617E-89 
2.3621617995E-89 3.3852272697E-89 4.5917683853E-69 5.9817598881E-89 7.5552275547E-89 
9.3121563793E-89 1.3376439512E-88 1.8174618261E-88 2.3786693497E-88 2.9972635929E-88 
3.6972544137E-88 5.3174873145E-68 7.2311351573E-88 9.4384425688E-88 1.1939337696E-87 
1.~733811327E-87 2.1263585732E-87 2.8847762223E-87 3.7666498816E-87·~.7659679581E-87 
5.8827498666E-87 
K STAGE 
FAILURES 
8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
PORTION or UNRELIABILITV CAUSED BV 
FAULT HANDLING AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES 
HAVE FAILED BY 1.8866E+61 HOURS 
1.6936987368E-S9 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
PORTION OF UNRELIABILITV CAUSED BY 
EXHAUSTION OF MODULES OF EXACTLY K STAGES FAILING BY 1.8868E+Sl HOURS 
8.S686888S66E+88 
5.8657963189E-S7 
1.7369658665E-12 
2.5816965786E-19 
1.357S143988E-26 
2.1278726398E-34 
8. 866888S866E+S6 
6.SS66888688E+8S 
TOTAL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT 16.8 HOURS· 5.8827498666E-87 
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